Advertise on podcast: Shadow Warrior by Rajeev Srinivasan

As the greatest investment bubble in economic history in happening right in front of our eyes, with the distinct possibility of a godawful bust in the not too distant future, and persistent memories of promising technologies that crashed and burned, it is necessary, and urgent, to consider how India should play this game of generativeAI now and into the future, whether that future is boom or bust for the technology. What adds criticality to this matter is the serious but hidden concern about three things: epistemology, values, and national security. The vacuuming up by Big Tech of Indian data gratis (hey, what happened to “data is the new oil”?) as well as the increasingly sophisticated manufacturing of narratives are at least as important as the threat to traditional knowledge systems that India has preserved more or less, under duress, for millennia. Is there a bubble? Irrational exuberance almost always ends up in grief, or at least that has been the experience in past cycles. We may be reminded of the Dutch Tulip Mania of 1634, as described in the book Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, wherein tulip bulbs were sold at enormous prices based on speculation about increasing value, which turned out to be baseless. Those of us with moderately long memories will also remember the 1999-era Internet bubble, where just having a web site and a cool online retail idea was enough to generate speculative investment. The net result was a huge bust, but there was a good outcome: the infrastructure left on the ground by bankrupt investors was useful in other ways in later iterations of the internet, which proved to actually generate value. But there indeed is irrational exuberance regarding generativeAI. The Wall Street Journal noted that Anthropic seems to believe its Total Addressable Market (TAM) is an eye-watering $30 trillion. For comparison, that was roughly the US’ GDP in 2025. Goldman Sachs goes one step further: it estimated in July 2025 that the global TAM may be as much as $40 trillion. In any case, The Economist magazine estimates that the current generativeAI mania is the daddy of all speculative bubbles in western history, surpassing others in the last few centuries. The problem is that there doesn’t appear to be enough revenue and profits being generated to justify the literally trillions of dollars that are being ploughed into capital investment by the likes of Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Meta, i.e. US Big Tech. The Economist magazine, again. Sorry, folks, there does not seem to be a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. The bottom line is that at least at the moment, there is a fair chance that there will be the mother of all busts from generativeAI. This is not investment advice, of course, but I’d say caveat emptor. The two potential business outcomes: the Linux way vs. the Windows way I am fundamentally an operating systems guy, having spent years working on UNIX internals at Bell Labs. I have observed how that market has evolved over the last forty years, and I believe there are good lessons to be learned from the experience. For, the OS is perhaps the most critical software on any machine, and strangely enough those who focused on it may have made either no money whatsoever, or lots of money. The “no money” category belongs to UNIX and its descendants, Linux, Android, Apple iOS etc. UNIX was developed at AT&T Bell Labs, and was given away for free to universities and other companies for complicated reasons having to do with AT&T’s status as a regulated monopoly. UNIX is now ubiquitous, running everything from data centers to smartphones to Internet servers through its progeny. Alas, AT&T made absolutely no money from it. I know this because I moved to Sun Microsystems from Bell Labs, and I was product manager for Sun’s UNIX OS Solaris. If I remember right, I suggested the name ‘Solaris’ in homage to Stanislav Lem. I was active in AT&T and Sun’s attempt to unify the slightly different variants of UNIX (HP-UX, IBM AIX, DEC Ultrix etc.) that had proliferated because experimentation and enhancements on especially the BSD (UC Berkeley) version of UNIX was very easy. We failed in this unification attempt in the “UNIX wars” of the late 1980s/early 1990s. The result was that UNIX lost a tremendous opportunity to be the desktop/laptop OS, because rival Microsoft was able to do disruptive innovation (see Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail) and capture the customer base that these firms had earlier served through mainframes, mini-computers and engineering workstations. Before the mid 1990s, Microsoft Windows had relatively little market share. What is really interesting is that Microsoft then proceeded to “make lots of money”, the second business outcome alluded to above, by realizing that Windows was not just an OS, but a distribution channel for third-party applications. At Sun, I knew this too, but basically as hardware companies, Sun, IBM, etc. didn’t think much of the OS. Apple figured it out, and has made good money off the App Store. I make a direct analogy between the OS and LLMs. Both are core software in that they both have a clear impact on the hardware requirements, and that they are part of a stack in which many things can be written in layers above. In my opinion, the LLM, just like the OS, could possibly become either background noise (like UNIX/Linux) or the main thing (like Windows). It appears to me that Anthropic, OpenAI, the hyperscalers et al hope to make their own LLMs the inevitable choice (like Windows), whereas the Chinese are on the way to, intentionally or otherwise, making LLMs immaterial (like UNIX and descendants). This, incidentally, fits into the standard operating procedures of the respective countries: the US likes to use overwhelming force (the metaphor here is American football), whereas the Chinese use scale, overproduction, and crashing prices to destroy the competition. From India’s point of view, in either case, this dictates that pursuing foundational models is the wrong game to play. If American Big Tech wins, they become money-minting machines like Microsoft and Windows, and resistance is futile; if Chinese Tech wins, the foundational models become commodities. Therefore, the right place to compete would be on the layers above, that is vertical applications for real problems faced by real people. India could emulate a major Big Tech company that has taken a similar approach: Apple. Instead of jumping headlong into the LLM race, and spending billions like Alphabet (Google’s parent) and Meta (owner of Facebook and Whatsapp), Apple has preferred to stay on the sidelines, perhaps seeking out market niches or waiting for an LLM winner to emerge. There is a chance that Apple may emerge the victor, intact after the possible bloodbath. Sovereign AI and dancing with elephants What, then, does AI sovereignty mean for India? In my humble opinion, India needs to find the “white spaces” that neither G2 giants (i.e. the US and China) are attempting to occupy. Therefore, India should look at areas of the overall stack that are open to it, and which it can profitably involve itself in. Even though the most obvious thing that comes to mind when you talk about sovereign AI is a Made-in-India foundational model or LLM, that is overkill considering the enormous expense it would entail, literally in the billions of dollars. It’s also something that has been done already by both American and Chinese players, so there’s nothing novel about it. On the other hand, unique applications that take into account peculiarities in the Indian environment, and provide real value to Indian consumers/businesses may well be of considerable value. Once again, there is an analogy: the India Stack, which has not only provided us with the wildly successful UPI, but also ONDC, and various other applications, such as Account Aggregator, FASTag, UMANG, Government e-Marketplace. Here we have a stack that is building domain-specific applications atop a standard backbone, e.g., Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission. That is where the value addition for India as a nation may come. One example, already explored by Sarvam AI, is that of multi-lingual capability. This could have a revolutionary impact on mother-tongue education, for instance if school textbooks are seamlessly translated by AI that would likely improve early-education comprehension. Just as the 10-year-old UPI, imagined for Indian conditions, has revolutionized payments, there surely are applications, most importantly in such areas as public health, jurisprudence, and governance, that will have a massive payback if implemented. Furthermore, there is the layer below, which is the hardware/computing infrastructure. Even though there are concerns about the availability of power and water, the fact that there is both less expensive skilled labor and increasing amounts of solar power, and the significant amount of opposition to them in developed nations, may well make India attractive to hyperscalars and others. Keeping a lot of Indian data on Indian soil is a good idea, too. Bonus: In case of a bust, all that infra will be available at big discounts. By the way, here’s a graphic I found on X, from an investor named Himanshu Sinha. He’s a little pessimistic, and his diagram shows the layers in the opposite direction from me, but it captures the entire stack concisely. The question, of course, is how well India can do in the applications layer and the “AI infrastructure” layers according to Sinha. It may be a question of glass half-full, but I believe India can play in the white spaces of applications and infrastructure. The goodies generativeAI may bring Every day brings new news about advances based on generativeAI: humanoid robots that can run as fast as Usain Bolt, Andrew Ng’s new plans to build a custom one-on-one

A version of this essay was published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/from-chanakya-to-ai-india-needs-its-own-management-model-14038647.html/amp If you interpret the term ‘management’ broadly, that is, to include not only the day to day running of companies, but also the bigger picture of governance, leadership, strategy, geoeconomics, and even civilizational survival, the clear answer is that there indeed is a unique Indian style of management. Whether it has been uniquely successful in the past is an open question, and given the ravages of invasion, one may be tempted to say it hasn’t been; similarly whether, or how, it is appropriate for today’s and tomorrow’s needs is another good question. But it is useful to identify what may in fact be the factors underlying such a style of management, and there are likely three reasons: civilizational, cultural, and practical. Civilizational The first is perhaps the idea of Bharatiya exceptionalism: that is to say that Bharat exemplifies a singular civilizational thread that goes back to the ancient four-fold Hindu idea of purusharthas: dharma, artha, kama, and moksha. It is a holistic approach, perhaps most evident in the Bhagavad Gita, with its emphasis on ethical leadership and nishkama karma. It is certainly influenced by the topography and geography of the land, Jambudvipa, which has natural boundaries marking its extremities: Bharat, the land between the mountains and the sea. The climate and the rivers and the vegetation reflect a reality of natural abundance: what Rajiv Malhotra referred to when he spoke of the ‘religions of the forest’ versus ‘the religions of the desert’. Bharat, in general, had a tropical cornucopia of food, and perhaps that was reflected early in a certain tolerance for not only for other humans, but also for all life. It is notable that among all the lands that were populated early, Bharat was the one that retained its megafauna the best. All other human settlements saw the rapid extinction of large animals. Sustainability, a key mantra these days, was built into the Bharatiya outlook all along. This same generosity was seen in trade patterns in the Indian Ocean as well: from 5,000 years ago, Bharatiya sailors executed cross-oceanic voyages, eastward during the southwest monsoon and vice versa during the northeast monsoon. The trade benefited everybody, as valuable goods were exchanged, in an illustration of the theory of comparative advantage. The infrastructure for trade was brilliantly executed: not only the building of ocean-going ships that plied the Spice Route, and the ability to defend them from pirates, but also the subtler aspects: the “multi-protocol switch” that allowed trading guilds along the peninsular coasts to facilitate trade between say, Romans, and say, Chinese, who had different languages and currencies. Bharatiya traders smoothed the transactions. Furthermore, the venture capital and banking services for the trading guilds were provided by Hindu temples. Pax Indica was benign; for instance, 1,001 years ago Rajendra Chola dispatched a large fleet to open up the Straits of Malacca for trade when the Srivijaya Empire interfered with it. The contrast with the current standoff in the Straits of Hormuz is salutary. Yes, it is necessary to ensure freedom of navigation, and the commons, with deadly force if need be. There was a very real notion of the ‘common good’. For instance, perhaps the greatest intellectual contribution of Bharat was innovation and the creation of Intellectual Property, and then making it freely available to all: not hoarding it for individual benefit. The model was that scholars and intellectuals were frugal, that the State (king or temple) provided for their basic needs, and in return, they produced masterworks over which they, unlike patenting in the western sense, did not claim any rights. Thus you have intellectual giants such as Brahmagupta with his invention of the zero, Panini with his context-free grammar, Madhava with his infinite series for trigonometric functions, and much later Ramanujan who wrote down his extraordinary theorems for all, and JC Bose whose seminal wireless communication discoveries he refused to patent, on principle. In fact, one could argue that the entire idea of “open-source” is a Bharatiya invention. The natural resources of the Indian subcontinent along with the industriousness of its residents allowed for the creation of tremendous wealth; but in the “Guns vs Butter” dichotomy in economics, Bharat neglected to build the guns; which meant that often invaders with guns were able to capture the butter .Management theory suggests that there are only three sustainable business strategies for long-term viability: 1) customer intimacy, 2) cost leadership, 3) innovation. Bharat historically chose innovation, and its native genius may result in the flowering of an intellectual revolution as the effects of impoverishment by conquest begin to recede. Cultural It is interesting to note that Bharatiyas are different from both Occidentals, (e.g. the Anglosphere) and Orientals (e.g. East Asians) culturally. The stereotypes (with good reason) is that Occidentals are highly individualistic and that Orientals are highly group-oriented. Bharatiyas fall somewhere in between, being fairly individualistic, and gregarious, yet only moderately group-oriented. This has implications for governance. A highly individualistic society needs powerful laws that control individuals, including their tendencies for mischief. Thus, for example, the US is a highly regulated society, and their police are quite capable of unleashing deadly force. A highly group oriented society like Japan has norms that mean children clean after themselves in schools, and that discipline carries over into adulthood as well. Bharatiyas are neither; the net result is that there is a distinction between public spaces and private spaces. While people may keep their homes spotlessly clean, they have no problem littering anywhere or throwing trash just over their walls onto the public street. They also have no problem breaking traffic rules. “The tragedy of the commons” is rife. There is also the cultural memory of shortages and deprivation. Since people have grown up in a shortage economy, there is a tendency to hoard, cut corners, to pay bribes, to find any way of getting a slight advantage over others. Thus the unnecessary pushiness on roads, the inability to queue up anywhere, and especially the unwillingness to let people exit a lift before you enter. This applies to groups as well, as is seen in the “race to the bottom” in the case of the backward, the most backward, and the extremely backward designations intended for government largesse. There is also the unfortunate feeling that a contract is just a mere annoyance, not something that is to be followed to the letter. Punctuality is a small indicator of this: Bharatiyas on average feel justified in being late and casually making excuses. In contrast, both Anglosphere people and many East Asians (especially the Japanese) are punctual, and they can be trusted to deliver absolutely whatever they promise, whenever they promise. Interestingly, Chinese, like Bharatiyas, do not have integrity in terms of keeping promises, which is a problem in doing business with both. In Bharat, there is also extreme reluctance to deliver bad news until the very last minute, for instance the day before something is due to be delivered. This can be very difficult for partners to deal with. Perhaps all this makes Bharat a low-trust society. As a result of all this, doing business in Bharat takes twice as long, and managers need to have contingency plans, and to do intrusive ongoing audits to ensure that things are on time. But there are inspiring counter-examples of community action and high trust. One is the re-greening of the Aravallis with the support of the Tarun Bharat Sangh and Rajendra Singh: a few villages built simple check dams based on traditional knowledge, bringing back an extinct river. Practical In addition to the refined heights of the civilizational perspective, Bharat also excelled in the theories of tactical management and even realpolitik. Even though there is a tendency in certain circles to lionize Machiavelli, von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, it is likely that Chanakya outdid all of them in the single-minded pursuit of strategy and governance, and he wrote his masterwork a millennium before them. Chanakya’s ideas of statecraft are notable for their cold realism. He focuses on the creation of leverage and thus power for the sovereign. Speaking of leverage, or competitive advantage, we have seen how China has turned its control of the rare earths supply chain into a weapon; similarly the US has its technology (the recent denial of Anthropic Mythos to all foreigners) as well as its control of the SWIFT network of financial transactions. These can be coercive. Another of Chanakya’s supremely rational assumptions is that your neighbor is likely to be your enemy, if not today, maybe tomorrow, simply because of proximity and the resulting irritants. Thus it becomes useful to make common cause with their neighbor. Taking this one step further, you arrive at the Mandala theory of statecraft: a series of concentric circles (for convenience of depiction), where you cultivate your neighbor’s neighbors, and also the Far Emperor or udasina (indifferent power), a player outside the immediate neighborhood, but powerful, and who can have a significant impact on your local power politics. Clearly Indian foreign policy has looked upon the US as a Far Emperor; similarly Indian firms may look upon Big Tech companies as Far Emperors in their local struggles. Chanakya does not shy away from the harsh realities of power politics. Matsya nyaya, where big fish eat little fish, is a crystal-clear exposition of the idea that might is

A version of this essay was published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/the-old-quad-is-dying-time-for-a-new-quad-14030966.html The Quad, a 2007 partnership broadly intended to contain China’s hegemonistic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, was a brainchild of then-Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. It makes sense: China is rampaging in its neighborhood, and gives every sign of wanting to either grab territory that belongs to others, or bully them into acquiescence and tributary status. The belligerence that created the current Chinese empire, that is the forced absorption of Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria into the core Han coastal heartland, is part of a harking back to ancient Chinese empires. Xi Jinping, perhaps even more than Mao, embodies a hankering to be the almighty King-Emperor of the erstwhile Middle Kingdom The US unwittingly allowed China to rapidly de-industrialize it post joining the WTO, and to come up with a business plan that calls for massive over-production and the resultant price collapse, which is a template they use to rape and pillage industry after industry. A recent casualty is Germany’s prized automobile industry: bellwether Volkswagen has been forced to lay off 100,000 workers, brutalized by a tsunami of Chinese electric vehicles. However, as Utpal Kumar points out in an insightful essay, all is not well in Xi’s kingdom: e.g., the debt mountain, paranoia as seen in regular purges of military brass, and propaganda that conceals all bad news (did you hear of a small plane hitting a tower in central Beijing? Yes, a mini-9/11. But the information was blanked out). Continuing rural poverty is also censored, although Indians on x.com posted images of extreme filth and poverty, far from the glossy high-rise, bullet-train image that Chinese propaganda projects. Paradoxically, that is precisely what makes China yet more dangerous: it will probably lash out in external adventurism to preserve legitimacy internally. Thus the need for sober containment of China’s destructive power. The US, which has been the natural candidate for reining in this rogue power, has now demonstrated that it is retrenching. It has, for instance, demonstrated that it is no longer willing to indefinitely support its NATO allies. The “nuclear umbrella” that it has offered Japan may also be getting a little threadbare. It is likely that President Trump invaded Iran with the good idea of denying China oil both Iranian and Venezuelan oil, as retaliation for China’s squeeze on rare earths. Alas, that has turned into a fiasco, creating collateral damage for innocent bystanders such as India. In game-theoretic terms, if an isolationist “Fortress America” mood has descended on the US, then a “G2 condominium” with China may be the simplest option, as I said several years ago. If the US has indeed acquiesced to China being the hegemon in its sphere of influence, namely the Indo-Pacific, then there is good reason for the jilted Quad members (Japan, Australia and India) to enter into bilateral agreements amongst each other to look after their own national interests, including but not limited to Sinophobia. And in fact they have done so. It is true that the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in May 2026 in Delhi produced some agreements on critical minerals (clearly a US priority) and surveillance collaboration, but I get the feeling that this is mostly a matter of keeping up appearances. Therefore it is worth pivoting to Japanese PM Takaichi’s recent visit to India, and PM Modi’s trips to Indonesia and Australia. Japan and India are obvious partners, because their economies are complementary: one is resource- and technology-rich, and labor-poor, and the other is the opposite. There is also an old civilizational link between the two, going back to Bodhidharma from Kanchipuram who embarked from Muziris circa 500CE and established the Zen school of Buddhism in Japan. There are also clear civilizational links between India and Indonesia. Hindu Bali is obvious; but Java, until the Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit Empire was defeated circa 1500CE by Muslim kingdoms (encouraged by the Chinese empire of the time), was also heavily Indianized. As someone who has traveled in both Japan and Indonesia, I was delighted to see Devanagari inscriptions on the Great Bell at Hiroshima, and the Ramayana Ballet at Prambanan temple. विपुलप्रभ अतुल्यनन्त नाथ दिशि विदिशि स्फुरि सर्वबुद्धक्षेत्रा। राग प्रशमि सर्वदोषमोहां नरकगतिस्मि प्रशामि धूमकेतुम्॥१५॥ "The lord of vast light, incomparable and infinite, has illuminated all Buddha countries in all the quarters; he has quieted passions, all sins and errors; he has quieted the fire in the walk of hell." This is the inscription on the Great Bell in Hiroshima. Japan and India signed a series of agreements, including an investment target of Yen 10 trillion (about $66 billion) in areas such as critical minerals, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. They agreed upon a new focus on Artificial Intelligence and quantum technologies and in energy self-reliance, including hydrogen and biogas. They also reaffirmed support for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (let us note that on June 16th the US renamed its Indo-Pacific Command to just “Pacific Command”, a telling admission of retreat. The US may well be abandoning the Indian Ocean just when it is becoming the focus of trade.) The Indonesia-India agreements were significant: they included, for instance, Brahmos and Astra missile systems (which, in conjunction with other ASEAN purchases of Brahmos missiles, creates a potentially integrated sea-denial mechanism against persistent Chinese maritime aggression). Pointedly, there will be joint development on Indonesia’s deep-water Sabang Port in Aceh, which is on the Malacca Straits just 90 nautical miles away from India’s upcoming Great Nicobar dual-use port. The two ports can form a defensive shield that could deny transit in Malacca to hostile ships and submarines (read Chinese). Since two-thirds of China’s trade and energy imports pass through Malacca, this is a potent threat, especially as we have just seen what the siege of Hormuz did to global trade. Let us also remember that, exactly 1,001 years ago, Emperor Rajendra Chola sent a large fleet to open up Malacca when the SriVijaya Empire closed it. There were also agreements on critical minerals (e.g. nickel for EV batteries, as Indonesia has the world’s largest reserves, cobalt, etc.), steel, maritime security, and technology cooperation. Let us also remember the trilateral Japan-Indonesia-India naval exercises in the Andaman Sea in February 2026. PM Modi’s visit to Australia is the most problematic. Earlier, under Kevin Rudd, a Sinophilic PM, Australia exited the Quad in 2008, effectively making it moribund. Besides, Australia for decades refused sniffily to sell India uranium, despite India being a committed non-proliferator. This may also have had something to do with the UK’s (Whitehall’s) deleterious influence on Australia. But days ago, Australia committed to supplying uranium to India, in support of the latter’s quest for energy security. Oz has apparently learned that cozying up to China is not good for its own economic health. Thus, the quadrilateral of US, Japan, Australia and India may well morph into a quadrilateral of Japan, Indonesia, Australia and India, all united in their concerns about China. The US has a choice: either continue to be the anchor of the Quad (Pentagon?), or be left behind if it insists on retreating into its shell. The former option would be better for all concerned. 1150 words, 11 July 2026 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

A version of this essay was published by firstpost at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/from-indo-pacific-to-pacific-delhi-must-prepare-for-strategic-loneliness-14024528.html I refer, of course, to the (in)famous newspaper headline which said, “Ford to City: Drop Dead” in 1975 when then-POTUS Gerald Ford refused to bail out New York City during a financial crisis. It appears to be the same sentiment now with POTUS Trump regarding India. The end of India’s fond hopes of a strategic alliance came not with a bang, but with a whimper: the Pentagon announcement, right in the middle of the G7 conclave in France, that the US has reverted its Indo-Pacific Command to the “Pacific Command”, which had been the name before Trump changed it in 2018. What this means is clear: the US has turned its back on the Indian Ocean, on India, and on the vaunted “strategic partnership” that Indian policymakers had long assumed would be a corollary of that presumed bedrock of Indo-US relations: the mutual need to contain a rampaging China. Coming on top of the remarkable cavalierness about the murders of three Indian merchant-navy sailors, and numerous other slights, we see a pattern of indifference at best, or disdain at worst. The US is signalling that they don’t need India. India, in other words, has no leverage. I am not amazed, to be honest: I wrote in 2023 that in an era of relative decline, it made sense for the US to downgrade its aspirations from sole hyperpower to first among equals: that is, a “G2 condominium” with China. This is, in principle, the same as the Vatican-brokered Treaty of Torsedillas in 1494 that divided the world into Portuguese and a Spanish spheres of influence. Interestingly, that didn’t end up well for either party, but we shall let that pass. Let us connect the dots: there is a ‘Donroe Doctrine’ whereby the US is asserting its hegemony in the Americas, its sphere of influence. Trump has ejected China from Venezuela, and is in the process of kicking them out of the Panama Canal zone; although the Pacific-to-Atlantic railway project in the Brazilian rainforest, and its terminus, the deep-water Port Chancay in Peru, remain. The disastrous Trump foray into Iran was predicated on denying China easy access to that country’s hydrocarbons. But the MoU after 100+ days of war suggests that the US has received a bloody nose, and is withdrawing, retired hurt. The shrinking of ambitions away from the Indian Ocean as in the reversion to the ‘Pacific Command’ suggests that the US is ceding the continent, including West Asia, to China. America-watchers have noticed this strange attitude to Asia before. Evan A. Feigenbaum, a former advisor to US Secretaries of State, wrote about this in 2011: For Washington, the problem is at once intellectual, strategic, and bureaucratic. Intellectually, the United States still has three separate foreign policies in Asia—one for East Asia, another for South Asia, and a third for Central Asia (which it scarcely regards as a part of Asia at all). As Asia reintegrates, then, the United States is too often stuck in an outdated mode of thinking ... Asia is being reborn, and remade. Yet, the United States is badly prepared for this momentous rebirth, which is at once stitching Asia back together and making the United States less relevant in each of Asia’s constituent parts. Asians are, in various ways, passing America by, restoring ancient ties and repairing long-broken strategic and economic links. Well, this is also the end of the “pivot to Asia”, even though it was probably half-hearted at the best of times. Then-POTUS Obama started using the term in 2011, but was himself guilty of ‘awarding’ “South Asia” to Chinese overlordship on a visit to that country. Now that the US is dumping its European allies, it should not be surprising, in view of the ‘Fortress America’ tone of the National Security Strategy of 2025, that India is also being thrown under the bus. A US official, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said this bluntly in Delhi at the Raisina Dialog 2026: India should understand that we’re not going to make the same mistakes with India that we made with China 20 years ago in terms of saying oh you know we’re going to let you develop all these markets and then the next thing we know you’re beating us in a lot of commercial things. Landau is right from a short-term US perspective. The US blundered, presumably taken in by Chinese propaganda, and allowed itself to be stripped of its industrial prowess. They have learned a lesson: squash potential competitors when you can. This is a back-handed compliment: it suggests that the US is aware that India can be a challenger, and make the G2 a G3. India is literally the only power that’s large enough to make it to Great Power status: Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, etc. have too many problems. No incumbent power wants an insurgent power to challenge its hegemony. The so-called “Thucydides Trap” predicts that chances are that they will go to war: a kinetic war or an economic war or both. India is simultaneously facing Thucydides Traps from both the US and China, those G2 buddies. I wrote about this as an “Abhimanyu Syndrome” for India: splendid isolation. I hasten to add that though Abhimanyu died, his side did win convincingly. So it’s time for India to be pragmatic, and develop its own self-reliance, both in military power and economic/trade power. The existing G2 are looking for vassals, not allies. The equation between them is also interesting. It is clear that the US is in gentle relative decline; but it does have deep resources, and can survive as a continent sized economy, even if it turns its back on the rest of the world, as it has done several times in its 250-year history. But Trump did kowtow to Xi on his May trip to China: he looked like a supplicant paying tribute to the emperor. China, if you look at its 3000-year-long history, is volatile and unstable. A pattern repeats, again and again: there are periods of prosperity and power under a strong imperial center, followed by collapse and utter chaos. An unwinding of the Chinese empire, much like the implosion of the Soviet empire, is probably only a matter of time. If you look at Indian history, the nation was mostly stable, though its prosperity invited invaders. As far back as 3000 years ago, India was the center of a lucrative Indian Ocean trade, based on Pax Indica in the region. With a deep water navy, a massive manufacturing push, and self-reliance, India can regain its past glory. Military power breeds respect from others. Economic power makes others want to trade. 1100 words, 18 Jun 2026 AI-generated slideshow courtesy notebookLM.google.com: This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

A version of this essay has been published by Open Magazine at https://openthemagazine.com/world/india-will-collapse-without-digital-sovereignty-and-pax-indica-lessons-from-hormuz By now it is clear that the Iran War (or West Asia War) has been a disaster to all concerned, including the principals as well as assorted passersby. The massive amounts spent by the US (at last count $25 billion) are at least articulated; the bill for the enormous infrastructural and human suffering inflicted on Gulf states, in the theater of war, must be greater, by definition. The collateral damages suffered by the rest of the world from the cessation of trade through the Straits of Hormuz will presumably run into the trillions of dollars. As one of the worst affected, India, which imports 90% of its hydrocarbons from the Gulf, not to mention other essential items such as urea (for fertilizer), sulfuric acid, helium, etc., is on track to take a massive hit. As an article in The Economic Times said, “India must brace for broad-based economic shock”. Indian exports of up to $50 billion are also affected, especially agricultural products including perishable foodstuffs, but also gems and jewellery, electronics, textiles and garments. Some of this can be diverted via Oman and the UAE’s Fujairah port, but much of it passes through the Straits of Hormuz and is potentially blocked and/or stranded at sea. The Hormuz closure is a body blow to India’s economy. What can and will India do about it? The Indian State has a habit of rising to the challenge only when there is a crisis, while vegetating otherwise. The 1991 economic crisis is a case in point; the sanctions following “The Buddha is smiling”, and the denial of cryogenic rocket engines and supercomputers are other examples where the nation rallied. So were covid vaccines. Necessity, they say, is the mother of invention. Turning a threat into an opportunity If I were to be an optimist, I could say that the current crisis is actually an opportunity. In fact, a major opportunity. My reading of the Iran War is that it is President Trump’s strategic tit-for-tat against China for denying him rare earths and cutting off soybean purchases. In return Trump decided to deny China access to oil by closing access to Venezuela and Iran. Whether this will work, or whether the G2 condominium (read ‘surrender’) will prevail, is unclear. But that is, in a sense, background noise that needs to be managed. India needs to focus on its own issues, of which I see several as critical, and the solution in general is to become Atmanirbhar, self-reliant, and from that, to create an Anti-Fragile nation: * National security/defense * Food security * Energy security * Digital security/narrative control * Trade security The first three do not need an explanation: they are obvious. Internal and external security are pre-requisites for any successful society. If India’s hard-won food security can be threatened by external threats, then there needs to be some deep introspection. Energy security means diversification, both of hydrocarbon sources, and of types of energy, including renewables, nuclear, biomass, coal-based, and so on. Malign narratives and digital sovereignty Narrative control is something that the Indian State has failed at so far; it is laughably easy to create hate speech against Indians and India (as has been demonstrated freely by any number of players, starting from the MAGA crowd, to Audrey Truschke to a”Cockroach Janata Party” and some nitwit Norwegian journalist in just the last fortnight) and there are no consequences to the culprits. It’s enough to make me pine for Lee Kuan Yew’s aggressive legal battles against the media. It’s one thing if it were only a problem with foreigners, but with the massive spread of social media, and in particular generativeAI, it is becoming a serious domestic issue. Since India is an avid consumer of social media, and because generativeAI is trained on things like Wikipedia, X, Whatsapp and Google content, biased and motivated material becomes ensconced as The Truth. I have written about narrative warfare and manufacturing consent. This used to be a one-way tsunami of (mis)-information by legacy media, but now there is also the opposite: the wholesale and free vacuuming-up of Indian data (whatever happened to “data is the new oil”?). The “Great Firewall of China” both kept out foreign BIg Tech applications and prevented their plundering Chinese data: is that the way to go? Manufactured narratives are intended for regime change: all the color revolutions today are hatched with massive bot-farms funded by some combination of Deep State, CCP, ISI, Qatar etc. (for example the alleged Gen-Z uprisings that rocked Nepal, drove Sheikh Hasina out of Bangladesh). Thus muzzling malign narratives, and ensuring data security, are imperative. Even Singapore is not immune: it had to block anti-India narratives that likely originated from Chinese sources. A particularly striking example of narrative warfare is the virtual hate speech inducted into Wikipedia by deeply prejudiced anonymous editors. Ashley Rindsberg, who exposed the mighty New York Times’ biases in his book The Gray Lady Winked, provides many examples of this. Of note to Indians and Hindus is his recent substack titled “Wikipedia’s India War” where he identifies just four editors as having created most of the content condemning the Hindu American Foundation (HAF) in ‘Wikivoice’, i.e. the allegedly neutral perspective of Wikipedia. They are, on the contrary, shown to be highly one-sided.As Rindsberg mentions, Wikipedia being central to generativeAI, the damage is baked into the world-view of all AI applications. Truly Orwellian. Says Rindsberg: “four… anonymous accounts can have an enormous impact on what millions of people believe to be the truth.” “Over four years (2021-2025), editors systematically erased HAF’s identity as an American civil rights group, transforming its Wikipedia page into a heavily curated dossier of accusations.” Trade, and how the Spice Route was far superior to the Silk Road Finally, something that is becoming increasingly important: ensuring freedom of trade. This is more than just freedom of navigation, although I find it instructive that Emperor Rajendra Chola sent a huge fleet 1,001 years ago simply to open up the Straits of Malacca. India can make an active attempt to regain primacy in Indian Ocean trade, the whole Pax indica idea. Here is another example of the power of narrative: we have been led to believe that the Silk Road to China was some major highway of commerce between ancient Rome and ancient China, but it was a term coined only in 1877 by the German Ferdinand von Richthofen. There was no highway. A large caravan might take six months, and with 500 camels traversing treacherous deserts and braving bandits, it might carry a maximum of 100 tons. That is puny. In comparison, on the Spice Route, a single stitched ship from Muziris could carry 400 tons of ivory, pepper, silk, tigers and elephants; and the historian Strabo around 1 CE talks about fleets of 250 ships going from Alexandria to India on a six-week monsoon-powered journey. That is 100,000 tons of merchandise. No wonder Pliny the Elder complained that Rome’s treasuries were being emptied of gold by India. Simple question: where are hoards of ancient Roman coins found in Asia? Answer: not along the Silk Road. The hoards are in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. Today, it is possible for India to aspire to port-led development of trade, especially with the major ports at Trivandrum (Vizhinjam), Maharashtra (Vadhavan), and Great Nicobar (Galathea Bay). The underlying ‘software’ of India’s millennia-old trade competency was a ‘multi-protocol switch’ as I pointed out, and today’s India Stack can replicate that. Then there is the need for a blue-water navy: muscle to provide security on the Hormuz to Malacca sea-lanes. So there is a vision. How can India get there? This is where policy matters, as I discussed with policy expert Anuj Gupta. Policy, especially industrial policy, has had a bad reputation in certain circles because it was deemed to violate the virginal purity of classical capitalism. However, in a recent U-turn, even the World Bank admitted that industrial policy may not be all that bad, after all: the success of Japan, the Asian Tigers, and China can’t be ignored. That leads to the question of why policy in India has produced mediocre outcomes, what is different now, and where the best use of policy might be. Industrial Policy: What went wrong in the past? There are many problems here. To begin with, the Soviet model, which Nehruvians swore by, was, in hindsight, a dead end. Second, there is the problem of governance: post-Independence bureaucrats have awkwardly borne the legacy of imperial hauteur and the needs of a developing society. Third, until recently, the bare necessities (food, electricity, road access) were not available to many citizens, and GDP growth was not their priority. There is also the culture of jugaad: of clever ways in which you overcome constraints through frugal improvisation and seat-of-the-pants making-do. This is fine for one-off things (e.g. converting a tractor trailer into a makeshift transport vehicle because your truck broke down), but it does not make for efficient and replicable industrial products. As The Economic Times said recently, it is time to junk jugaad. Quality has to become ingrained in people’s minds. The issue of governance is significant: the bureaucracy and the judiciary have both under-performed, politicians, as everywhere, have been venal. It is said that China’s growth can be attributed to the fact that its babus are engineers, and therefore with engineering ruthlessness move in straight lines. The US’ babus are lawyers, and India’s are humanities graduates. Well, engineers are

Episode 5: May 17th, 2026: Shri Anuj Gupta, B Tech Mechanical 2003, Managing Director of Policy Consulting Firm BowerGroup Asia, former Govt of India policy expert, and former Chief of Staff to the Commerce Minister . Policy expert Anuj Gupta on how India Governs and why it matters for Business * The government has moved sharply toward outcome-orientation — targets, dashboards, PRAGATI reviews. What does that mean for how you sell to, partner with, or contract with the government? * The government operates with a clear priority stack — Swachh Bharat, Ayushman Bharat, PLI, ONDC. Reading that stack correctly seems like the most underrated business intelligence exercise in India. How do you read it? * if you knew exactly how a reform-oriented government thinks, decides, and executes, how would you run your business differently? This is a fireside chat hosted by the IIT Madras Alumni Association featuring policy expert Anuj Gupta, who examines the evolving relationship between the Indian government and the private sector. The discussion highlights how the state has transitioned from a mere regulator to a primary shaper of market structures, utilizing industrial policy and digital public infrastructure to drive rapid economic change. Gupta emphasizes that modern governance in India prioritizes outcome-oriented execution and scale, as evidenced by massive initiatives in electrification, poverty reduction, and the India Stack. Business leaders are encouraged to move from a reactive compliance mindset to an anticipatory strategy that aligns with state-driven goals like competitive federalism and technological innovation. By understanding the structural logic of current reforms, entrepreneurs can better navigate emerging opportunities in sectors like green energy, space technology, and logistics. Ultimately, the sources advocate for a collaborative partnership where businesses leverage government-built foundations to foster national growth and wealth creation. Brief Profile of Anuj Gupta Anuj Gupta is the Managing Director of Policy Consulting firm BowerGroupAsia. BowerGroupAsia is present in 30+ countries in the World and helps Fortune 500 companies enter or expand in a country and operates at the intersection of policy and business. Anuj previously was a Vice President at TataSons and spent a decade in the Indian and Abu Dhabi governments, where he shaped flagship policies across trade and industry, energy, finance, technology, infrastructure and startups. As chief of staff to Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal, he was instrumental in India’s recent economic, trade and supply chain realignment. He has worked in 10+ Ministries with experience ranging from energy, mining, transportation, industry, trade and food. Anuj holds an MBA from Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, and a BTech (ME, 2003) from the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras. He is also an alumnus of Mays Business School, Texas A&M University. In his spare time, he enjoys reading more than 100 books an year and exploring ideas at the intersection of policy, innovation and global development. Here’s the AI-generated audio podcast based on the conversation: Here is also a brief AI-generated video summary: This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

A version of this essay has been published by rediff.com at https://www.rediff.com/news/column/gulf-war-crisis-why-india-will-take-a-huge-hit/20260511.htm In the heat and dust of elections, many of us have forgotten that there is a war going on. But the PM’s warning about sacrifices and conservation reminds us that this essentially unwinnable war, and the on-again, off-again negotiations to bring it to a closure, are going to hit every one of us in our wallets. On 30th April, the Pentagon announced that the US had so far spent $25 billion on the West Asia war. This is a staggeringly huge number, and I was startled because I had casually thrown around this number as the ultimate cost of the war for all parties. Clearly I underestimated the damage, if this is the US’ cost alone. Add the other frontline states, and then the untold misery and cost imposed on all of us innocent bystanders. And it’s not over yet by any means. Pete Hegseth, the US secretary of war (self-fulfilling prophecy, isn’t it, they changed the name from secretary of defense, and lo! they went to war immediately thereafter) bristled at the idea of a quagmire, according to The Economist. But I am old enough to remember Vietnam, and then Afghanistan. These forever wars are easy to get into, but hard to get out of. Indeed, the war has become not only an impasse, but also a charade. Even considering how the narrative gets bizarre from all sides during every war, this one seems especially messed up. So much so that there literally is no point in paying attention to the day-to-day events, because they don’t seem to make much difference. Except of course, when the price of Brent crude hits $120, as it did on April 30th, twice what it was before the war. Ouch! And Hormuz is still closed. India is reeling under a heatwave, and we live under the Damocles’ sword of power cuts. Kerala announced a half hour of rolling cuts (anodyne euphemism: “load shedding”) every night, but they will not tell you when or where the cuts will be. This is like the Malayalam proverb: “the guy who got hit by lightning was then bitten by a snake”. Incidentally, there’s been a number of deaths from snakebites in Kerala as the reptiles enter houses seeking cooler temperatures. If this El Nino weather holds up, India’s assumptions about load (maximum 270 GW) will be challenged: we hit a record on April 25th of 256 GW peak demand, and the fact that the grid didn’t collapse is admirable, but being so close to the maximum is worrying. In Kerala, the grid cannot absorb the solar electricity produced by many households during the day because the Electricity Board did not purchase enough storage batteries: so much for on-grid. I am also fairly confident that once the elections are over, the government will be forced to increase fuel prices. Petrol has held steady at pump prices of Rs. 107.45/liter for a few years, but as crude oil prices have doubled, I see an inevitable rise not of Rs. 28 or so as speculated, but Rs. 50-100 based on how much inflation the Reserve Bank is willing to tolerate. In passing, I remember seeing somewhere that petrol prices have reached Pak Rs. 500/liter in that country. Therefore I have stopped paying much attention to the daily press releases and JUST IN, BREAKING NEWS types of ‘analysis’ (some of the most prominent of these are clear AI slop, possibly manufactured by Chinese troll farms). The big picture is that the Straits of Hormuz remain blocked, the amount of oil and gas coming from the Persian Gulf remains diminished dramatically, and recovery may take months, if not years, even if the strait is unblocked. The chances are increasing that this will become a protracted war, as the principals are standing by their maximalist positions, where this is little reason to believe they will be able to arrive at a via media and a lasting ceasefire. It is not business as usual. This is the biggest energy shock since 1973, and as always, it is developing countries that will be most seriously affected. India is going to take a large hit, with inflation rising by, say, 2%, and GDP growth falling from 7+% to 6%. There are several things India needs to do urgently: * Strive for self-reliance (“Atmanirbhar”) in a variety of areas * Diversify its sources of hydrocarbons to other geographies eg. Africa, South America, Central Asia (through Chabahar), and accelerate exploration of its own (offshore and onshore) blocks as Mumbai High and Assam fields are aging rapidly * Pursue other forms of energy: * Renewables * Coal, including carbon sequestration * Biofuels * Nuclear (both SMR and FBR) * Shift households from LPG to LNG, including tapping Krishna Godavari wells, coal gasification, biomass Especially at a time when electricity demand for new industries (eg. generativeAI data centers, semiconductors) is ramping up, it is important for India’s manufacturing rise to ensure that this does not become a constraint. From a consumer perspective, increased affluence brings increased electricity demand. In addition, the Indian migrant worker population of about 10 million in West Asia, and their inward remittances of some $40-$50 billion per annum (total of $120 billion globally) may be increasingly under pressure if oil/gas production does not go back to pre-war levels. There is one more factor: India needs military muscle. As I said about Pax Indica, the Indian Ocean needs a strong, impartial facilitator of trade in the Hormuz to Malacca sea-lanes, and India is best placed to do this, harking back to Rajendra Chola re-opening Malacca in 1025 CE. But this requires three things: * Major container ports: Trivandrum (Vizhinjam), Vadhavan, Great Nicobar (Galathea Bay) * The ‘switch’ to ease multiparty, multi-protocol trade: the India Stack * Security: three aircraft carrier groups, two dozen SSBNs, SSNs, AIP diesel submarines This is the time for India to plan forward fully, with the goal of Atmanirbharata, and energy security. The Persian Gulf is no longer a reliable source. The war is indeed a quagmire. 950 words This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

A version of this essay was published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/shadow-warrior-the-need-for-pax-indica-malacca-was-blocked-1001-years-ago-hormuz-is-choked-now-14005673.html In 1025 CE, exactly 1,001 years ago, Emperor Rajendra Chola sent an armada (probably the largest fleet in history before the advent of steam) 4,000 kilometers clear across the Indian Ocean. It was on a mission strangely familiar to us in 2026: open up a critical strait that was being choked by a littoral state. The thalassocratic SriVijaya Empire of Sumatra was closing the strait and imposing tolls, as well as winking at a little piracy. The strait in question then was Malacca. The Chola goal: to reopen Indian trade with Southeast Asia and China. Remarkably, the Cholas were not interested in territorial conquest, only in freedom of navigation. It is ironic that today, it is again a question of free trade, that shibboleth that has been waved about for decades (although that was a euphemism for ‘managed trade that benefits the West’). The difference between then and now? The salient fact is that Rajendra Chola was able to open Malacca with his wooden ships. With all his aircraft carriers and F-35s and missiles, President Trump is unable to open Hormuz. This must mean something, although reasonable people may differ on what that is. My claim is that it means India has the opportunity, in fact the need, to step into the breach. Maritime trade is severely disturbed today, and it is increasingly a disaster for innocent bystanders bereft of oil and gas. And it is increasingly the Indian Ocean that matters: specifically the sea-lanes from Hormuz to Malacca, which handle a significant portion of both oil/gas trade and goods trade globally. Geo-politics and geo-economics, Mahan’s and Spykman’s theories It is a reasonable conjecture that the locus of power has shifted over the centuries: in the 19th century, the Atlantic was supreme; in the 20th century, the Pacific; and in the 21st century, the most important ocean is the Indian Ocean. Asia has returned to center stage. In support of this assertion, see how the economic center of gravity of the world has returned to the vicinity of India, after the European colonial interlude. It is therefore appropriate to ask what it would take for India to regain its former keystone role in the Indian Ocean. Of course geography offers it to the country on a platter. From both Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory of naval power, and from Nicholas Spykman’s Rimland theory, India could be, or should be, the dominant power in the region: it is almost literally India’s ocean. Mahan’s ideas, updated for today, suggest that a strong navy should protect a large merchant marine fleet, manage trade, and control choke-points. The preferred hardware may have changed from battleships to aircraft carriers and especially nuclear submarines these days, but the basic idea remains: speak softly but carry a big stick with a force-projection navy. Spykman’s Rimland theory seems more appropriate in current circumstances than the Heartland theory popularized by Halford MacKinder. The Eurasian land mass may well be subject to control by a coastal hegemon or an alliance that controls the sea lanes and choke points. Despite pipelines and rail-borne containers, maritime trade still dominates. Spice Route >> Silk Road A stark reminder of this is the comparison between the fabled ‘Silk Road’ and the ancient ‘Spice Route’. Despite all the breathless propaganda about the Silk Road, it is abundantly clear that sea-borne trade was an order of magnitude greater, because a caravan of 500 camels, braving deserts, bandits and so on across central Asia couldn’t possibly carry more than 100 tons of goods; whereas an ocean-going stitched teak ship, like a single uru from Beypore, Kerala, could easily carry 400 tons. And the monsoon winds provided predictable, seasonal propulsion. India’s prowess was built on the monsoons. By mastering the seasonal winds, Indian mariners turned the ocean into a highway. This made India the supreme trading power. Merchants from Rome and Egypt traded with Chinese and Southeast Asian counterparts on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, leaving behind troves of coins as evidence. The Switch The remarkable thing is that these merchants did not even need to meet each other physically, because India provided the “multi-protocol switch”: translating their diverse needs and offering the conveniences of an entrepot, while also itself producing coveted, high-value products such as black pepper. For example, a Greek buyer could buy something from a Chinese seller, and settle the transaction using Indian credit. And how did India do it? By providing the “switching fabric”, such as the ports, the credit systems, and the security, that allowed these disparate worlds to exchange products and wealth without ever meeting. This is much like what a network gateway such as TIBCO does for packets of different kinds of data (in passing, how appropriate that TIBCO was founded by an Indian-American, Vivek Ranadive!). Hardware switches, eg. from Cisco Systems, have been around for a while, but TIBCO abstracted that functionality in software to connect those with different protocols. India already has many of the ingredients of the switching fabric in the India Stack. Using protocols like UPI, e-KYC, Account Aggregation, Central Bank Digital Currency, and ONDC, especially along with distributed-ledger blockchain-based Smart Contracts, it should be possible to provide end-to-end transparent and reliable multi-party trade support which complements the SWIFT payment system. Complement, not necessarily replace. The same pattern held with India’s age-old trade system. The ports were on the Malabar Coast, such as Muziris; on the Coromandel coast, such as Arikkamedu; and on the Konkan Coast, such as Bharuchcha. The credit systems were run by temples which acted as both bankers and venture capitalists for the trading guilds. The security: well, that’s what Rajendra Chola demonstrated in 1025 CE. Alas, medieval India lost its maritime focus. So did China. Both became insular, and were overwhelmed by invaders, including Turkics and Europeans. In India’s case, the Turkic invaders were land-focused powers, although there were isolated maritime attempts (e.g. the Maratha Navy, Travancore defeating the Dutch in an amphibious battle at Colachel in 1741, etc.) Now, however, there are new ports. The most interesting is the Port of Trivandrum (Vizhinjam). This deep-water container transhipment port is only 10 nautical miles away from the Hormuz-Malacca sea lanes, and now when Dubai is closed, it reportedly has a backlog of a hundred container ships waiting to be berthed. Then there is the upcoming Vadhavan container port in Maharashtra, and the Galathea Bay container port in Great Nicobar, which overlooks the mouth of Malacca. Pax Indica today The modern idea of Pax Indica borrows from both perspectives: hard power and a switch. An Internet search brings up the fact that it was my friend Bapa Rao and I who first started talking about it in terms of India being the benevolent hegemon in the Indian Ocean, way back in the 1990s. Later, Shashi Tharoor wrote in his 2011 book Pax Indica that it could be “a peace system based on cooperation, stability, and rule‑based order in Asia and beyond, in which rising India helps shape the rules of the road rather than impose its will through hegemony.” That is, along roughly the same lines as the “multi protocol switch” or entrepot concept. Pax Indica is not an empire; it is an ecosystem. There are three aspects: military power, the full exploration of the multiprotocol switch, and the port-led development policy. Bapa Rao and I will consider these in a future article. Briefly, though, here is what these entail. * Project Power: Use a 3-carrier, 18-24-submarine navy to ensure no single power can close the ocean’s gates. * Enable Trade: Use the Digital India Stack to act as the “Multi-Protocol Switch” for a fragmented world, plus super-ports like Vizhinjam (Trivandrum). * Secure the Choke Points: Be ready, like the Cholas, to act decisively when a “Srivijaya-style” blockade threatens the common good. Hard power needs to come through the acquisition of a blue water navy: at least three aircraft carrier groups, one for the Arabian Sea (Hormuz), one for the Bay of Bengal (Malacca), and one in maintenance, refit and upgrades. Even though drones and missiles have rendered them less dominant than in earlier times, carrier groups are still important for air superiority and power projection. But an ever-more critical factor is “area denial” by nuclear attack submarines (SSBN) that can launch second strike nuclear missiles as part of the “triad”, of which India should have at least three to four. In addition, there should be at least a dozen silent AIP-equipped diesel-electrics for securing straits, and at least 6-12 SSN (possibly leased) to enhance blue-water reach. “The IOR must become an Indian lake,” said General Raj Shukla on X. I agree: Not as a territory of conquest, but as a sanctuary of trade, where India sits at the center, as the protocol provider that makes world trade work again, as in millennia past. 1500 words, 27 Apr, 2026 Here’s the notebookLM.google.com AI-generated video about this article: This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

This is a fireside chat hosted by Rajeev Srinivasan of the IIT Madras Alumni Association, featuring Dr. Suraj Rengarajan, MD and Principal Technologist, Applied Materials India. The discussion centers on the current renaissance of India’s semiconductor industry, highlighting how favorable government policies and shifting global geopolitics have created a unique window for domestic manufacturing. They discuss how supportive government policies, shifts in global geopolitics, and a massive domestic consumer market are creating a unique opportunity for India to establish a manufacturing ecosystem. The dialogue emphasizes the necessity of developing specialized talent and hands-on training to move beyond semiconductor design into actual fabrication. Dr. Rengarajan highlights the potential of AI-driven manufacturing and predictive analytics to improve production efficiency and material discovery. He also explains the critical need to build a supporting ecosystem of suppliers, specialized power, and ultrapure water around newly announced fabrication plants. He emphasizes that while India possesses significant design talent, the country must now focus on hands-on technical training and leveraging AI for manufacturing efficiency. The conversation also addresses the challenges of competing with established global players and the importance of niche applications in the domestic market. Ultimately, the source portrays a hopeful yet realistic outlook on India’s journey toward becoming a global electronics manufacturing hub over the next decade. Here’s a brief profile of Dr. Suraj Rengarajan: Dr. Suraj Rengarajan is the Managing Director and Principal Technologist at Applied Materials India, Bangalore. In this role he drives strategic engagement between Applied Materials India and external technology ecosystems, including universities, research institutions, the start-up eco-system and industry forums. He serves as a key spokesperson for Applied Materials in technology-related events and manage programs that foster innovation, collaboration, and talent development. Suraj started his career at Applied Materials, Santa Clara in 1997, where he held different roles ranging from process engineering, technology, program management, and product marketing for thin film deposition and metallization for interconnects silicides and novel memories. He moved to India in 2007 to head the SunFab group for Applied Materials in India. Later he headed the engineering group for dielectric deposition. As the India CTO, he worked on materials engineering driven inflections to develop and commercialize new technologies. As Semiconductor Products Group India head he drove SPG strategic objectives in India, planning and growing a customer focused organization, building local leadership talent, enabling collaboration across India & Asia region, and strengthening university and ecosystem partnerships. Suraj holds a B. Tech from IIT Madras in Metallurgical Engineering and earned his M.S and Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin in Materials Science. Suraj holds over 15 US patents and has more than 20 publications. The following are courtesy Google notebook LM. Audio podcast (a good summary of the conversation with some AI masala): This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

A version of this essay has been published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/shadow-warrior-drones-are-the-new-tanks-time-for-india-to-catch-up-13998019.html The most important lesson (of many) from Gulf War 3 may have been foreshadowed by the Ukraine War and other conflicts: that a combination of a step-change in warfare (military strategy) and disruptive innovation (business strategy) could rewrite the rules. If so, we may need to rethink the value of much expensive hardware. Moreover, nations such as India may need to seriously revamp their arms procurement: to small, cheap, local maybe? The most disturbing aspect of this scenario is that it reduces the human factor, and human control, over warfare. It leads to the specter of robot warfare, of Skynet, of 2001: A Space Odyssey, where autonomous intelligences may take rational decisions that have grave consequences for humans, inflicting collateral damage on innocent bystanders in ways that nobody quite understands. We need a real-life version of Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics”. But then humans too inflict unthinking collateral damage.. Step-change in warfare, and disruptive innovation There have been numerous instances where a settled and standardized war tactic was suddenly overturned by a new invention, rendering old military assets impotent. One or two examples will suffice: one was the eclipse of heavy cavalry after the invention of massed archers using longbow volleys to mow them down with thousands of synchronized arrows raining down, also inducing panic in their horses in mid-charge. Another example is how battle tanks overwhelmed the previous model of trench warfare. (Ironically, in turn, tanks are now being rendered sitting ducks by drones.) In both cases, long-held assumptions had to be rewritten practically overnight, and entirely new mechanisms had to be put in place. It is a good question (on which reasonable people may differ) as to whether the arrival of drone-and-missile-based warfare is rendering air power, including fighters, bombers and aircraft carriers, essentially obsolescent. Clayton Christensen articulated the theory of disruptive innovation in business, where an entrenched incumbent can be overthrown in short order by an insurgent attacking them from an unexpected direction, often based on lower-cost options. One example is that of Kodak and the film-camera business. Cheap and convenient digital photography dislocated Kodak et al practically overnight. I personally experienced this disruption in the 1990s when I had a key role in operating system strategy for Sun Microsystems, the runaway leader in engineering workstations and servers, which used the Unix operating system. Despite our best efforts, Microsoft+Intel coming in from the low end (as Windows systems became more capable) rapidly captured the key resource, which is third-party software vendors. This caused end users to desert in droves. There were other reasons, too: internecine warfare among firms using Unix, such as IBM, HP, Sun, AT&T, Toshiba, et al. While they bickered, Windows systems became more powerful. Lesson: the ecosystem has to be managed carefully, including supply chains. Putting these three together (step-change, disruptive innovation, and the ground realities of the Gulf War 3) one can speculate that future military doctrine will be vastly different. Here is Iran’s military doctrine, for reference, from the substack NotesonGeopolitics (Disclaimer: I am neither endorsing it or criticizing it, just offering it as an example). The US is adjusting to this reality. There is a book titled “Project Maven”, based on 200+ interviews chronicling the US military’s shift to AI-driven warfare, starting with a 2017 Pentagon project to automate drone footage analysis amid overwhelming data volumes. Project Maven evolved from error-prone early tools (such as misidentifying school buses as threats) to supporting autonomous systems like Goalkeeper drones and Whiplash naval units, now used in conflicts from Ukraine to the Caribbean by 25,000 personnel across 32 companies. Speaking of disruptive innovation, it is ironic to see the US reverse-engineering Iranian Shahed drones, and the Russians doing the same to Ukrainian drones: incumbents learning from insurgents. This is only the beginning, of course. There is a nightmare scenario: murmurating, autonomous drone swarms with a hive mind. A flock of starlings flying in perfect synchrony is a thing of beauty: they do not collide with each other, the entire swarm changes direction instantaneously, and there is emergent intelligence in the swarm, much greater than the intelligence of the individual bird. The same is true of beehives and ant colonies, too. A company called ShieldAI in fact has a product named Hivemind that does precisely this. Imagine a murmurating drone swarm of 1,000 or even 10,000: and since they cost so little make, this is not unrealistic. The enemy may shoot down 90% of them, but the 10% that gets through, especially if they are kamikaze drones fitted with explosives, can cause real damage. There is the old joke about quantity: “What do you do when you invade China? First day, you take 10,000 prisoners. Second day, you take 100,000 prisoners. Third day, you surrender!” But we don’t have to go that far: just take two instances where inexpensive drones were able to penetrate the defenses of heavily secured military airports. The first was in Russia in June 2025. Using 117 low-cost drones, Ukrainians struck several airbases at once. There is video footage of FPV drones landing on Tu-95 bombers, destroying them. These are strategic long-range nuclear bombers from the Cold War era, and will be difficult to replace. And then, just last month: at Barksdale Air Force Base in the US, where B-52 nuclear bombers are deployed, there were repeated drone swarm overflights (of 12-15 drones) between March 9th and March 15th, 2026. They couldn’t be jammed, and displayed “non-commercial signal characteristics”, although they did not actually attack the planes. Reconnaissance, it must be assumed. Superpower militaries are unable to contain them. Electronic warfare like jamming may be ineffective anyway as swarms self-repair. But it is true that there are air defense weapons that can shoot down the majority of drones. There are interceptors (but they are much more expensive than the drones themselves). Then new Directed Energy Weapons (including both lasers and high-powered microwaves) are in development. Rail guns, I understand, are overkill for them. Where is India in this arms race? India finds itself left behind in this transition, and remains committed to legacy platforms such as tanks, fighters, and other imported systems. It is true that there were battlefield successes in Operation Sindoor, where X-25 drones (towed on a 100 meter optical cable) emitted the radar signatures of Rafale fighter jets, thus drawing enemy missiles to themselves, without harming the planes. But these were Israeli products; also British-origin Banshee drones were used for spoofing Su-31 and Mig-29 signatures.. Indigenous drone efforts lag China by 3-5 years in scale, AI integration, and mass production; reliance on Chinese components persists despite bans. It does not have to be this way: India should create Production Linked Incentives for drones and missiles, and harness Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence at scale. India needs to promote this as a cottage industry, so that many individuals will get involved, as in the following post by a Ukrainian drone-maker, with a hashtag #MadebyHousewives. That country produces as many as 4.5 million cheap drones a year, often using 3d printing. While Ukraine and Iran improvise hive-mind swarms under fire, India’s northeast and border regions face asymmetric threats from low-cost systems. The recent mercenary scandal in the Northeast illustrates the peril. Mercenaries, the Northeast and a new Christian enclave? The March 2026 arrests by India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) expose how this drone proliferation directly endangers the Seven Sisters. Six Ukrainians and American mercenary Matthew Aaron Van Dyke were detained across Indian airports. They had repeatedly crossed from restricted Mizoram into Myanmar since 2024, training ethnic insurgent groups in drone assembly, operation, jamming, and electronic warfare. They smuggled European drone consignments through India for insurgent networks, some linked to proscribed Indian groups operating in the northeast. This is no abstract threat: drones enable precision strikes on security forces, surveillance of remote terrain, and supply drops. These capabilities could ignite or sustain insurgencies in India’s volatile borderlands. In the background is former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s explosive 2024 warning. Hasina alleged a “white man’s” conspiracy to carve out a new “Christian nation” (akin to East Timor or South Sudan) from Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts, Myanmar’s Rakhine and Chin regions, and India’s Northeast. She cited foreign eyes on the Bay of Bengal and ethnic fault lines. Hasina’s claim was dismissed as paranoia then; today, Ukrainian-American actors arming Myanmar’s rebel groups lend credence to a broader destabilization playbook. A hive-mind-enabled drone campaign could empower separatists and create a Christian-majority enclave, exploiting Christian tribal demographics and porous borders. This is hybrid warfare at its most insidious: mercenaries as force multipliers for great-power proxies. If these insurgents can leverage drone swarms to close the Siliguri Corridor or target regional infrastructure, they can create a fait accompli on the ground for India. Conclusion The drone-missile age demands urgent adaptation. Nations must invest in AI swarm doctrine, resilient EW, decentralized deployment, and indigenous mass production ecosyst

A version of this essay has been published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/iran-war-no-winners-oil-de-dollarisation-global-impact-13992276.html War is hell, we all know, and it’s bad for everybody, but there is – usually – a winner. After more than three weeks of the Iran war, I am beginning to believe that there are no winners here, only losers. The principals are overextending themselves, and will suffer as a consequence. Innocent or not-so-innocent bystanders are suffering significant collateral damage. Some are getting hurt more than others, so it’s mostly a question of degree: but the bottom line is that this is war that is just not good for anybody. As usual, Henry Kissinger had a useful aphorism: “It’s a pity both sides can’t lose”, quoth he. (Hat tip to reader Sudarshan M). Well, Henry, both sides are losing this one, so take heart: your wish has come true. Someone made the analogy of going to Family Court with a dispute: there are no winners, as the father, mother, and the children, will all suffer, whatever the outcome. It is best in that situation to listen to a counselor and solve your problems amicably. Similarly, it would be good to find a neutral intermediary to help iron out a ceasefire in this war, too. In a way, this war is the classic idea of irresistible force meeting an immovable object, thus leading to a stalemate, as Walter Russel Mead suggested in the Wall Street Journal. First, the toll on the belligerents, in alphabetical order: * Iran. It is creditable that Iran has held out against the might of the US war machine for three weeks and more. My belief is that they can keep it up for a while longer, because they have been preparing for this eventuality for some decades, ever since the 1979 crisis in which they held Americans hostage for 444 days. They are taking, and will take, horrendous losses, but it will be difficult to completely overthrow the Islamist regime. Among other things, Iran is a large country, about half the size of peninsular India. * The US attack on Kharg Island’s military targets (but not its oil terminals) has shown that Iran’s oil exports could be in jeopardy, pushing global prices up. * Just like their proxy Hamas, it appears Iran has built extensive tunnel complexes, veritable underground labyrinths, where they are hiding all sorts of things, including fast patrol boats. Their military assets are doubtless ensconced in these tunnels which makes them hard to locate and possibly quite mobile. * Israel. Iran’s consistent rhetoric that Israel doesn’t deserve to exist leads to fears that Iran’s nuclear arsenal (if and when built) will be primarily aimed at Israel. This, and troubles with Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, have led to massive Israeli human intelligence penetration of Iran (as seen in the Stuxnet incident as well as the effective strikes on the Ayatollahs and Hamas, including the pager incident). But Israel is also believed to be taking heavy losses, which it can ill afford, although information has been tightly censored. There were apparently missile attacks near Israel’s nuclear sites at Dimona as well. * The US. The original idea of a decapitation strike that would lead to a rapid regime change as the Iranian public rose up and anointed a new leadership (one more acceptable to the US), was questionable, as I pointed out fairly early. It appears that the CIA and US intelligence have just one playbook, which they used more or less successfully in Iraq, Libya, etc. But that was never going to work in Iran, and now the US is stuck with a tar-baby and may be quietly seeking de-escalation and an off-ramp. * Talk of a Marine Expeditionary Unit of 2500 American soldiers re-deployed from Japan means “boots on the ground” followed inevitably by that dreaded word, “body bags”. The troops will be meant to keep Hormuz open, or perhaps to capture Kharg Island. Whether they can achieve these is unclear right now. * However, overall it appears that the US’ capacity to coerce other countries through economic means is declining, as suggested by the FT in “The era of US dominance in economic warfare is over” on March 17th. Now for the others in the firing line and in the periphery: * The GCC, consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. They have taken the brunt of the Iranian drone and missile attacks, and their oil and gas exports, and economies, are affected by the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. But more alarmingly, their food and water supplies may also be affected, and they are, being desert nations, highly dependent on imported items via the blockaded Hormuz, and critically dependent on their desalination plants. Keeping the Straits of Hormuz open may be critical for them. They have been with human casualties, infrastructure damage, and reputational damage as well. In particular, Dubai, which has been a magnet for high-net-worth individuals, is affected. * Lebanon and Jordan. Lebanon was hit by Israeli fire, and Jordan by Iranian fire, although they are mostly bystanders. Israel has been responding to increased activity by Iranian proxy Hezbollah, and Iran has sent drones and missiles towards Jordan as part of general horizontal escalation. * Pakistan and Turkey. These are wild card nations in the conflict. So far they have not (yet) been affected badly, but they have to walk a tightrope. On the one hand, it is very likely that Pakistan has offered logistical and intelligence support to the US in its air attacks on Iran. On the other, as a fellow-Islamic nation, Iran has, under both the Shah and the mullahs, consistently supported Pakistan (especially against India). * Furthermore, if there is a ground assault on Iran, it will probably involve Balochis from Pakistan and Kurds from Turkey, both attempting to capture land in, respectively, the Sistan and Baluchistan Province, and the heavily Kurdish regions of Iran bordering Turkey. * Turkey, as a NATO member, is obligated to support the US, despite its Islamist leadership which is duty-bound to side with the fellow-Islamic Iranian regime. The traditional Sunni-Shia split, which has been exacerbated by Shia Iran attacking Sunni Gulf nations, sharpens the dilemma for both nations. (Meanwhile, Pakistanis slaughtered 400 Afghans by bombing a hospital, but they get a free pass from, e.g. the BBC.) * The United Nations. It has been rendered superfluous. Nobody even called for a Security Council meeting condemning the war. This is the latest in a long process wherein whatever the UN, or many other multilateral organizations do or say has become immaterial. The UN, hit by a budget crunch, might as well be shut down. * Europe and Britain. The EU and NATO have been noticeably absent in the discussions about the war. Of course, they are likely to be affected by the increase in hydrocarbon prices. In fact, their folly in shuttering their nuclear power plants in pursuit of vague ‘green’ goals has put them at the mercy of Russian oil and gas. In particular, the virtual shutting out of Britain from the entire war is notable, considering that their Whitehall has long managed to treat the US Deep State as their vassals, ‘master-blaster’ style. * Russia. Even though Russia has long been friendly with Iran, it has desisted from doing anything that could bring it into direct conflict with the US. Russia is probably supplying satellite and other reconnaissance data as well as spares for existing systems (such as the S-300 air defense batteries, Su-35 fighters) and possibly Iranian-designed Shahed drones as well. Interestingly enough, Russia may be the one possible winner in the war, considering its oil is now a coveted commodity, prices have soared, and there is less attention being paid to its Ukraine war. Europe, China and India are ever-more dependent on Russian oil, and the windfall profits may be sustainable. The US may even lift its sanctions and bring Russia back into the Western fold. * China. There are wins and losses for China, but in sum it may also be a bit of a winner. * The loss is in energy security: China has lost Venezuelan oil as well as access to Iranian oil, but they have overland pipelines from Russia, as well as access to Russian tankers at sea. Besides, they have a massive strategic petroleum reserve (1 billion barrels), so it should be manageable, for a while at least. Cuba, their reliable ally in the US’ backyard, is now back to the wall with the US enforcing a blockade. * On the other hand, they have acquired a significant military edge: US munitions inventory has been getting depleted at a furious rate, so much so that if China were to attack Taiwan now, the US would be hard pressed to intervene. Even US THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense) systems are being cannibalized: after four of their radars in the GCC were damaged, the US is forced to scavenge for them from their South Korean bases. Now comes news that China is massing both civilian ships and military aircraft near Taiwan, quite possibly a precursor to an actual invasion. * Unfortunately for China, their weapons systems don’t seem to have performed very well in Iran, just as they didn’t in Operation Sindoor. There are sarcastic posts on X, especially about their radar that looks like a big grille and is supposed to detect stealth aircraft, but didn’t quite work. * China has also been on the horns of a dilemma, as it were: what would Xi do when Trump visits in April while in the midst of a war with one of China’s principal allies? It would be “damned if you do, damned if you don’t”. If China were to greet him warmly, it would send a negative message to Iran, as well as its other Belt and Road Initiative partners. If China were to treat Trump coldly, then trade wars will continue. Fortunately for Xi, Trump decided to delay his visit; perhaps he intends to continue the war well into April, or maybe he

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com War is hell, we all know, and it’s bad for everybody, but there is – usually – a winner. After more than two weeks of the Iran war, I am beginning to believe that there are no winners here, only losers. The principals are overextending themselves, and will suffer as a consequence. Innocent or not-so-innocent bystanders are suffering significant collateral damage. Some are getting hurt more than others, so it’s mostly a question of degree: but the bottom line is that this is war that is just not good for anybody. As usual, Henry Kissinger had a useful aphorism: “It’s a pity both sides can’t lose”, quoth he. (Hat tip to reader Sudarshan M). Well, Henry, both sides are losing this one, so take heart: your wish has come true. Someone made the analogy of going to Family Court with a dispute: there are no winners, as the father, mother, and the children, will all suffer, whatever the outcome. It is best in that situation to listen to a counselor and solve your problems amicably. Similarly, it would be good to find a neutral intermediary to help iron out a ceasefire in this war, too. In a way, this war is the classic idea of irresistible force meeting an immovable object, thus leading to a stalemate, as Walter Russel Mead suggested in the Wall Street Journal. First, the toll on the belligerents, in alphabetical order: * Iran. It is creditable that Iran has held out against the might of the US war machine for two weeks and more. My belief is that they can keep it up for a while longer, because they have been preparing for this eventuality for some decades, ever since the 1979 crisis in which they held Americans hostage for 444 days. They are taking, and will take, horrendous losses, but it will be difficult to completely overthrow the Islamist regime. Among other things, Iran is a large country, about half the size of peninsular India. * The US attack on Kharg Island’s military targets (but not its oil terminals) has shown that Iran’s oil exports could be in jeopardy, pushing global prices up. * Just like their proxy Hamas, it appears Iran has built extensive tunnel complexes, veritable underground labyrinths, where they are hiding all sorts of things, including fast patrol boats. Their military assets are doubtless ensconced in these tunnels which makes them hard to locate and possibly quite mobile. * Israel. Iran’s consistent rhetoric that Israel doesn’t deserve to exist leads to fears that Iran’s nuclear arsenal (if and when built) will be primarily aimed at Israel. This, and troubles with Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, have led to massive Israeli human intelligence penetration of Iran (as seen in the Stuxnet incident as well as the effective strikes on the Ayatollahs and Hamas, including the pager incident). But Israel is also believed to be taking heavy losses, which it can ill afford, although information has been tightly censored.. * The US. The original idea of a decapitation strike that would lead to a rapid regime change as the Iranian public rose up and anointed a new leadership (one more acceptable to the US), was questionable, as I pointed out fairly early. It appears that the CIA and US intelligence have just one playbook, which they used more or less successfully in Iraq, Libya, etc. But that was never going to work in Iran, and now the US is stuck with a tar-baby and may be quietly seeking de-escalation and an off-ramp. * Talk of a Marine Expeditionary Unit of 2500 American soldiers re-deployed from Japan means “boots on the ground” followed inevitably by that dreaded word, “body bags”. The troops will be meant to keep Hormuz open, or perhaps to capture Kharg Island. Whether they can achieve these is unclear right now. * However, overall it appears that the US’ capacity to coerce other countries through economic means is declining, as suggested by the FT in “The era of US dominance in economic warfare is over” on March 17th.

Just around the same time as the axe fell on Washington Post’s global staff, accompanied by much wailing and gnashing of teeth, I got a message from my Rediff.com editor, Nikhil Lakshman, mentioning it was the 30th anniversary of its founding. An interesting contrast indeed: the old Western flagbearer waning, while the Indian pioneer holds on, despite a plethora of competitors and copycats, including many pushing specific agendas. That also made me think of why there was a bloodbath at the Washington Post, where they gutted the foreign desks, sports, books, and some leading podcasts, and laid off a third of its staff. I suspect there are two reasons: one is the increasing insularity of the US, a retreat into Fortress America, and paradoxically a turning away from the rest of the world at the very moment the rest of the world should be looming more prominently in the rear-view mirror. And two, the economics and the technology of the narrative business have turned. On the one hand, print media have been retreating and losing ad revenue for years, and on the other hand, the rise of generativeAI has made it possible to eliminate entire layers of (at least) entry-level journalists, just as it is decimating paralegals, code-jockeys, and apprentice accountants. Only junior doctors seem immune so far, but we shall see how that goes. I must confess that there was a time when I consumed the Western narrative with gusto: reading Time, Newsweek, and so on, and listening to the BBC. In fact, I actually subscribed to the New York Times for years (ok, in my defense I was living in the New York area), and later The Economist for at least a dozen years. I still listen to some podcasts from the latter, but with considerable caution, as I am far more aware of their biases and proclivities. That’s where my concern about big-name Western media comes from. They are all somehow associated with the Deep State, that amorphous entity, the hidden puppet-master behind pretty much everything that goes on in foreign and domestic policy. For instance, an outlet that I considered the voice of NATO, turns out to be the voice of Whitehall, Britain’s bureaucracy. There has long been a truism that the Washington Post is the mouthpiece of Foggy Bottom, i.e. the US State Department, and the New York Times that of Langley, i.e. the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Noam Chomsky long ago made the insightful observation that they are both in the business of “manufacturing consent”, i.e. narrative-peddling to suit vested interests, specifically the Military-Industrial Complex, which likes, or needs, constant wars. The eclipse of the WaPo is not only a statement about the decreasing influence of the State Department on foreign affairs (in the wake of the decline of the “liberal, rules-based international order”). But it is also because the print media business is no longer lucrative, as the bulk of advertising revenue has now moved online, to the likes of Alphabet, Meta, Amazon et al. Large numbers of smaller US newspapers have closed down over the past few decades. I suspect also that gaslighting at scale is much easier now with the advent of outlets such as Wikipedia. Ashley Rindsberg, author of The Grey Lady Winked (an expose of the NYT), has been chronicling on Twitter how Wikipedia has become a handmaiden of the usual suspects. Editors are often paid agents provocateurs, and stories that do not serve their purpose are simply trashed. There is much that is subjective/motivated about the content. However, since Wikipedia has become the encyclopaedia of record, and generativeAI uses it unabashedly as a genuine source, the level of force-multiplication is immense. Every AI chatbot uses it, and of course all of us are using these chatbots. If it’s not in Wikipedia, it ceases to exist, and I fear this is happening to India’s Traditional Knowledge Systems. This level of groupthink, alas, is not unusual. That is where I applaud Rediff. When it appeared in the 1990s, the discourse in India was tremendously skewed to the Left. What was considered “Centrist” in India was, objectively speaking, “Left”, and what was considered “Left” was, in reality, “Lunatic-Fringe Left”. It was simply impossible to get a dissenting opinion published, especially because nobody would hire you if your views didn’t pass a test of fealty. But Rediff offered that possibility. Nikhil Lakshman, the editor, and Ajit Balakrishnan, the publisher, were willing to take risks with other voices, and I personally am grateful. Here I was, a non-specialist, a technologist and product manager in Silicon Valley, and also an unapologetic Hindu nationalist, which would have made me “Lunatic-Fringe Right” in the scheme of things. Rediff gave me a voice. Before me, it also gave a voice to my dear and late friend, Varsha Bhosle. We wrote stuff as we saw it, without self-censoring, and it turned out it resonated with a lot of people, especially in the diaspora, who at that time had much more Internet access than in India. I used to get hundreds of e-mails in response to my columns. Varsha got even more. We had the great advantage that, as non-professionals, we didn’t care about employment or income from journalism. Sun Microsystems paid my way; Varsha was the daughter of the celebrated Asha Bhosle. Conversely, that is a problem today for those JNU products who were planning to enter the field: USAID and Soros funds are down, and their proteges in the Indian online world (you know who they are) aren’t doing all that well. I have an old classmate, a journalist, whom I consider deranged and terminally anti-India, who makes a nice living off, I gather, funds from several countries inimical to India, but the outlook for his tribe is a little dim these days. Rediff was the only game in town in 1996, and it thrived. It was India’s pioneering internet portal with web news, email, shopping, entertainment, and it rode the first dot-com wave and survived multiple cycles (including the 2000 crash). It adapted from a pure portal to an aggregated and news-focused site, outlasting many peers by staying lean, India-centric, unbiased, and low-cost. Rediff represents a digital-native model that persisted through adaptation without the massive overhead of legacy print giants. More power to it! Thank you again, and best wishes! Postscript Those tests of fealty to the ‘cause’ continue. I personally have been ejected from two op-ed columns because my thoughts were apparently impure. One, a few years ago, was at a prominent national daily. After writing occasionally for some time on invitation, my contact ruefully told me that I was persona non grata, in his words, not because my stuff was not good, but because the opinion editor did not agree with my perspectives. More recently, I had a regular monthly column in a well-known regional daily. After having my words over-edited repeatedly, I realized that their opinion editor, who had invited me on board, simply did not like my pro-Hindu stance. So I quit. The remarkable thing is all of the dramatis personae, including me, these two opinion editors, and the Rediff folks, are originally from Kerala. I wonder if this reflects some deep psychosis in the make-believe world in this last bastion of extreme Leftism. Tellingly, the ‘all-India strike’ called by left trade unions on the 12th of February was ignored everywhere except Kerala, where it was total. 1075 words, 10 Feb 2026 updated 13 Feb 2026 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

A version of this essay was published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/india-us-trade-deal-trump-skepticism-13977047.html I am beginning to feel quite like ‘The Boy Who Cried Wolf’, who was destined to be ignored. Or maybe I am the boy who cried ‘The Emperor Has No Clothes’. For, I was skeptical last week about the India-EU FTA, which I called a triumph of hope over experience. Now I am equally skeptical about the so-called India-US trade ‘deal’, which in fact is not a deal at all, but a sort-of statement of direction about the way to an actual deal. The AI-generated video about this essay Google NotebookLM: I expressed my caution on a Malayalam TV program where the host was a retired Ambassador. He was less skeptical than me, but he understood where I was coming from: after all, a diplomat’s job is to put the best spin on the news (good or bad) from his country’s perspective. And I spent much of my professional career in marketing: I can tell spin when I see it. Reason No. 1: Trump is famous for exaggeration and U-turns. The very first reason for the scepticism about the Indo-US lovefest is that it was announced by President Trump, who, in the past six months, has, in his whimsical way, executed any number of U-turns, as well as Z-turns, and various other pretzel-logic twists, so much so that anything he says, and its opposite, can be equally true, in a quantum Schrodinger’s Cat sort of way. It is prudent not to take him at face value when he swears eternal allegiance to India. Again. Quoth he: “It was an Honor to speak with Prime Minister Modi, of India, this morning. He is one of my greatest friends, and a Powerful and Respected Leader of his Country. We spoke about many things, including Trade, and ending the War with Russia and Ukraine. He agreed to stop buying Russian Oil, and to buy much more from the United States and, potentially, Venezuela. This will help END THE WAR in Ukraine, which is taking place right now, with thousands of people dying each and every week! Out of friendship and respect for Prime Minister Modi and, as per his request, effective immediately, we agreed to a Trade Deal between the United States and India, whereby the United States will charge a reduced Reciprocal Tariff, lowering it from 25% to 18%. They will likewise move forward to reduce their Tariffs and Non Tariff Barriers against the United States, to ZERO. The Prime Minister also committed to “BUY AMERICAN,” at a much higher level, in addition to over $500 BILLION DOLLARS of U.S. Energy, Technology, Agricultural, Coal, and many other products. Our amazing relationship with India will be even stronger going forward. Prime Minister Modi and I are two people that GET THINGS DONE, something that cannot be said for most. Thank you for your attention to this matter!” Okay. Very interesting. There has been no Indian readout corroborating a number of these claims, especially on agriculture, which I imagine is a redline, a no-go, for India. Besides, these are supposed to be ‘reciprocal’ tariffs. If Indian tariffs go to zero on US products, why is the US imposing 18% on Indian products? Reason No. 2: Desperation of ‘jilted lovers’ The ‘shotgun wedding’ vibe was present in the India-EU FTA as well: a sort of desperation. There is not much choice: you simply have to do this. I am not the only one saying this. Here is a tweet from a senior EU leader, former PM of Sweden and co-chair of the EU Council for foreign relations. Of course you could say that he would say this, wouldn’t he? But it happens to be true. The number of suitors is declining rapidly, so you compromise. But that is not a recipe for the longevity of the relationship, nor for faithfulness. You can expect er… adultery (early and often). The roving eye roveth. Reason No. 3: Agriculture and dairy red-lines We really don’t know much about the fine print. I am aware that sales and marketing people tend to promise anything (even things they are completely aware are impossible) just to get the sale. Thus, when India diversifies away from the US market, and its Q3 numbers are not badly affected by the Trump tariffs, it is incumbent upon Trump and Navarro, Bessent, Lutnick et al to reverse their previous abuse, and be all milk and honey. The problem here, as always, is the agriculture and dairy product front. It is an absolute red line for India: no government can afford to piss off its farmers, nor to open up the country, home of much of the world’s genetic diversity, to Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) including Terminator Seeds (that would forever put farmers at the mercy of Cargill and friends). Not only that, non-veg milk (that is, milk from cows that have been fed, among other things, ground-up animal bodies) is abhorrent to a large number of Indians. Not to mention the risk of things like Creuzfeldt-Jakob Disease or mad-cow disease (transmitted via feed that includes the ground-up brains of diseased cattle: see also the fatal brain disease Kuru, transmitted between cannibals in Papua New Guinea). The US rather urgently needs to get rid of its soybean and corn mountains and milk lakes (in contrast with the EU’s butter mountain and wine lakes) and in both, exporters salivate at the prospect of the proverbial billion-customer market. (The Chinese expertly used this rather illusory meme to attract foreign makers of consumer goods. That didn’t end well). In the case of India, there is no demand for soybeans, and the one place where I can see demand for corn is in ethanol, especially for blending into petrol. That would be a win-win, because it would reduce the need for India to grow highly thirsty sugarcane, thus drawing down the already alarmingly depleted water-table. Reason No. 4: Russian oil and energy in general The unseemly pressure over Russian oil raises hackles on the Indian side. After all, this is not the only time India has been pushed to the wall by American sanctions: there was the post-’Buddha is smiling’ period, and the prevention of the sale of ex-Soviet cryogenic rocket technology, as immortalized in Nambi Narayanan’s story in “Rocketry: The Nambi Effect”. Earlier, there was the embargo on supercomputers. In each of these cases, India rode out the sanctions and denials. But the question arises: why should India not use Russian oil if it makes commercial sense to India? Just because there is a conflict between Russia and Ukraine? That is really not India’s problem: India does not have a dog in that fight. Now there is the allegedly impending US attack on Iran. India has been denied Iranian oil for some time, and now under US pressure, it is being forced to ramp down its involvement in Chabahar Port in Iran that India built, and views as a gateway to Central Asia. Notably, China continues to import Iranian crude. Is India getting some relief there? It is not realistic to imagine that large amounts of Venezuelan crude will now flow to India if it abjures the Russian stuff. For one, even though Reliance’s Jamnagar refiner can process the heavy, sour Venezuelan oil, it is said that Venezuela will take some time and a lot of money to ramp up its output because of years of neglect, lack of naphtha to dilute and pump out the crude, and so on. Reason No. 5: Non-tariff barriers and subsidies. The US claims that India will drop all its non-tariff barriers, but what is the guarantee that the US will not raise an impenetrable wall on their side? It is a simple matter to impose difficult-to-comply-with rules that basically say “Your products are not welcome”. These may include environmental, carbon tax, quality, and various other demands. For example, there is the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 that insists that only American owned/built/crewed ships can transport goods between US ports. Then there are Buy American Act procurement restrictions that handicap foreign-origin products. Furthermore, quality standards e.g. on hormone-treated meat products, and on certification that seafood is tuna-safe have been used to keep out imported products. The US Farm Bill provides gigantic subsidies for five major crops – corn, soy, wheat, rice and cotton – amounting to $9.3 billion in 2024. Reports suggest that crop insurance and new benefits from the ‘bridge payments’ announced in 2025 may add another $10 billion+ to this sum. That is an enormous subsidy, pricing competitors out of the market. Reason No. 6: Loss of trust Finally, there is a sixth and critical reason: the loss of trust. For the longest time, India had convinced itself that it was an essential strategic partner to the US, if for nothing else to contain China. But that illusion is now gone, quite possibly because the US has decided to create a G2 condominium with China and retreat into Fortress America. The US administration now considers India, at best, a transactional vassal, and at worst, a potential rival to apply the Thucydides Trap to: and what better than to do war by economic means? India has to adjust. On the other hand, there are indeed positives. In the interest of fairness, here are the immediate views of Citibank and Bank of America, who both considered it a net positive for India. If you accept the tariff reductions by the US at face value, then India at 18% is doing marginally better than several other nations, including Vietnam, Thailand and Bangladesh. Ironically, Trump’s recent best-friend-forever Pakistan is hit with 19%. There was a video circulating showing Raghuram Rajan, the economist who wants to be to Rahul Gandhi who Manmohan Singh was to his mother, gloating earlier that India was suffering from 50% tariffs compared to Pakistan’s 19%. That brings up one more observation: the Opposition in India is screaming bloody murder about this supposed India-US ‘deal’ not because they claim India is getting a bad deal, but apparently because they think India is getting a good deal. They should see

A version of this essay was published by firstpost.com at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/shadow-warrior-the-epstein-files-expose-elite-depravity-13975791.html Here is the AI-generated video version of this podcast. I am not going to get into the political aspects of the infamous Epstein Files, nor so much into the morality thereof, but what amazes me is the fact that everyone seems shocked at the kinds of things that apparently went on in Epstein Island and elsewhere in his empire. I have long thought of the Epstein Files (and earlier Watergate, Wikileaks, Cablegate, even the silly Steele Dossier) as a mere sideshow, entertaining but hardly earth-shattering. To be candid, what they reveal is what we already knew: politicians and the rich are different from you and me, as Jay Gatsby might say. Yes, they can be vile monsters and get away with it. F. Scott Fitzgerald describes how extreme wealth fosters a sense of superiority, cynicism, carelessness with consequences, and emotional insulation: all qualities that make the rich operate by different rules, often viewing themselves as exempt from ordinary accountability. Extreme wealth provides insurance, or insulation, against consequences. We were warned with graphic images in cinema: “Eyes Wide Shut” by Stanley Kubrick was a revelation. It fits strikingly into the context of Fitzgerald’s “the rich are different” and the Epstein files, a cinematic bridge between literary critique and real-world revelations of predatory privilege. In Kubrick’s world of orgies where masked super-elites play, the victims are from lower strata (they are treated as disposable), while the elite retreat into impunity. The film was prescient about how money, secrecy, and impunity create inevitable nexuses of abuse. There was a dramatic and possibly relevant video of a young Mexican model, distraught, screaming, “They are eating babies!”, after attending one of the Epstein parties. She was, it is said, arrested, and ‘disappeared’, and was never seen again. Yet, it is “Salo: The 120 Days of Sodom” that I am most reminded of. This is quite possibly the most disturbing film ever made, at least among those that I have seen. Only “In the Realm of the Senses”, by Nagisa Oshima, a staggering tale of sexual obsession, comes close in shock value. A couple are caught up in a vortex or vicious cycle of increasingly dangerous sexual behavior. The unsimulated, explicit sex scenes in fact produce not prurience, but horror in the viewer. The film’s intensity peaks with its violent conclusion, where the female protagonist strangles her lover to death during erotic asphyxiation and then castrates his corpse, carrying the severed penis with her, blending extreme eroticism with graphic mutilation and murder in a way that challenged societal taboos on sex, obsession, and violence. Tellingly, it is based on a real-life story, but then it is a private tale, not one that involved powerful, public, men. “Salo”, by Pier Paolo Pasolini, is a loose adaptation of the Marquis de Sade’s 1785 novel “The 120 Days of Sodom”, relocated to the final days of Mussolini’s fascist Republic of Salo (1943–1945) in northern Italy. Four powerful libertines: a Duke (nobility), Bishop (church), Magistrate (law/state), and President (finance/capital) are the protagonists. They kidnap 18 young victims (mostly teenagers) and subject them to escalating cycles of sexual torture, degradation, humiliation, and murder in a remote villa. I remember the horrifying close-up of a young man’s eye being plucked out. This isn’t mere shock exploitation; Pasolini uses de Sade’s framework as a scorching allegory for: * Absolute power corrupting absolutely, where the elite treat bodies (especially vulnerable young ones) as disposable objects for consumption and control. * Fascism as the ultimate expression of capitalist/consumerist nihilism. The libertines embody the “anarchy of power” in a permissive, totalitarian system where rules exist only to protect the perpetrators. * Moral detachment and cynicism: the rich aren’t just wealthier; they’re philosophically and emotionally severed from humanity, viewing others as means to gratification without consequence. Is this how powerful men are? Is this how those with absolute power, especially men, have always acted? Or is it culture-specific? That’s a good question. But are elites generally debauched, depraved, and dissolute? There are several unconfirmed rumors that many of the rich and famous were associated with Epstein. But a certain royal was drummed out of the family and lost all his privileges for his (confirmed) participation in Epstein orgies. Others include captains of industry and political bigwigs, including US Presidents, a major leftist ideologue, and a film director. So it was apparently the in-thing in the US, sort of like the most sought-after restaurant in New York City, where the hoi-polloi were strictly excluded. This, in a country that allegedly finds its moral compass in the Puritans, people who were so religious that even Britain couldn’t stand them. And has been accused of being into moralization, not into morals. As of now, if you ignore the extreme claims (cannibalism) it is clear that the following happened: * Recruitment and grooming of underage girls * Sexual assault on minors * Distribution of Child Sexual Abuse Material * Trafficking across State and International Borders Frankly, this is probably just business as usual in many elite circles. If you have immunity, you tend to be very naughty. I expect this, too, will blow over, and public attention will move on. The apparent fact that many in political power in the US are part of the Epstein network is neither here nor there. This may be the way all powerful men work. Sad, but true. 895 words, Feb 2, 2026 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe