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Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook | 01/21/26 | Docket #: 25A312 25A312 TRUMP V. COOK DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2654786 THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT IN JANUARY 2026. JURISDICTION NOTED 10/1/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 23-1209 23-1209 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC V. TRUSTEES OF THE IAM PENSION FUND DECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 316 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act imposes "withdrawal liability" when an employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan. This withdrawal liabilty covers the employer's share of the plan's underfunding. Because a plan's amount of underfunding hinges on projections about its projected liabilities and assets decades into the future, withdrawal liability computations are partly a product of actuarial assumptions about anticipated interest rates and other predictions. Withdrawal liability must be computed "as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the employer withdraws." E.g., 29 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2)(E)(i). The question presented is: Whether 29 U.S.C. 1391's instruction to compute withdrawal liability "as of the end of the plan year" requires the plan to base the computation on the actuarial assumptions to which its actuary subscribed at the end of the year, or allows the plan to use different actuarial assumptions that were adopted after the end of the year . LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-7157, 22-7158, 23-7028 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER 29 U. S. C. § 1391 ’ S INSTRUCTION TO COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY “ AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR ” REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS TO WHICH ITS ACTUARY SUBSCRIBED AT THE END OF THE YEAR, OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT WERE ADOPTED AFTER THE END OF THE YEAR. Order of July 3, 2025: The order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari is amended as follows. THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER 29 U. S. C. §1391 ’ S INSTRUCTION TO COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY “ AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR ” REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS MOST RECENTLY ADOPTED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT WERE ADOPTED AFTER, BUT BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF, THE END OF THE YEAR.         CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025

Wolford v. Lopez | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 24-1046 24-1046 WOLFORD V. LOPEZ DECISION BELOW: 116 F.4th 959 LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen , 597 U.S. 1, 33 (2022), holds that "the Second Amendment guarantees a general right to public carry" of arms, meaning ordinary, law-abiding citizens may "'bear' arms in public for self-defense." In this case, the Ninth Circuit sustained a Hawaii law that makes it a crime for a concealed carry permit holder to carry a handgun on private property unless he has been "given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." H.R.S. § 134-9.5. That holding is in acknowledged direct conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in Antonyuk v. James , 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), a decision that struck down an identical State law in the same procedural posture as this case. The Ninth Circuit also sustained a multitude of other location bans on carry by permit holders, relying solely on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws. That doctrinal approach is in direct conflict with the Third Circuit's decision in Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police , 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Connelly , 117 F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024), the Eighth Circuit's decision in Worth v. Jacobson , 108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024), and, most recently, the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in NRA v. Bondi , No. 21- 12314, 2025 WL 815734 at *5 (11th Cir. March 14,2025) (en banc), all of which hold that primary focus must be on Founding generation laws and tradition in applying the text, history and tradition test Bruen mandates. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, in direct conflict with the Second Circuit, that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively gives express permission to the handgun carrier? 2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws in applying Bruen 's text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-16164

Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | 01/14/26 | Docket #: 24-1021 24-1021 GALETTE V. NJ TRANSIT CORP. DECISION BELOW: 332 A.3d 776 THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED, LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION IS AN ARM OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY FOR INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PURPOSES. CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-1113 . ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 19,2025 :  THE TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER  15 , 2025 , IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY, IS THEREFORE STAYED PENDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE MANDATE OF THIS COURT IN NJ TRANSIT CORP., ET AL. V. COLT, JEFFREY, ET AL. , CASE NO. 24- 1113 , AND GALETTE, CEDRIC V. NJ TRANSIT CORP. , CASE NO. 24-1021 .   CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is entitled to interstate sovereign immunity under the Federal Constitution, as held by the highest court of Pennsylvania in square conflict with the highest court of New York. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 4 EAP 2024

West Virginia v. B. P. J. | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-43 24-43 WEST VIRGINIA V. B.P.J. DECISION BELOW: 98 F.4th 542 CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Like everywhere else, West Virginia schools offer separate sports teams for boys and girls. The West Virginia Legislature concluded that biological boys should compete on boys' and co-ed teams but not girls' teams. This separation made sense, the Legislature found, because of the "inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females." A parent sued on behalf of her child, B.P.J., arguing that the State must allow biological boys who identify as girls to compete on girls' teams. After extensive discovery, the district court disagreed, entering summary judgment for the State on claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. Yet a divided Fourth Circuit panel granted an injunction pending appeal. B.P.J. then beat and displaced hundreds of girls in track and field. Ultimately, the same divided panel ruled in B.P.J.'s favor on the Title IX claim and vacated the district court's judgment for the defendants on the equal-protection claim. Judge Agee dissented, criticizing the majority for "inappropriately expand[ing] the scope of the Equal Protection Clause and upend[ing] the essence of Title IX." App.44a. He hoped this Court would "take the opportunity with all deliberate speed to resolve these questions of national importance." App.74a The questions presented are: 1. Whether Title IX prevents a state from consistently designating girls' and boys' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth. 2. Whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents a state from offering separate boys' and girls' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1078, 23-1130

Little v. Hecox | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-38 24-38 LITTLE, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO V. HECOX DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1061 ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 2025: RESPONDENT'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT DISMISS THE CASE AS MOOT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT. SEE ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER , 601 U. S. 1, 4 (2023). CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Women and girls have overcome decades of discrimination to achieve a more equal playing field in many arenas of American life-including sports. Yet in some competitions, female athletes have become bystanders in their own sports as male athletes who identify as female have taken the place of their female competitors-on the field and on the winners' podium. The Idaho Legislature addressed that injustice by enacting the Fairness in Women's Sports Act, which ensures that women and girls do not have to compete against men and boys no matter how those men and boys identify. The Act-one of 25 such state laws around the country-is consistent with longstanding government policies preserving women's and girls' sports due to the "average real differences" between the sexes. Clark ex rel. Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982). Breaking with this Court's precedents, its own caselaw, other circuit decisions, and biological reality, the Ninth Circuit panel here upheld an injunction against the Act because it prevents "transgender women and girls"-meaning males who identify as women and girls-from competing in "women's student athletics." App.4a-5a. The question presented is: Whether laws that seek to protect women's and girls' sports by limiting participation to women and girls based on sex violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 20-35813, 20-35815

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | 01/12/26 | Docket #: 24-813 24-813 CHEVRON USA INC. V. PLAQUEMINES PARISH DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 324 January 8 , 2026 JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE. CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: This petition arises from Louisiana parishes' efforts to hold petitioners liable in state court for, inter alia , production of crude oil in the Louisiana coastal zone during World War II. Petitioners removed these cases from state court under 28 U.S.C. §1442 (a)(1), which as amended in 2011 provides federal jurisdiction over civil actions against "any person acting under [an] officer" of the United States "for or relating to any act under color of such office." The Fifth Circuit unanimously held that petitioners satisfy the statute's "acting under" requirement by virtue of their WWII-era contracts to supply the federal government with high-octane aviation gasoline ("avgas"). But the panel divided on the "relating to" requirement, with the two-judge majority holding that petitioners' wartime production of crude oil was "unrelated" to their contractually required refinement of that same crude into avgas because the contracts did not contain any explicit "directive pertaining to [petitioners'] oil production activities." App.38. Judge Oldham dissented, explaining that the majority's approach reinstates a variant of the "causal nexus" requirement that multiple circuits (and the U.S. Congress) have expressly rejected. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a vote of 7 to 6. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute. 2. Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-30294, 23-30422

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-345 24-345 FS CREDIT CORP. V. SABA CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD. DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 3174971 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The courts of appeals have split 2-1 over whether Congress created an implied private right of action in Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which provides: (1) A contract that is made, or whose performance involves, a violation of this subchapter ... is unenforceable by either party .... (2) To the extent that a contract described in paragraph (1) has been performed, a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(1)-(2). The Third and Ninth Circuits, relying on statutory text and structure, hold that Section 47(b) does not create an implied private right of action, and a panel of the Fourth Circuit has agreed in an unpublished opinion. Only the Second Circuit-where plaintiffs may be able to sue most investment funds subject to the ICA, given New York's and the New York Stock Exchange's roles in financial operations- holds the opposite based on an "inference": parties may bring a lawsuit under Section 47(b), even though Congress never said so. The question presented is whether Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), creates an implied private right of action. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-8104, 24-79, 24-80, 24-82, 24-83, 24-116, 24-189

Hamm v. Smith | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-872 24-872 HAMM, COMMISSIONER AL DOC V. SMITH DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4793028 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER AND HOW COURTS MAY CONSIDER THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MULTIPLE IQ SCORES IN ASSESSING AN ATKINS CLAIM. CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Like most States, Alabama requires that offenders prove an IQ of 70 or less to satisfy the intellectual-functioning prong of Atkins v. Virginia . This case was not close: Smith scored 75, 74, 72, 78, and 74 on five full-scale IQ tests. There is no way to conclude from these five numbers that Smith's true IQ is likely to be 70 or below. So the courts below required Smith to prove only that his IQ " could be " 70 and required the State to bring evidence "strong enough" to "foreclose" and "rule out the possibility" of intellectual disability. The first question presented is: 1. Whether, under a proper application of Atkins , a State can require a claimant to prove an IQ of 70 or less by a preponderance of the evidence. Evaluating multiple IQ scores is "complicated," and "this Court has not specified how" to do it. In the State's view, five scores are more accurate than one, and there are ways to account for that fact. The courts below disagree. The district court relied on Smith's 72 ± 3 to find that his IQ "could be" 69. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit's "holistic approach" asked whether Smith had scores of "about" 75 or less. Counting four out of five scores between 72 and 75, the court found "consistent evidence" that Smith "may" qualify as mildly disabled. Thus, the court "followed the law's requirement," in its view, to "move on" to Smith's adaptive deficits. The second question presented is: 2. Whether courts evaluating multiple IQ scores must find that every valid score of "about" 75 or less supports an Atkins claim. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-14519

NRSC v. FEC | 12/09/25 | Docket #: 24-621 24-621 NRSC V. FEC DECISION BELOW: 117 F.4th 389 Order of July 1, 2025: ROMAN MARTINEZ, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. Order of December 5 , 2025 : THE MOTION OF COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IS GRANTED. CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: A political party exists to get its candidates elected. Yet Congress has severely restricted how much parties can spend on their own campaign advertising if done in cooperation with those very candidates. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d). In an opinion by Chief Judge Sutton, a 10-judge majority of the en banc Sixth Circuit agreed that these so-called "coordinated party expenditure limits" stand in serious tension with recent First Amendment doctrine. App.10a-15a. It nevertheless upheld them as constitutional, both on their face and as applied to coordinated political advertising ("party coordinated communications"), believing the case to be controlled by FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee , 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ( Colorado II ). In doing so, the majority acknowledged that in the 23 years since Colorado II , this Court "has tightened the free-speech restrictions on campaign finance regulation," that "tension has emerged between the reasoning of Colorado II and the reasoning of later decisions of the Court," and that relevant facts have "changed, most notably with 2014 amendments" to the limits and "the rise of unlimited spending by political action committees." App.3a-4a, 11a. But it thought "any new assessment of the validity of the limits" remained this Court's "province, not ours." App.14a-15a. The question presented is: Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with "party coordinated communications" as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3051

Trump, President of United States v. Slaughter | 12/08/25 | Docket #: 25-332 25-332 TRUMP V. SLAUGHTER DECISION BELOW: THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS GRANTED. THE JULY 17,2025 ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NO. 25 – CV – 909 , ECF DOC. 52 , IS STAYED. THE APPLICATION IS ALSO TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION IS GRANTED.   THE STAY SHALL TERMINATE UPON THE SENDING DOWN OF THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. CERT. GRANTED 9/22/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: (1) Whether the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey ’ s Executor v. United States , 295 U. S. 602 (1935), should be overruled. (2) Whether a federal court may prevent a person ’ s removal from public office, either through relief at equity or at law. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5261

Olivier v. City of Brandon | 12/03/25 | Docket #: 24-993 24-993 OLIVIER V. BRANDON, MS DECISION BELOW: 2023 WL 5500223 CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Gabriel Olivier is a Christian who feels called to share the gospel with his fellow citizens. After being arrested and fined for violating an ordinance targeting "protests" outside a public amphitheater, Olivier brought a § 1983 suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement against him in the future. The Fifth Circuit, applying its precedent construing this Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that Olivier's prior conviction barred his § 1983 suit because even the prospective relief it seeks would necessarily undermine his prior conviction. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the "friction" between its decision and those of this Court and other circuits. Over vigorous dissents, the Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by one vote. The questions presented are: 1. Whether, as the Fifth Circuit holds in conflict with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, this Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars § 1983 claims seeking purely prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged as unconstitutional. 2. Whether, as the Fifth Circuit and at least four others hold in conflict with five other circuits, Heck v. Humphrey bars § 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they never had access to federal habeas relief. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-60566

First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin | 12/02/25 | Docket #: 24-781 24-781 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. V. PLATKIN DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 5088105 CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: New Jersey's Attorney General served an investigatory subpoena on First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy center, demanding that it turn over most of its donors' names. First Choice challenged the Subpoena under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal court, and the Attorney General filed a subsequent suit to enforce it in state court. The state court granted the Attorney General's motion to enforce the Subpoena but expressly did not decide First Choice's federal constitutional challenges. The Attorney General then moved in state court to sanction First Choice. Meanwhile, the district court held that First Choice's constitutional claims were not ripe in federal court. The Third Circuit affirmed in a divided per curiam decision. Judge Bibas would have held the action ripe as indistinguishable from . Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Banta , 594 U.S. 595, 618-19 (2021). But the majority concluded First Choice's claims were not yet ripe because First Choice could litigate its constitutional claims in state court. In doing so, the majority followed the rule of the Fifth Circuit and split from the Ninth Circuit. It did not address the likely loss of a federal forum once the state court rules on the federal constitutional issues. The question presented is: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3124

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | 12/01/25 | Docket #: 24-777 24-777 URIAS-ORELLANA V. BONDI DECISION BELOW: 121 F.4th 327 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that noncitizens on American soil are generally eligible for asylum if they qualify as a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (A). A refugee is someone with "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. § 1101(a)(42). Noncitizens are presumptively eligible for asylum if they have "suffered persecution in the past." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). If ordered removed by an immigration judge (IJ), noncitizens may appeal the removal order-and with it, the denial of asylum-to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). From there, "judicial review" is available in "an appropriate court of appeals." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The INA mandates judicial deference on "findings of fact" and three other kinds of administrative decisions. Id. § 1252(b)(4). The statute also explicitly provides for judicial review of the BIA's decisions on "questions of law," but does not establish a deferential standard of review for such decisions. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), (b)(9). The question presented is: Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the BIA's judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute "persecution" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1042

Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment | 12/01/25 | Docket #: 24-171 24-171 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT DECISION BELOW: 93 F.4th 222 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. This Court has held that a business commits contributory copyright infringement when it "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster infringement." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster , Ltd ., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). The courts of appeals have split three ways over the scope of that ruling, developing differing standards for when it is appropriate to hold an online service provider secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by users. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it? 2. Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable as a willful violator of the law-and subject to increased penalties-without proof that it knew or recklessly disregarded a high risk that its own conduct was illegal. In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit upheld an instruction allowing the jury to find willfulness if Cox knew its subscribers ' conduct was illegal-without proof Cox knew its own conduct in not terminating them was illegal. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1168