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In today’s episode, we’ll examine the role of development finance in U.S. economic statecraft and Washington’s efforts to compete with China for influence in strategically important areas.   Competition between the United States and China increasingly extends into trade, technology, infrastructure, and critical mineral supply chains. China has used state-backed financing to support overseas infrastructure and resource projects, building economic relationships and, in some cases, dependencies that can serve its broader strategic interests. The United States has sought to offer an alternative by mobilizing private investment, strengthening supply chains, and supporting development projects that advance American economic and national security priorities.  The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, or DFC, is a central part of this effort. By providing financing, political risk insurance, and other forms of investment support, the DFC aims to mobilize private capital for projects in developing markets that might otherwise struggle to attract investment. Its role has taken on added significance as Washington looks to diversify critical mineral supply chains and reduce strategic dependencies.   I'm pleased to have as my guest today, Conor Coleman, Head of Investments and Chief of Staff at the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. We’ll discuss the DFC’s mandate, its role in U.S. economic statecraft, and how development finance can advance American strategic interests in an era of intensifying competition with China.  Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction [02:10] The Role and Mission of DFC  [03:58] Recent Projects and How They Advance US Interests [06:37] How the DFC Diversifies Supply Chains [08:33] Competing with the BRI  [10:33] Success in Mobilizing Partnerships and Direct Investments [13:20] Balancing Support and Sovereignty  [16:06] Internal and External Indicators of Success [18:12] Competition with China as a Measure [19:48] Coordinating with Allies and Partners [21:03] Prioritizing Competing Goals  [22:38] Challenges for DFC and Defining a Story

In today's episode, we'll examine the state of EU-China trade relations after a pivotal few weeks that may shape how Europe deals with China for years to come. Europe's trade deficit in goods with China reached roughly 360 billion euros last year, nearly a billion euros a day, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called the imbalance structural and unsustainable. Against that backdrop, three events stand out. On October 5, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sent a joint letter to von der Leyen urging a tougher response, including a rapid-action trade instrument. It was a striking shift for a Germany that has long been wary of confrontation with Beijing. On October 8 and 9, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao held trade talks in Beijing that produced 16 outcomes, including an understanding to curb Chinese exports of hybrid vehicles through a 350,000-vehicle annual quota. And on October 15 and 16, EU leaders met in Brussels to decide what comes next. Is the hybrid deal a genuine breakthrough or a pressure-release valve? Does it do enough to prevent a second "China Shock," or will Chinese carmakers simply build in Europe instead? Could tools like the EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument, or its proposed faster successor, ever be used against China? And how will relations between Beijing and Brussels likely develop going forward. I am joined today by Finbarr Bermingham, Chief Europe Correspondent at the South China Morning Post, who specializes in geopolitics, geoeconomics and EU-China relations. He has spent the last five years reporting from Brussels and around Europe on rising bilateral tensions, Europe's place in the shifting world order, diplomacy, trade, and EU politics. Timestamps:[00:00] Introduction[02:26] Outcomes of the Agreement  [04:46] Trading Import Volume for Localization?  [08:20] "Made in Europe" for Chinese Hybrids[09:16] Unilateral Actions and Ultimatums[13:16] A Kill Switch for Unfair Trade Practices[19:32] Measuring EU Unity and Fear of Retaliation[25:12] Beijing’s Hardline Signals – A Shift to Accommodation?[29:13] On Transatlantic Coordination[31:23] What to Watch for a Durable Rebalancing

In today's episode, we'll examine China’s ambitions in the Arctic and the growing importance of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region.  The Arctic is undergoing profound change. Climate change is reducing sea ice coverage, creating new opportunities for shipping, resource extraction, infrastructure development, and military activity. Russia views the Arctic as central to its economic future and national security. China doesn’t border the Arctic, but it is a permanent observer in the Arctic Council and has increasingly sought a role in Arctic governance, scientific research, shipping, and energy development. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has transformed Moscow's relationships with both Western countries and Beijing, raising new questions about the future of Arctic cooperation and competition.  How aligned are Chinese and Russian interests in the region? What are the prospects for commercial development along the Northern Sea Route and elsewhere in the Arctic? And what challenges and opportunities do these developments present for the United States and its allies?  To help us understand these issues, we're joined by Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist in China Studies at CNA and Distinguished Fellow at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. She is one of the leading experts on China's Arctic policy, Sino-Russian relations, and the geopolitical implications of a changing Arctic. Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction [01:49] How China’s Interests in the Arctic Have Evolved  [05:04] Which Arctic Actors are Receptive to a Larger Chinese Role?  [08:19] Unpacking China-Russia Cooperation [13:33] Russian Invasion of Ukraine Impact on Chinese Involvement [15:32] Benefitting from Northern Sea Route [19:40] Arctic Energy Cooperation [22:47] How US Asian Partners View Arctic Security and Governance[24:51] Shifting US Policies and Priorities in the Arctic [26:04] What to Watch in the Arctic

Expectations for the 3rd Trump-Xi summit since Trump returned to power were modest, and the meeting delivered limited concrete outcomes: a two-month extension of the trade war truce, lower tariffs on some US and Chinese goods, an agreement to talk more about AI risks, two pandas for the Atlanta zoo, and a potential MOU between the US and Chinese militaries on crisis prevention and management.  As I wrote in an analysis of the summit, Xi Jinping came away with a larger diplomatic and strategic win. He was greeted personally by President Trump upon arrival at Andrews Air Force Base and hosted for a lavish White House dinner. Those optics can be displayed to the domestic Chinese audience as evidence that China is now a peer of the United States, and its leader Xi is a peer of the US president, Donald Trump.  Summits are rare opportunities to advance policy agendas, and this meeting fell short. The two leaders reportedly talked for about 90 minutes with consecutive interpretation. In my view, the leaders of the world’s two largest economies failed to seize the opportunity to discuss how to address bilateral, regional and global challenges: AI risks, technology competition, Taiwan, China’s rare earth exports, and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The result was a summit that preserved the fragile stability in the US-China relationship without addressing the broader challenges that make it so consequential.  On today’s episode, we’ll talk to a renowned Chinese scholar about his perspective on the summit and where U.S.-China relations may be headed next. I'm pleased to welcome Dr. Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and one of China's leading scholars on U.S.-China relations.  Timestamps:   [00:00] Introduction [02:32] Competing Views of a New Framework [05:19] Will a Warm Reception Lead to Changes in Chinese Policy?[10:18] Will the Fourth Period Effort Last? [14:02] Barriers to Bilateral Dialogue [18:07] Comparing the U.S. and Chinese Readouts [21:24] Beijing’s View of a Military-to-Military MOU [25:41] Greater Chinese Confidence = Greater Restraint [31:17] Trump and Xi on Taiwan [36:58] Lai Ching-te and Cross Strait Integration [40:20] What Can Be Achieved In Between

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Chinese foreign policy has become significantly more assertive. More than a decade ago, Xi moved away from Deng Xiaoping's approach of "hiding capabilities and biding time" and embraced what he calls “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.” Since then, China has adopted a more assertive presence on the world stage, placed greater emphasis on relations with the Global South, taken a tougher approach toward Taiwan, and reorganized its foreign policy apparatus around Xi’s personal leadership and priorities.  Understanding this transformation – and more fundamentally, understanding what Beijing wants – has become a central question for China-watchers and policy makers. What are China’s ambitions as it emerges as a global superpower?  A new book offers an answer that differs in important ways from many previous analyses. The book is titled “China's Global Strategy Under Xi Jinping.”  Its co-authors are Steve Tsang, Professor of China Studies and Director of the China Institute of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and Olivia Cheung, a Lecturer in Politics at King’s College London. On this episode, we have Steve Tsang with us today to discuss the book, his assessment of China’s global ambitions under Xi Jinping, and what those ambitions mean for policymakers.    Timestamps:  [00:00] Introduction [01:52] A Sinocentric Party-State Realist Analytical Framework  [07:14] Tianxia in Chinese Foreign Policy [09:45] Xi Jinping’s Growing Ambitions  [13:42] The Role of the Global South  [16:59] What Accepting Chinese Preeminence Looks Like  [19:57] Taiwan and the China Dream  [25:48] China First Policy as a Hindrance? [28:25] Using the Built-In Stop Button

Artificial intelligence is emerging as both a powerful source of competition between the United States and China and an area where the two countries may have a shared interest in reducing risk. Washington and Beijing have sharply different views about technology, national security, and governance, yet they also face some of the same potential dangers from increasingly capable AI systems—from cyberattacks and biological threats to unintended escalation and the loss of human control over critical decisions.   With U.S.-China talks on AI expected to take place ahead of the Trump-Xi summit later this month, a pressing question is whether the two countries can carve out practical areas of cooperation even as they compete intensely over the technology itself. What could realistically be achieved in those talks, where do American and Chinese concerns about AI risks converge or diverge, and can the two sides keep discussions about risk reduction separate from the broader struggle over technology and export controls?  To unpack those objectives and what a credible outcome might look like, we are joined by Mark MacCarthy. Mark is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Governance Studies program's Center for Technology Innovation and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches on the governance of emerging technology, AI ethics, and privacy. He is the author of Regulating Digital Industries: How Public Oversight Can Encourage Competition, Protect Privacy, and Ensure Free Speech. He also recently co-authored an article on how the US and China can cooperate to reduce urgent AI risks, which you can find on the Brookings website.  Timestamps:  [00:00] Introduction  [02:17] The Need for US-China AI Cooperation and Risks  [04:32] Converging on AI Risk Reduction  [07:18] Setting Guardrails Amidst Competition   [10:14] World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation  [13:33] Trump-Xi Talks: A Technical Exchange  [18:31] Who Needs To Be At the Table   [21:25] Low Hanging Fruit for Cooperation  [24:39] Assessing Bill Gates’ Recommendations   [28:30] Different Approaches to Technology and Governance

Thirty years ago, the People's Republic of China ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, Beijing has frequently invoked UNCLOS to support its maritime claims and legal positions, while advancing interpretations of the Convention that many other states –but not all – reject.  This June the China Institute for Marine Affairs under the Ministry of Natural Resources marked the 30-year anniversary with an extensive report providing Beijing's interpretation of UNCLOS, including its account of the 2016 arbitral award that found China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea as lacking a legal basis under the Convention.  To examine the PRC’s evolving interpretation of UNCLOS and Chinese maritime activities, and how both are being used to advance Chinese interests, I’m joined today by Dr. Peter Dutton. Peter is a Senior Research Scholar in law and senior fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. Previously, he held several positions at the U.S. Naval War College, including as director of the China Maritime Studies Institute. He served in the US Navy for more than 40 years in several capacities, including as a Judge Advocate and naval flight officer.   Timestamps:  [00:00] Introduction  [01:45] UNCLOS and China’s Approach to International Law   [04:48] Favorable Interpretations of UNCLOS for China  [07:07] Unpacking Wu Shicun’s Comments on Future Construction  [10:47] Capitalizing versus Defending Interests  [16:56] Potential Deterrence Options for the US and Allies  [19:14] Renegotiating the Law of the Sea Convention?   [22:45] Updated Arguments to the 2016 Ruling   [25:50] China’s Strategy and Relying on Power  [29:03] Indicators and Actions to Watch For

China's growing use of economic power for strategic and political purposes has become one of the defining features of international competition. Beijing is no longer simply using trade and investment to promote economic growth—it is increasingly deploying a sophisticated toolkit of laws, regulations, export controls, market access, infrastructure investment, and technological standards to advance its broader geopolitical objectives.   In today's episode, we'll explore how China's approach to economic statecraft has evolved, how effective it has been, its impact on Chinese foreign policy – especially relations with the United States -- and what governments around the world can do in response. I'm delighted to be joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, one of the leading experts on Chinese foreign policy, including its use of economic statecraft, to help us unpack these important issues.   Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies at Georgetown University. He served seven years in President Obama’s NSC first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction [01:49] What is Chinese Economic Statecraft? [04:52] How Chinese Leaders Think About Economic Power and Political Influence [06:43] The Evolution of China’s Economic Statecraft Toolkit [09:49] Chinese Market Accessibility as Statecraft [14:07] Institutionalizing Economic Statecraft [17:37] How Legal Bodies are Implemented [23:32] Implications for the US-China Relationship [25:36] Strengthening US Economic Statecraft

In today’s episode, we’ll examine the state of Europe-China relations and the trajectory of the EU’s policy toward China at a pivotal moment. The EU-China relationship has become increasingly complex and contentious. The growing trade imbalance is among the top priority issues: The EU had a record trade deficit in goods with China of 360 billion Euros last year. China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine also remains a major concern. At the same time, uncertainty in the transatlantic relationship has prompted debate across Europe about strategic autonomy, de-risking, and whether the EU should recalibrate its approach toward Beijing. We'll discuss the outcomes of the recent European Council meeting, debates taking place within Europe, and what we should expect in EU-China relations going forward. To make sense of where EU policy toward China is headed, we are joined by Noah Barkin, Visiting Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, Senior Advisor at Rhodium Group, and author of the fantastic Watching China in Europe newsletter, which you can read on Substack. Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction  [01:38] Partner, Competitor, and Systemic Rival: Accurate or Obsolete?   [03:36] How Europe is Responding to Trade Imbalances  [06:26] European Council Meeting Outcomes  [09:53] EU-China Trade and Investment Consultation Mechanism [12:30] Germany’s China Policy [19:57] EU's Top Concerns About China   [23:45] Transatlantic Tensions Influencing EU-China Relations [28:05] The Future of EU-China Relations

On today’s episode of the China Global Podcast, we’re going to discuss the South China Sea. The past year has been marked by four intersecting dynamics: First, a sharp escalation of Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia operations, especially against the Philippines. Second, a resumption of large-scale Chinese island construction after nearly a decade-long pause; Third, increasingly sophisticated Chinese legal and administrative moves to consolidate and institutionalize its claims; And fourth, a deepening of the US-Philippines military partnership and the emergence of a broader network involving US allies and partners from Europe and the Indo-Pacific. To discuss these trends, I’m delighted to have as my guest today, Dr. Collin Koh, who is a senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies based in Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction [01:33] Beijing’sObjectives in the South China Sea [06:24] Changes in China’s Strategy  [09:13] A Revival of Island Building in Antelope Reef [16:11] Increased Activity in Scarborough Shoal  [20:13] Violating the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct?  [24:21] Pros and Cons to Finalizing the Code of Conduct [28:58] China’s Response to US-Philippines Security Cooperation [33:15] Claimant Perceptions of US Policy

Summits between US and Chinese leaders are important events. They provide opportunities to discuss sensitive issues, manage friction, and to identify ways to solve problems and promote cooperation where possible. A great deal of preparation usually goes into a US-China summit, involving hundreds of phone calls, virtual, and in-person meetings between US and Chinese officials.   The May 14-15 summit in Beijing was atypical, perhaps not surprisingly since Donald Trump is a very atypical president. Today we are going to talk about the summit – the process and well as the outcomes and the implications for the US-China relationship and American interests.  Joining us today to talk about these issues is Sarah Beran. Sarah Beran was senior director for China and Taiwan affairs in the National Security Council during the Biden administration from 2022 to 2024. She was subsequently deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Beijing. At the NSC, she led strategic preparations for multiple summits between President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. After her 23 years in government service, Sarah joined Macro Advisory Partners.   Timestamps:   [00:00] Introduction   [01:45] Differences in Preparing for the Summit   [03:33] What Was Missing from Trump’s Itinerary   [08:18] US and Chinese Objectives for the Summit   [12:30] Constructive Strategic Stability as a Framework   [18:09] Iran, North Korea, and Denuclearization in Chinese Policy [23:55] Tension over Taiwan Language   [29:15] Potential Reactions to Trump Calling President Lai   [30:12] Future of US-China Relations and Ally Reactions

A currency becomes “internationalized” when it is widely used beyond its home economy for trade, financial transactions, and as a store of value. Achieving that status can lower transaction costs and exchange rate risks, while also enhancing the issuing country’s geopolitical influence. Today, the global financial system remains overwhelmingly dollar-centric, with China’s renminbi playing a comparatively modest role. Yet over the past decade, Beijing has taken steps to expand its global use, expanding offshore renminbi markets, establishing bilateral swap lines, and developing alternative payment infrastructure.  To help us unpack where China’s renminbi internationalization efforts stand today, we are joined by Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Zoe’s research centers on international political economy and global financial markets, with a focus on China and East Asia, as well as the Middle East. She is the author of Can BRICS De-dollarize the Global Financial System? and Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Global Ambitions.   Timestamps:  [00:00] Introduction  [01:54] Strategic Motivations for Beijing  [04:55] Progress Report on RMB Internationalization  [08:16] Main Mechanisms Used to Promote the RMB  [11:08] RMB in the Belt and Road Initiative  [13:46] Using Clean Energy Supply Chains to Promote RMB in Key Commodities  [15:57] RMB as a Reserve Currency?  [21:23] Xi’s Fourth Term Goals with the RMB  [27:26] How Global Conflicts Impact RMB Internationalization

In the 1950s, Mao Zedong described the relationship between China and North Korea as “as close as lips and teeth.” Over subsequent decades, the relationship has ebbed and flowed, alternating between close alignment and periods of strain. In recent months, China-NK ties appear to be warming once again. A series of high-level exchanges, including Kim Jong Un’s attendance at China’s Victory Day parade last September, followed by a trip to North Korea by Chinese Premier Li Qiang the following month, suggest renewed diplomatic momentum. Chinese Foreign Affairs Commission Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Pyongyang in mid-April is the latest sign of this trend. What is driving this renewed rapprochement between China and North Korea, and what are the implications for the United States? To explore these questions, we are joined today by Andrew Scobell. Andrew is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy’s Asia Program and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. His work focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy, and he has published extensively on China-North Korea relations. Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction  [01:38] China’s Interests on the Korean Peninsula [04:41] A Cooling of Pyongyang-Beijing Relations? [07:48] How Beijing Views Russia-North Korea Ties  [11:26] What’s Driving Chinese Interest in North Korea [14:57] Assessing Wang Yi’s Visit to Pyongyang  [18:20] Shifting Stances on Denuclearization [22:09] Implications for the United States [25:48] US-China Shared Interests on the Korean Peninsula

On today’s episode, we’ll discuss the recent meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun, the first in a decade between a Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and a KMT Chair. Ms. Cheng was elected party chair only four months ago, and her top priority was to meet with Xi Jinping. She has not yet visited the United States, but says she intends to do so later this year. In their public statements, Xi Jinping and Cheng Li-wun highlighted several common themes, including opposition to Taiwan independence, support for the 1992 Consensus, shared history and Chinese heritage, that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, the importance of China’s national rejuvenation, and the need to preserve peace and promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. To discuss this historic meeting, I’m joined by Amanda Hsiao. Amanda is a director in Eurasia Group's China practice covering China's foreign policy and cross-strait relations. This episode was recorded on April 10, 2026. Timestamps:  [00:00] Introduction   [01:42] Why the Xi–Cheng Meeting Matters    [03:00] Cheng Li-wun’s Aims and Messaging  [06:13] Xi Jinping’s Strategic Objectives  [11:17] Signaling Ahead of the Trump-Xi Summit  [13:23] Progress Towards Unification  [17:53] Shifting Positions on the 1992 Consensus  [22:25] Public Views of Cheng Li-wun  [26:32] Potential Shifts to China’s Taiwan Policy  [28:12] Implications for Use of Force   [30:34] What Stood Out During Cheng’s China Trip

On February 28th, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on multiple sites in Iran, marking the beginning of a wider military conflict with Iran. Tehran responded with attacks on Israel, US military bases, and US allies across the Middle East and closed the Strait of Hormuz. These events have caused a major disruption in the global supply of oil and gas. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, is exposed to these disruptions, but its long-term energy security strategy has left it better prepared than most.  How has China approached energy security, and how might the current conflict reshape this strategy? To discuss these issues, we are joined today by Dr. Erica Downs. Erica is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Her research focuses on Chinese energy markets and geopolitics, and she has published extensively on the subject. Timestamps: [00:00] Introduction  [01:38] China’s Energy Security Strategy [03:54] Divergent Approaches to Energy Security in the US and China [06:03] Beijing’s Response to Supply Chain Shocks  [09:55] Dependencies on Russian Oil & Gas [12:33] New Lessons for Chinese Policymakers? [15:30] Impact on Teapot Refineries and Responses [18:37] Percentage of Chinese Oil and Gas Impacted [22:26] Could China Buy Gas from the US? [25:15] Potential Wins and Losses for Chinese Industries