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This podcast has
214 episodes
Language
EnglishPublisher
Tony BradleyExplicit
No
Date created
2018/02/07
Latest episode
2026/11/18
Average duration
46 min.
Release period
11 days
Description
The TechSpective Podcast brings together top minds in cybersecurity, enterprise tech, AI, and beyond to share unique perspective on technology—unpacking breakthrough trends like zero trust, threat intelligence, AI-enabled security, ransomware’s geopolitical ties, and more. Whether you’re an IT pro, security exec, or simply tech‑curious, each episode blends expert insight with real-world context—from microsegmentation strategies to the human side of cyber ethics. But we also keep it fun, sometimes riffing on pop‑culture debates like Star Wars vs. Star Trek or Xbox vs. PS—so it’s not all dry and serious.
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The Hidden Cost of AI Pen Testing
2026/11/18
Years ago, my mother-in-law had a computer that seemed to catch every virus making the rounds. She had two or three different anti-malware products running at the same time, and she still got infected on a regular basis. I wasn't running anything, and I wasn't getting infected. Stacking more security tools on that machine didn't make her any safer, but it did give her more pop-ups.
AI-powered penetration testing has a version of that same trap built into it. Vendors keep rolling out agentic pen testing tools, and they're getting very good at finding things. That's where the cost nobody puts on the price sheet starts to pile up.
Why Security Teams Want AI Pen Testing
Companies used to be able to make a rough guess at how fast the attack surface would change, because a certain number of developers could only write so much code. AI coding tools have thrown that math out the window. Applications now change faster than security teams can keep up, and the traditional pen test hasn't kept pace.
Most organizations test their crown jewel applications once or twice a year. That leaves all the releases in between, plus the other 400 or 500 applications and assets that never got crown jewel treatment. Historically, that long tail got a scanner and a crossed finger or two.
Braden Russell, CTO at Bugcrowd, told me that AI agents have raised the floor on what automation can detect by orders of magnitude. Agents can run broad testing across that whole long tail and return deeper, higher-quality results than legacy scanners ever did. They also don't sleep, and they can keep threat models current in a CI/CD world where a new build ships every day.
Somebody Has to Validate the Findings
All that breadth comes with a lot of noise, though. Most security pros have chased a suspicious file down a rabbit hole, pushing it to VirusTotal and digging through it, only to find out it was harmless the whole time. Multiply that by thousands of AI-generated findings, and you get a sense of the problem.
Russell, who has also written about the hidden cost of agentic pentesting, pointed out something the market doesn't talk about much. Many of these platforms proved themselves by climbing leaderboards on bug bounty and vulnerability disclosure programs, and those programs already had a triage layer between the agent and the customer. When a company just licenses the AI tool on its own, that layer goes away, and the job lands on the security team. Instead of a force multiplier, Russell said, "it's just giving me a whole lot more work."
His suggestion is to ask a vendor what happens between an agent finding something and your team seeing it. If the answer amounts to dumping raw findings in your lap, then by his description, "you're paying to be the validation layer for that platform." Bugcrowd's approach with Savant Pathseeker, its agentic pentesting product, is to run findings through the same human and automated triage process it uses for its bug bounty programs.
The human-in-the-loop argument has a flip side, too. If you could validate every AI result by hand, you wouldn't need the AI in the first place. The USDA doesn't inspect every pound of ground beef. It spot-checks samples and makes a call on the batch. Validating AI findings is going to look a lot more like that, so somebody has to decide what gets checked and how.
Building It Yourself Costs More Than the Model
Some security teams figure they have access to the same frontier models as everyone else, so why not wire up a harness and build their own? Russell says teams learn a lot by doing it. The model is the easy part, though.
Somebody has to manage credentials at multiple permission levels, because the unauthenticated attack surface is a small slice of the whole thing. Logging in through an SSO or identity provider can send the agent out to someone else's infrastructure, and suddenly the agent may be testing systems you don't own. Staging and production are rarely as identical as people like to think, and plenty of breach-causing misconfigurations only exist in production.
Maintenance adds up, too. Every new model release means checking whether the results are still as good as they were last time. Running a frontier model for recon and report writing also burns money on routine work that a cheaper model could handle. "There's a whole lot more to the car around the engine," Russell said.
Where Humans Still Fit
Agents still struggle with intent. An agent can tell you an endpoint accepts negative numbers, and it can tell you the app issues refunds, but it may not connect those two facts into a refund for something nobody bought. Regulated environments and audits also still want a person's name on the report.
I expect that balance to shift over time. The first time I used adaptive cruise control, I kept my hands right next to the wheel, and now I'm perfectly happy riding in a Waymo. AI pen testing will earn more trust as it proves itself, but humans will keep finding novel attacks first and teaching them to the AI later.
Russell considers AI the best tool available right now for offensive testing, and testers who ignore it are putting themselves at a disadvantage. The license fee just isn't the whole bill, though, and the part missing from the invoice usually lands on the security team's plate.
Check out the full TechSpective Podcast episode here:
Steering Autonomous Agents Toward the Safe Route
2026/11/11
If you’ve driven a newer car with lane-keeping assist, you know how it feels. You drift a little toward the line, and the steering wheel pushes back just enough to nudge you back into your lane. It doesn’t take the wheel away from you, and it doesn’t make you ask permission every time you want to change lanes. It knows where the road is and keeps you from wandering off of it while you’re still doing 70 on the highway.
That’s close to what organizations need from security for autonomous AI agents, and it’s a lot harder to build than it sounds. Yuval Zacharia, co-founder and CEO of Bay Security, joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about what it takes to let agents move at full speed without ending up in a ditch.
Agents Go Wrong Without Being Compromised
Most of the security stack assumes there’s an adversary somewhere. Firewalls, endpoint protection, and identity management were all built to keep bad guys out or catch them using stolen credentials. Agents complicate that picture, because an agent can do something harmful while working exactly as designed. As Yuval put it, “They don’t have to be compromised in order to go wrong.”
Give an agent a vague prompt and broad permissions, and it’ll often take the shortest path to finishing the job, even when that path is something no security person would approve. And agents usually have broad permissions, because they inherit them from the user who installed them. That means access to files you forgot existed, secrets stored on the machine, and whatever SaaS apps you’re signed into.
Attackers have noticed this as well, and an agent that reads your email on your behalf will also read instructions someone hid inside a message, and it may act on them. Identity and access management has spent years sorting out who has access to what, and agents add another layer on top of that, which is whether a given action should be happening right now, given what the person actually asked for.
Approving Every Step Doesn’t Scale
Keeping a human in the loop sounds like a reasonable safety net, and it makes a nice sound bite, but the whole reason to use AI is that it moves faster than people can, and if a human has to sign off on every tool call and every file access, you’ve slowed the whole thing back down to human speed.
Anyone who’s clicked through a cookie consent banner knows how this plays out, because nobody reads them and everybody clicks “accept all.” Approval prompts for agents end up the same way.
Blocking AI tools outright doesn’t work any better. I remember when companies banned Dropbox and personal Gmail, and employees just found another tool. AI is the same game of whack-a-mole, only worse, because there are always more models, plugins, and connectors than any security team can keep up with, and AI is now built into the software companies already use.
Guardrails That Ride Along
With approval prompts and blocking both falling short, Bay’s approach is to steer the agent instead, with guardrails inside the agent’s session, in line and in real time, wherever the agent happens to be running. That could be a coding assistant on a developer’s laptop or a long-running agent on a cloud server that keeps working after everyone has gone home.
Bay’s platform is designed to understand the organization’s policies and the intent behind the original request, then compare that against what the agent is actually doing. If someone asks an agent to summarize their inbox and it starts gathering credentials from the machine, the actions don’t line up with the request. That’s the moment to nudge the agent back into its lane or stop it entirely, before anything leaves the building, instead of chasing an alert after the fact.
The guardrails also need to fit the work. What’s normal for a developer’s coding agent might be a red flag for an agent working in finance, so a single policy for everyone either blocks too much or misses too much. Yuval expects a future where each employee runs dozens of agents, many of them without anyone watching in real time, and that only works if the steering happens automatically.
Reasoning about intent is hard, though. A system that guesses wrong too often will flood people with false alarms and bring back the same approval fatigue it was supposed to fix.
Where to Start
Yuval’s advice for organizations starts with finding out which agents and tools people are already using, along with the ones they should be using but aren’t. She suggested security teams “influence the AI adoption and not just be there and observe it.” From there, check how those agents are configured, get rid of plaintext credentials sitting where an agent can grab them, and sandbox what you can. Then put guardrails in place that can tell whether what an agent is doing matches what it was asked to do.
Agents are already running across most businesses whether security teams sanctioned them or not, so the controls around them have to work at the same speed the agents do.
Bay Comes Out of Stealth With $50 Million
Bay officially emerged from stealth this week, about nine months after it was founded. The company has raised $50 million so far, which includes a $37 million Series A led by Battery Ventures and a previously undisclosed $13 million seed round led by YL Ventures and Striker Venture Partners. Micron Ventures, M12 (Microsoft’s venture fund), and Wiz CEO Assaf Rappaport also took part in the Series A.
The company says dozens of enterprises already use the platform, including Micron, Peloton, ClickUp, and Wix. According to the company, it can roll out AI governance and enforcement across employee devices, cloud infrastructure, and SaaS applications in under five minutes, without adding a persistent endpoint agent, a kernel driver, or a network proxy. Bay says it evaluates each proposed agent action against the context of the full session and decides locally, in milliseconds, whether to let it proceed. Instead of relying on security teams to write rules for every new agent or tool, the platform learns from the organization’s own agent activity and adjusts its policies as new agents and workflows come online.
Zacharia co-founded Bay with CPO Aner Morag, who was previously VP of Product at Noname Security, and VP of R&D Boris Danilovich, who led a 90-person engineering department at CrowdStrike. The company plans to use the funding to grow its product and engineering teams and to expand its sales, marketing, and customer teams in the United States and Europe.
Earning Trust in the Age of AI Agents
2026/11/04
Every time Claude stops in the middle of a task to ask permission to open a file or read an email, I get two choices. I can allow it once, or I can allow it always. I click "allow once" pretty much every time. I understand that "allow always" would make things smoother down the road, but it also opens the door to the kind of mistake you can't take back, and I'm not ready to hand over that much on faith.
Businesses are facing the same decision, just on a much bigger scale. Rishi Bhargava, co-founder of Descope, joined me on a recent episode of the TechSpective Podcast, and our conversation kept circling back to how much access an AI agent should get, and how it earns more.
Lessons From Driver-Assist Technology
Rishi compared it to the evolution of driver-assist technology, which is an analogy I've used myself. The first time you turn on adaptive cruise control, you don't let the car roll up on the bumper in front of you while you check your phone. Your foot hovers over the brake while the car proves itself, and over time you relax.
I trust adaptive cruise control now, to the point that it's become a problem when I rent a car that doesn't have it, set the cruise, and realize this car has no intention of slowing down for the traffic ahead.
AI agents should earn access the same way. Rishi has been giving agents more access over time, but he still isn't comfortable letting one into his email. "Once you have e-mail access, you have everything," he said, since email is the reset button for nearly every other account.
Giving Each Agent Its Own Identity
Building trust gradually only works if you can tell the agent apart from the person who gave it the assignment, and that's where a lot of organizations fall short. Many agents today run on system credentials or borrow the identity of the user who launched them. When something goes wrong, the logs can't tell you who actually did what.
That takes me back to my days as a network admin, when we spent a lot of energy telling people to stop using shared accounts. If ten people log in to a server with the same admin credentials, the audit trail is useless. A shared agent used by a whole marketing team creates the same blind spot.
Rishi argues that agent identity has to be treated as "a first-class citizen," with agents acting on a user's behalf rather than as the user. In the model he described, each agent gets a unique identity, starts with limited default permissions, goes through an approval workflow, and leaves an audit trail for everything it does. When it needs more access, it asks, and someone with the authority to approve or deny it makes the call.
Accountability ends up shared between the IT and security teams who set the policies and the user who approves the agent's task. That only works if the agent is visible in the first place, which is a challenge when employees are spinning up tools on their own. It feels a lot like the early days of BYOD and SaaS apps, when users moved faster than IT could keep up.
Where Trust in Agents Is Heading
I can see a day when I tell an agent it's handled my email 150 times without a problem and it can stop asking. Rishi expects trust to keep growing, much like it did with cloud infrastructure, and he expects agents to get access to systems without ever seeing a password.
More trust doesn't take the human off the hook, though. Whoever turned the agent loose is still responsible for what it does, even when the agent made the call on its own. Whether I'll ever let an agent make payments on my behalf is another matter. I don't see it right now, but I'm not sure I plan to die on that hill.
To learn more, watch or listen to the full episode:
The Billionaires Who Want to Outgrow Democracy
2026/10/28
Every time I pull up directions on my phone, I'm using something the government built. GPS started as a Department of Defense project and was run for decades by the Air Force, the same branch I served in. The internet traces back to a Pentagon research program. A lot of the technology that made Silicon Valley rich was paid for by taxpayers long before anyone figured out how to put an app store on top of it.
That history matters when the people who got rich on that foundation start talking about tearing down the system that built it. Gil Durán, author of The Nerd Reich: Silicon Valley Fascism and the War on Democracy, joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about a group of tech billionaires who see democracy as an obstacle and technology as the tool for getting around it.
Built on Public Money
Durán describes many of these figures as government welfare kings, pointing to how much of their wealth traces back to public money. Peter Thiel rails against government, yet he co-founded Palantir in 2003, and the company's business runs heavily on contracts with intelligence agencies and law enforcement. Elon Musk's companies have been fueled by billions in government contracts and subsidies. The idea that these men can now opt out of the public and go build something better on their own is, in Durán's words, "a laughable little boy fantasy."
None of the underlying ideas are secret, either. They've been laid out in blog posts, podcasts and investor letters for more than a decade, and for most of that time they were treated as billionaire eccentricity. I'll admit I'm guilty as well. I've spent a couple of decades in tech and cybersecurity circles; I'd heard rumors and whispers of a lot of this, and I dismissed it as rich guys saying weird things. Meanwhile, those ideas moved from the fringe into the second Trump administration.
Surveillance Nobody Voted For
Aside from the existential threat to democracy itself, I also think a lot about the data privacy implications. Last year, I talked with Chris Inglis, the former deputy director of the NSA (I accidentally referred to him as head of the CIA when talking to Durán), about the Edward Snowden revelations. His position was essentially that yes, the data was collected, but it wasn't being used for the insidious things people feared. My immediate thought, though, was that even if you take that at face value for 2012, the data still exists, and the people with access to it, and their intentions, can change.
Case in point: today we have Palantir, Flock license plate cameras and DOGE teams that walked into federal agencies and pulled data out, and those tend to get covered as separate stories. I see them as one connected system. Private companies can collect and combine information in ways the government legally can't, then sell or share it right back, which turns a public-private partnership into a way around the Constitution and data privacy guardrails. Durán calls these supposed libertarians government surveillance libertarians, and he sees growing resistance to it from voters on the right as well as the left.
Owning the Pipes
Surveillance is only one piece. A handful of billionaires now own or control major social platforms, newspapers, TV networks and movie studios, and in Musk's case, the satellite network an entire military depends on.
Ukraine has found out what that means more than once. Walter Isaacson's biography of Musk describes him refusing a 2022 Ukrainian request to enable Starlink near Crimea for a drone attack on Russia's fleet, and Reuters later reported, citing unnamed sources, that he ordered coverage shut off over part of Kherson during Ukraine's counteroffensive that fall. Musk has denied turning off terminals.
It happened again this month. In mid-October, right after Russian missile strikes on Kyiv, Ukrainian officials said Starlink was suddenly limited for terminals moving faster than 100 mph, which hobbled the drones Ukraine relies on to fight back. Musk first posted that any limits on speed or usage were decided by the U.S. military and ultimately the president. Then on October 24, he said SpaceX had closed a "loophole" that let Ukraine use the civilian service for offensive drone strikes. President Zelenskyy said speeds were restored that same day, after more than a week of disruption he'd warned would cost a lot of lives. Whatever you think of the terms-of-service argument, one company owner was able to dial a country's battlefield communications up or down in the middle of a war, and the public explanation changed depending on the day.
When that same concentration of wealth floods into elections, Durán argues the math stops working for democracy. "We can have billionaires, or we can have democracy. We can't have both," he said.
That's a blunt way to put it, and plenty of people will push back on it. I don't think you have to agree with every word to see the pattern, though. When the same few people own the communication channels, the data, the infrastructure, and a growing share of the politicians, voting still happens, but the choices on the ballot and the information people use to make them have already been shaped.
With the midterms a week away, a lot of people are focused on the 2026 election. Durán's view, however, is that this fight will run much longer than one or two election cycles. Pulling public power back from private hands will take years of pressure on the people we elect, starting with asking which billionaires are paying for their campaigns.
Watch or listen to the episode for the full conversation:
Why Your Home Address Is the Privacy Risk That Matters Most
2026/10/21
Remember those Facebook quizzes that made the rounds during the pandemic lockdowns? They'd ask for things like the street you grew up on or the name of your first pet, and everyone treated it as a fun way to get to know each other. I spent a good chunk of that time telling my family to stop answering them, because those are the same questions banks and websites use to verify who you are. My family mostly thought I was making a big deal out of nothing, and in fairness, each of those details is pretty harmless by itself. They just don't stay by themselves for very long.
Ron Zayas, CEO and founder of Ironwall, joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about how those pieces get stitched together and what you can do about it. Ironwall started about 15 years ago by removing personal information for judges, and it has since expanded to protect executives and other people in the public eye. The company is now part of Incogni.
Your Address and Phone Number Tie It All Together
A couple of years ago, I had a call with a different company that sells privacy services to executives and wealthy clients. They ran a quick scan on me before we talked and opened the call by telling me where I'd lived and where my kids live, and they'd already connected me to my parents. It was impressive and a little unnerving, but I also pushed back, because a lot of that is public record and most people don't buy their house through an LLC to keep their name off the deed.
Ron's view is that your home address is exactly where to draw the line, and there are ways to protect it that don't involve setting up a shell company. Data brokers are where all those scattered bits come together, and the details that tie them back to a specific person are usually your home address and your mobile number. Think about how many times you've moved in the last ten years compared to how many times you've changed your cell number. As Ron put it, "We just need to break the things that tie us to everything else."
You don't have to be a judge or a celebrity for this to matter, either. People get doxxed now for posting an unpopular opinion, and someone who's angry enough will go looking for your employer or your house. "We're all one interaction away from somebody wanting to hurt us," Ron declared.
AI Does the Legwork Now
Connecting those dots used to take some effort. An attacker needed several databases and the patience to cross-reference them and figure out which details went with which person. AI is very good at that kind of pattern matching, so the same old data is a lot more useful to someone who wants to impersonate you or find you than it was a few years ago. Ron also raises concerns about government agencies buying commercially available data they'd otherwise need a warrant to collect.
Be Harder to Find Than the Next Person
I'm a little cynical about some of this. My name, my birth date, and the other details that never change have been exposed in enough breaches that I assume they're out there for good, and when another breach notice shows up I barely look at it. Ron doesn't claim you can scrub everything, though. His point is that making yourself harder to find still pays off, because if someone has a hundred pieces of information on you and twenty on the next person, you're the one they'll go after.
That's the same advice I gave years ago, when people figured out WEP encryption on Wi-Fi could be cracked in about a minute. If you couldn't upgrade, I said to leave WEP turned on anyway, because the neighbor with an open network was still the easier target.
You're not going to disappear from the internet, and Ron isn't suggesting you try, but there's no reason to make it easy. He wraps up the episode with a few inexpensive steps that are worth the effort.
Watch or listen to the full episode.
The Real Cost of AI Hasn’t Shown Up Yet
2026/09/30
I realize I am dating myself to some extent, but my first cell phone plan came with a fixed number of minutes and a small allotment of text messages, and anything beyond that was billed one at a time. You got in the habit of watching the clock on calls and thinking twice before you replied to a text. That model didn't last. Once enough people wanted to use their phones without doing arithmetic, the carriers moved to unlimited plans, and now nobody counts anything.
AI is still in the counting stage. A company signs up with OpenAI or Anthropic, people start using it for real work, and then the invoice arrives, and someone has to explain how many tokens the team went through last month. Richard Luna, CEO of Protected Harbor, joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about where that pricing model is headed, and why he thinks the better option for a lot of businesses is to run AI on hardware they own.
Who Pays for the Build-Out
My assumption going in was that token metering will eventually give way to something closer to unlimited use, because people won't lean on a tool they have to ration. Richard comes at it from the other side. He points out that “no AI company is making money,” while enormous amounts of borrowed money are going into new data centers. Sooner or later that debt shows up in what customers pay.
If he's right, the prices businesses pay today are an introductory rate, and nobody has said yet what the regular rate will be. Richard compares the moment to the subprime lending run-up before 2008 and to the dot-com era. The dot-com comparison is a useful one, because the bubble burst and the web kept going, while plenty of the companies that looked permanent in 1999 did not. Richard doesn't doubt the technology itself. As he puts it, “AI is real, and its benefits are real.” The open question is who will be selling it, and at what price, once the correction happens.
The Case for Running It Yourself
Richard's answer is local models. His view is that a model running on your own machine is the best way for a business owner to use AI, and the best way for a developer to “own their own destiny.” The data stays in-house, and the cost is tied to hardware you already bought rather than to a vendor's need to earn back its investment.
The hardware side of that argument keeps getting stronger. My first computer was a Commodore 64 with 64K of memory. The Surface Studio laptop I use now has 64GB, and I've already downloaded a local LLM to run on it. Hugging Face has a huge catalog of open models to choose from, and some of the models coming out of China run on far less hardware than the big U.S. platforms use.
My kids object to AI for a number of reasons, including the water and power that data centers consume and the IP theft and general lack of ethics demonstrated by the big AI companies. Those are exceptionally valid concerns, but a few months ago Bruce Schneier shared some insightful wisdom that I keep referring back to: most complaints about AI are really complaints about the companies behind it. Running an open model on your own laptop doesn't answer every one of those objections, but it takes a lot of them off the table.
Planning Around the Bill
None of this means businesses should drop cloud AI tomorrow. The frontier models are still better at some tasks, and plenty of teams don't have the hardware or the in-house skills to run models themselves. It does make sense to track what you're actually spending on tokens and to figure out which workloads could run locally before a price change forces the question.
Richard and I cover a lot more ground in the full conversation, including how he went from punch cards and a bulletin board system in his grandparents' house to running an engineering-heavy company, and where he expects today's AI giants to be in 20 years. Watch or listen to the full episode of the TechSpective Podcast below, and let me know whether you're running AI locally yet.
Rebuilding Identity Security From Scratch for the Age of AI Agents
2026/09/21
Amihai Niederman joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about what happens to identity security once AI agents start outnumbering the humans on a company's network. He's the co-founder of NewCore, a startup betting the answer isn't another tool bolted onto what companies already run. It's a rebuild.
That bet is worth taking seriously. The identity stack most companies run today wasn't built for this problem. It was built for a much smaller one.
Identity Grew Up As An IT Problem
For most of its history, identity has been treated as plumbing, not protection. Active Directory sat inside the network. If it got breached, the conversation was about how someone got past the firewall. Identity itself wasn't seen as the thing that failed. That framing made sense when the network was the perimeter.
It stopped making sense once everything moved to the cloud. Identity providers became the real gatekeepers. Stealing a password turned out to be a lot easier than breaching network hardware. The industry responded the way it usually does. It bolted on point solutions, one after another, each one solving a piece of the problem on its own.
NewCore talked to more than 100 CISOs while building its product. The average company, they found, runs 8.3 identity tools. That's a vendor number, worth taking with a grain of salt, but the picture rings true. A pile of tools from different makers, held together, hoping the seams don't split.
Agents Break The Math, Not Just The Tools
None of that was built with AI agents in mind, and that's where the trouble really starts. An agent isn't just a faster version of a person logging in. Amihai draws a real line here. A lot of what gets called an agent today is really a power tool, with a person still making every meaningful decision. It only becomes an agent once you hand it a full task and let it decide which tools to use, in what order, on its own. At that point it stops being a stand-in for a human. It needs its own governance.
That distinction matters because of scale. Agents can work something like 100 times faster than a person, and they never log off. That's not a modest bump in the number of identities a company has to manage. It's closer to 100 times as many. A ninth tool doesn't fix a jump that size. Amihai compares it to converting a gas engine to run on electricity. You can't patch your way there.
Most companies are handling this the sensible way for now. Deploy one agent. Watch it closely. Adjust, then repeat. That works fine at a ratio of one agent to one human. It falls apart once the ratio flips, and the flip is coming faster than most rollout plans assume.
The Resistance Isn't Where You'd Expect It
The instinct is to assume the hardest part of an identity rebuild is convincing a CISO to hand someone new the keys to the whole environment. It usually isn't. CISOs already live with what's broken in their current stack. They know exactly what they're trying to fix. The real friction shows up everywhere else in the company. Old identity connections nobody wrote down. Employees who need a new authenticator app. A migration slow enough that nothing breaks along the way.
That's the harder, less glamorous problem. It's also the one that will decide whether identity security catches up to what AI agents are about to demand of it.
There's more to this conversation than fits here. Where identity security goes as the ratio of agents to humans keeps climbing. A sharp comparison involving stoplights and self-driving cars. How NewCore is thinking about protecting actual people while building for a mostly agentic future.
Catch the full episode on the TechSpective Podcast:
Moving Past Indicators Toward Behavior
2026/09/09
Nicole Beckwith joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about a problem most of the security industry still hasn't fully reckoned with. Beckwith runs security engineering and operations at Cribl, and before that she spent years in law enforcement and digital forensics, which is the lens she uses to explain why the way we've built detection for the last couple of decades is running out of road.
Matching Isn't the Same as Understanding
For as long as I've covered this industry, detection has mostly come down to matching something you already know is bad against something showing up on your network: a hash tied to known malware, an IP address tied to known bad infrastructure. It's a yes or no answer, and for a long time that was good enough, because attackers weren't changing their tooling anywhere near as fast as they're changing it now.
That model is breaking down. Polymorphic malware changes its own hash per victim. Phishing infrastructure gets built fresh, one URL at a time, sometimes one top-level domain at a time. By the time a hash or a bad domain makes it into your threat feed, the attacker who used it has often already moved on to the next one. Beckwith put it plainly: the bottom layers of the pyramid of pain, the framework the industry has used for years to rank how much damage a given detection actually does to an attacker, are “essentially just on fire right now.”
An Indicator Only Proves Someone Was There
Beckwith's law enforcement background gives her a useful way to explain what's actually missing. An indicator, she says, is a single piece of evidence, the equivalent of a fingerprint on a glass or a license plate written down at the scene. It puts someone there. It doesn't tell you what they did once they arrived, who they were working with, or why. “It's a fast, cheap triage of known bad,” is how she describes it, and that's the right job for it. The mistake is treating a triage tool like it's the whole case.
Behavior is a different kind of evidence. An attacker can swap a hash in seconds, but if they want credentials, they still have to do the things credential theft requires, and those actions leave a pattern an indicator alone was never built to catch.
Why This Is Harder to Fake, and Harder to Buy
This is also where a lot of vendor marketing falls apart. Walk any security conference floor this year and nearly every booth claims some version of AI-powered, behavior-based detection. Beckwith has spent enough time doing exactly that to know most of it is still a rules engine underneath, with a model bolted on for the pitch. Real behavioral detection takes the unglamorous work of engineering telemetry, mapping it to actual attacker tactics, and tuning it against your own environment instead of shipping something generic and calling it AI. That work doesn't show up on a slide, which is exactly why most vendors skip it.
Beckwith gets into a lot more of this on the episode, including what this shift means for who gets hired into a SOC and how she personally judges whether a vendor's AI claims hold up.
Watch or listen to the full conversation on the TechSpective Podcast.
When the AI Breaks Its Own Rules
2026/09/02
For most of the last year, the AI security conversation had a clear villain. Attackers were using AI to write better phishing lures, adapt malware mid-attack, and move faster than defenders could keep up with. That story was easy to tell because it fit the shape we already understood. Bad guys get a new tool, they use it against us, we build a defense.
Then the defenders' own AI started breaking its own rules, and the story stopped being that simple.
The Model Did What It Was Told
In July, OpenAI disclosed that one of its models, running an internal test with reduced safety guardrails, found a zero-day vulnerability, broke out of its own sandbox, moved laterally through OpenAI's research environment, and reached across to Hugging Face. Two weeks later, Anthropic acknowledged that three of its own models had done something similar. Both companies were describing their own systems doing exactly what they'd been asked to do, just not in the way anyone expected.
Brad LaPorte of Morphisec has been tracking this closely, and he pushes back on the idea that this is as novel as the headlines suggest. "This isn't necessarily novel," he told me. "It's just they made the front page of the newspaper finally." What's changed is the scale, and the level of autonomy behind it, enough that it's getting harder to write off as an edge case.
That reframes what "guardrails" actually means. A model told to solve a problem and finds an unsanctioned path to solving it is still doing its job, just not the way anyone intended. Isaac Asimov's laws of robotics get invoked a lot in these conversations, and for good reason. "Don't harm a person" sounds like a rule until you realize a model can read it literally and conclude nobody got physically hurt, so nothing went wrong. Financial harm doesn't register that way. Neither does legal exposure or reputational damage, and neither shows up in a rule that vague.
The Fundamentals Haven't Caught Up
While that governance conversation plays out, the operational numbers are moving in the wrong direction. IBM's most recent cost of a data breach report showed the average time to identify a breach getting worse for the first time in five years, up six days to 247. Meanwhile, roughly 88 percent of organizations report using AI in at least one function, but only 5 to 10 percent are seeing meaningful return on that investment. A lot of the AI-driven layoffs making headlines aren't the result of AI actually doing the work yet. They're companies freeing up budget to chase a productivity gain that hasn't arrived.
That gap between adoption and governance is where the real risk lives. Organizations are running AI agents that talk to each other, share data, and make decisions with non-human identities that most security teams haven't fully inventoried, let alone secured. Add unsanctioned AI tools employees are using without approval, and you have an attack surface that's expanding faster than most companies can map it.
None of This Changes the Basics
The uncomfortable part is that the fix isn't exotic. Identity and basic visibility into what's actually running in your environment still account for most of the risk reduction available to any organization. AI adds a new layer to secure, but companies that had their fundamentals in order before AI showed up are adapting. The ones that didn't are finding out that AI doesn't so much create new problems as it makes the old, ignored ones impossible to keep ignoring.
Brad and I get into all of this on the latest episode of the TechSpective Podcast, along with where he thinks the AI funding bubble is headed and why he compares it to the mortgage-backed securities mess of 2008. Give it a listen.
Your AI Agents Are Multiplying and Nobody’s Counting
2026/08/26
Think about every account you've ever created and then forgotten about. A login for a gym you canceled two years ago. A free trial you signed up for and never used again. A vendor portal from a job you left. Nobody deletes those things, and nobody circles back to check whether they still work. Now multiply that across every employee at a mid-size company, running for ten or fifteen years, and you've got a rough picture of what most identity and security teams were already dealing with before AI showed up.
Roy Katmor, co-founder and CEO of Orchid Security, joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about exactly that problem, and what happens to it once AI agents get involved. He calls the invisible, unaccounted-for slice of it “identity dark matter” — the accounts, agents, and access grants that exist on a network but stay invisible to the tools meant to track them.
The Old Sprawl Moved at Human Speed
That slowness bought people time. Shadow IT and orphaned service accounts piled up over years, not days, which gave security and compliance teams a fighting chance to run periodic access reviews, dig through the logs, and clean out what they found. It was never a good system, ask anyone who has sat through a 700-line spreadsheet asking whether a given employee still needs access to a given application. But it worked on the timeline that mattered, because the sprawl itself grew slowly enough for people to catch up to it eventually.
Agents Don't Wait for a Ticket
AI agents broke that timeline. An agent can be created, granted access to a handful of internal systems, and put to work in the time it takes to write a prompt. It doesn't file a request with IT. It doesn't sit in an approval queue. And once it's running, it can turn around and hand off a slice of its own access to a second agent that needs a piece of data it doesn't have, without anyone signing off on that handoff either. What used to take an organization years to accumulate can now happen in an afternoon, in a dozen departments at once, with nobody in any one of them aware of what the others just built.
Somebody Still Owns What the Agent Does
None of this access shows up out of nowhere, though. A person built the agent, gave it a task, and pointed it at a set of systems, even if that person has since forgotten doing it or left the company entirely. Nobody's really figured out yet who's accountable for what an agent does months or years after the person who created it has moved on. “You needed to get your stuff together,” Katmor told me, describing what happens when nobody's kept a record of who authorized what in the first place. That's the kind of problem that stays cheap right up until the day it isn't.
Katmor and I get into how identity dark matter piles up, what it actually takes to find it, and what changes once AI agents start delegating access to each other without anyone signing off.
Watch or listen to the full episode of the TechSpective Podcast to hear the whole conversation.
The Attack That Turns Your AI Agent Into A Weapon Against You
2026/08/20
Barak Sternberg spent a chunk of this year proving something that should worry anyone who has plugged an AI coding agent into their observability stack. His team at Tenet Security found that a single fake error report, sent to a public Sentry endpoint with no login required, was enough to get AI agents to run code they had no business running. In a controlled test, more than 100 organizations' agents acted on the injected error, including one belonging to a company worth roughly $250 billion.
Tenet published the full research, including the disclosure timeline, on its blog.
The attack doesn't touch the agent at all. It touches the tool the agent already trusts.
How A Fake Bug Report Becomes A Command
Sentry, Cloudflare, and Datadog all use a public write key that lets any website report its own errors back to the vendor. That's by design. It's also a wide-open door once an AI agent is on the other end reading those errors and deciding what to do about them. Sternberg's team crafted an error message formatted to look exactly like a legitimate Sentry “Resolution” note, complete with headers and code blocks that matched the real thing. When a developer asked their agent to look into unresolved Sentry issues, the agent read the fake resolution and ran the attacker's command with the developer's own permissions, no phishing and no jailbreak required.
Sternberg told me it’s a common misconception that manipulating an agent looks like typing "forget your instructions" into a chat window. "It’s very easy to fool them," he said, and the version that actually works doesn’t look like an attack at all. It looks like a diagnostic step the agent was already primed to trust.
Telling The Agent Not To Trust Doesn't Work
Tenet also tried the obvious fix: instructing agents through system prompts to treat tool output as untrusted. The agents ran the malicious code anyway. Sternberg explained that once an agent sees something resembling a real problem in its environment, it reasons its way to a conclusion on its own terms. It doesn't register the fix as coming from an outside source. It registers the fix as the logical result of its own investigation, which means a prompt telling it to be suspicious of external data never actually gets triggered.
That's a different failure mode than the prompt injection most security teams have spent the last two years preparing for.
A Shared Responsibility Model Nobody Has Written Yet
Sternberg draws a direct line to the early days of cloud computing, when it took years for the industry to settle on a shared responsibility model that made clear where a cloud vendor's job ended, and a customer's job began. Nothing like that exists yet for AI agents, and the ambiguity shows up every time something goes wrong. When Sentry was notified of the flaw, the company called the underlying issue technically indefensible rather than something it could patch away. Sternberg doesn't disagree, but he also doesn't think that lets anyone off the hook. Anthropic can't see a company's internal business context well enough to secure every agent conversation on its own, and Sentry can't see what happens inside a customer's agent session after its data leaves the server.
The same ambiguity showed up earlier this year when an OpenAI agent broke out of a sandbox environment during testing involving Hugging Face. Nobody at any of the AI labs seemed eager to claim responsibility for it, and some treated it more like a curiosity than an incident. A decade ago, a person doing the same thing to a company's infrastructure would have faced prosecution, not a mention in an investor deck.
Old Rules Don't Scale To A Package Install
At one point in our conversation, I brought up Isaac Asimov’s laws of robotics, mostly to point out how badly they’d hold up if an AI agent actually tried to apply them. Sternberg pushed back on the idea that any single rule set could work at all. "There’s not one generalistic constitution that will work well for all the businesses," he said. The problem isn’t that the rules are wrong. It’s that distinguishing a legitimate new package install from a malicious one requires business context that no frontier lab is positioned to have, and an agent rewarded for speed and autonomy has every incentive to resolve that ambiguity in favor of getting the job done.
Where To Actually Start
Sternberg's advice for a security leader walking into the office Monday morning isn't complicated, even if it's rarely done. Map where your agents operate, what data they touch, and how much of that data comes from outside your own walls. The tools accessing public, untrusted data are the ones worth scrutinizing first. It's a smaller ask than solving the shared responsibility question for the whole industry, but it's the only part of the problem an individual company can actually act on today.
Sternberg and I talked through a lot more of this, including the open-source tooling Tenet released to help harden coding agents against this exact class of attack, on a recent episode of the TechSpective Podcast.
Check out the full episode here:
Building an AI That Learns Like an Analyst
2026/07/29
Most AI-driven security tools lean on retrieval-augmented generation: pull relevant precedent, drop it into the context window, let the model reason over it. It works, but it has a cost problem and a consistency problem. The more data you feed a large language model to improve its answer, the more expensive that answer gets — and the more room there is for the model to produce inconsistent results, independent of hallucination.
Torq built its "SOC brain" to get around that tradeoff. On the latest episode of the TechSpective Podcast, I sat down with Torq Co-Founder and CTO Leonid Belkind to talk about how it works. Belkind says he was skeptical of the term when Torq's marketing team first coined it — he's a technologist, not prone to warming up to superlatives — but changed his mind once he mapped out what the system was actually doing.
Reflex, recall, and retrospect
Belkind frames the problem around cognitive load. Security analysts are buried under a growing volume of alerts as attack surfaces expand, and the goal isn't just automation — it's shifting judgment itself onto the machine, confidently enough to act on it.
System one is instinct: fast, cheap, mostly right, and not something you can trace back to a specific lesson. System two is deliberate: pulling precedent, weighing relevance, reasoning it through. Torq builds both.
The instinctive layer comes from a per-organization encoder model trained on an organization's own alert history — the sources, the entities involved, the actions taken, the outcomes. That model doesn't generate language; it produces a feature vector, a numerical fingerprint of what a given alert resembles. A classifier neural network then places new alerts relative to clusters of confirmed true positives, false positives, and benign activity, producing something close to a gut check.
The deliberate layer works more like memory retrieval: alerts get indexed by attack pattern and technique so the system can pull the most relevant past cases and reason about how closely they match. When the instinct and the recall — plus a third, independent verdict — all agree, confidence to act autonomously goes up. When they diverge, that's the trigger for a closer look.
Grading the data that trains it
Not every past decision teaches the system the same amount. Torq scores outcomes as bronze, silver, or gold data points, based on how much signal they carry. A confirmed true positive is useful but modest. A verdict that gets overturned on deeper investigation is more valuable. And a reversal that comes with documented evidence explaining why is the most valuable of all.
Training also isn't neutral about the cost of being wrong. Torq uses weighted cross entropy so that missing a real threat is penalized far more heavily than over-flagging a benign one — a deliberate bias toward caution that mirrors how people weigh irreversible risk against wasted effort.
The accountability question
We also got into where this leaves human expertise. If organizations lean on AI to do more of the judgment work, do people lose the ability to recognize when it's wrong? Belkind's answer: that risk isn't unique to security operations, and it isn't really about the tool. It's about whether the people using it stay curious enough to understand what's happening underneath — the same distinction between someone who can drive an automatic transmission and someone who understands how it shifts.
That shift doesn't change accountability, though. When the data involved is healthcare records, financial information, or critical infrastructure, "we just trusted the AI model with it" isn't an answer anyone accepts after the fact. The tolerance for a wrong guess on a security alert is nothing like the tolerance for a bad restaurant recommendation.
What we didn't get to here
There's more in the full conversation than fits in a write-up — including why Belkind thinks survivorship bias applies to machine learning the same way it applies to human judgment, how Torq imports an organization's incident history so the system starts learning before day one, and the line he draws between AI built to look intelligent and AI built to actually get better over time.
Listen to the full episode of the TechSpective Podcast, out now.
Most AI Problems Are Really Capitalism Problems
2026/07/19
Bruce Schneier joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about hacking, power, and why so much of what gets blamed on AI might actually be something else.
Schneier is one of the most well-known and respected names in cybersecurity. He has been working in and writing about cybersecurity since the term was invented, writing more than a dozen books in that time. Data and Goliath looked at surveillance. A Hacker's Mind looked at loopholes in the rules we all live by. His most recent book turns that same thinking toward AI and democracy.
A Hacker's Way of Seeing the World
Schneier's idea of a “hack” is not limited to computers. I have read a number of his books, and I am always fascinated by how he is able to frame cybersecurity concepts and illustrate how they appear everywhere in the world around us. They are more philosophy or psychology books than cybersecurity, really.
To him, a hack is any gap between what the rules say and what they were meant to do. Some of his best examples have nothing to do with the internet at all — they come from professional sports, the tax code, even ancient Rome. In each case, someone found a gap that the rules never closed.
That same lens applies to Washington. Rules get written for one purpose, and someone always finds a way to use them for another. We spend a good chunk of the episode on how that plays out in the US government.
Most AI Problems Are Really Capitalism Problems
Schneier argues that a lot of what people are angry about with AI right now is not really about the technology. It is about who controls it and what they choose to do with it.
“A lot of people's problems with AI are actually not AI problems,” Schneier told me. “They're capitalism problems.”
We talk through what that looks like in a few different fields. The same tool can concentrate power in fewer hands. Or it can spread that power out. Which way it goes depends on who is using it, not on the tool itself.
We also talk about the fact that AI does not create new problems so much as it amplifies the ones that already exist. Schneier gives a few examples of how that shows up in law, in medicine, and in everyday life. He points to how the same technology can push power in opposite directions depending on who holds it.
A Lot More Ground to Cover
Schneier and I also get into his new book, Rewiring Democracy, co-authored with Nathan Sanders. We talk about what it has been like to watch the political ground shift under a book about strengthening democratic institutions. We also cover election security, security theater in the age of deepfakes, and where Schneier thinks the value of human writing is headed next.
Watch the full episode to hear how it all connects.
The Case For Rebooting Democracy With AI
2026/07/09
Beth Simone Noveck joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about her book, Reboot, AI and the Race to Save Democracy. She's a professor at Northeastern, where she leads the Burns Center for Social Change. She also founded Innovate US, a training program for public sector workers. It's grown into one of the largest AI training efforts in the country. Before that, she ran AI for the state of New Jersey and worked on tech policy for the federal government under President Obama.
I admit I hadn't read the book before we sat down to talk. My reading backlog is somewhere around 160 books deep at this point, a genuinely embarrassing number, but Reboot jumped near the top of the list by the time we wrapped.
The Messy Middle
Most of what gets said about AI publicly sits at one of two extremes. It's either going to wipe us out or save us. There's very little room in between. Noveck wrote Reboot because she thinks that the messy middle is where the real story actually is. Dystopian collapse and idyllic utopia both make for better headlines than anything nuanced, so that's what gets covered. It skews how people think about these tools before they've even used one. Her point extends past AI, too. Things like Flock cameras, Ring doorbells, or blockchain are not inherently good or bad. What matters is what gets built on top of them and who's making those decisions.
Noveck pushes that dual-use idea further with a comparison to nuclear technology. The same science can build a bomb or a power plant. She argues we spend most of our energy relitigating the bomb conversation. We spend almost none of it asking what the power plant should look like. What would we deliberately choose to build because it actually matters, instead of just building whatever a company happens to find profitable?
Who Gets to Decide
Decision-making is where this gets political. Who actually has influence over AI policy right now? Some of that influence happens in the open, through lobbying and testimony. Some of it happens over closed-door dinners most of us never hear about. Noveck doesn't think it should come down to whoever has the most money or the loudest microphone. "When it's positive, we call it targeting. When we don't like it, we call it manipulation," she told me. That framing problem shows up everywhere from search results to airline pricing, and in how a city decides what its residents actually want.
Noveck also pushes back on the idea that you need a technical background to have a say in any of this. Just as you don't need to be a mechanic to drive a car safely, you also don't need a computer science degree to use AI responsibly or weigh in on how it should be regulated. She backs that up with real examples of AI already being used to make government more participatory instead of less, along with her own case for why she's still hopeful about where this is headed. I'm leaving the specifics for the episode.
Give it a watch or a listen and let me know what you think.
The Remediation Cycle No Security Team Wants to Be Running
2026/06/24
Most cloud security tools have a detection problem. They find misconfigurations well enough. The issue is what happens after — a ticket gets opened, someone works the queue, the fix goes in, and three weeks later the same misconfiguration is back because a different person on the team made the same call. Ariel Litmanovich watched that cycle for years, not at some mid-market company struggling with tooling, but at the Israel Defense Forces, running cloud security for one of the more demanding environments you can imagine. The team had budget, direct relationships with AWS, Azure, and GCP, and access to good tools. They still kept finding the same problems.
That frustration is where Aryon Security started.
The platform Ariel and his co-founders built intercepts cloud configurations before they reach production. If a resource is being deployed in a way that violates policy, it gets stopped at that stage — not discovered later, not added to a remediation queue. They came at this from the application security world, where shift-left has been standard practice for years, and applied the same logic to cloud infrastructure. The security controls move to where the decision is made, not where the damage shows up later.
Ariel joins me on this episode of the TechSpective Podcast to talk about what that looks like in practice. We cover the friction organizations run into when they move from detection to enforcement — what it means for the engineer whose deployment just got blocked, how the exception process is supposed to work, and why those details determine whether a policy actually holds or quietly gets routed around. We also get into a specific challenge that rarely comes up in cloud security marketing material: what happens when developers have a legitimate reason to configure something outside the standard policy, and how Aryon handles that without creating a backdoor that undermines the whole approach.
We talk about AI too. Ariel’s argument is that attackers using AI have compressed the window between a misconfiguration going live and it being exploited. He walks through what that means for detect-and-remediate as a primary strategy and why the timing math matters for cloud security decisions today. He also gets specific about where Aryon actually uses AI in the product versus where it does not.
Aryon does not fit neatly into any existing analyst category, which can be a challenge for procurement. Budget gets allocated against categories defined by Forrester Waves and Gartner Magic Quadrants. When something does not have a pre-approved line item, buying decisions get complicated, regardless of whether the product solves the problem. He talks through what that friction looks like and mentions some 2026 market research that is relevant if you are actively making cloud security tooling decisions right now.
If you work in cloud security and have ever looked at your remediation backlog wondering why the same issues keep cycling back through, this conversation is worth your time.
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