Advertise on podcast: The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC | 11/10/26 | Docket #: 25-966 25-966 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR V. SUN VALLEY ORCHARDS, LLC DECISION BELOW: 148 F.4th 121 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 1) WHETHER ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION PRECLUDES THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FROM ADJUDICATING PROCEEDINGS TO COLLECT MONETARY REMEDIES FROM EMPLOYERS WHO HAVE ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF H-2A WORKERS AND DOMESTIC WORKERS IN CORRESPONDING EMPLOYMENT. 2) WHETHER 8 U. S. C. §1188(g)(2) AUTHORIZES THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO ADJUDICATE PROCEEDINGS TO COLLECT MONETARY REMEDIES FROM EMPLOYERS WHO HAVE ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF H-2A WORKERS AND DOMESTIC WORKERS IN CORRESPONDING EMPLOYMENT. CERT. GRANTED 4/27/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The H- 2 A visa program grants U.S. employers the privilege of "import[ing]" foreign aliens into the United States for temporary agricultural work under special visas. 8 U.S.C. 1188 (a)( 1 ). As a condition of granting petitions to import foreign workers, federal law requires an employer to agree to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements governing workers' living and working conditions. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Labor to impose monetary remedies to assure employer compliance with those "terms and conditions." 8 U.S.C. 1188 (g)( 2 ). The question presented is: Whether Article III of the Constitution precludes Congress from assigning to the Secretary of Labor the initial adjudication of proceedings to collect monetary remedies from employers who violate the terms and conditions of participating in the H- 2 A visa program. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-2608

Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. | 11/09/26 | Docket #: 25-159 25-159 HOFFMAN V. WBI ENERGY TRANSMISSION, INC. DECISION BELOW: 132 F.4th 1058 CERT. GRANTED 6/29/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Natural Gas Act authorizes private companies to condemn land in order to build certain natural gas infrastructure, but it says nothing about how to determine the amount of just compensation owed for the property taken. 15 U.S.C. § 717f. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that compensation awards in private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act must therefore be determined by reference to state law, which often mandates higher compensation than the floor set by the Fifth Amendment. In this case, the Eighth Circuit expressly split with its sister circuits and instead held that the Natural Gas Act permits only the constitutional minimum of compensation required by the Fifth Amendment. The question presented is: In private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, should just compensation be determined by reference to state law? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1693

Nielsen v. Watanabe | 11/09/26 | Docket #: 25-417 25-417 NIELSEN V. WATANABE DECISION BELOW: 115 F.4th 1034 CERT. GRANTED 6/22/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case concerns the judicially created damages remedy first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Carlson v. Green , 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court extended Bivens to an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs where prison officials failed to address an inmate's acute asthma attack and exacerbated it, causing his death on-site within hours. Since then, this Court has emphasized that the creation of damages actions rests with Congress, not courts. The judicially created Bivens remedy thus cannot be ex-tended to any "new Bivens context" if any "special factor counsel[s] hesitation" in doing so. Ziglar v. Abbasi , 582 U.S. 120, 139-140 (2017). "[T]he new-context inquiry is easily satisfied," encompassing cases with '"meaningful[ly]"' different facts, or "'potential special factors' "-including "alternative remedial structures"-" 'not consider[ed]"' in the Court's prior cases. Egbert v. Boule , 596 U.S. 482, 492-493 (2022). "[A] court may not recognize a Bivens remedy" if "there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy." Id . at 492. In this case, respondent alleged that he suffered a fractured coccyx in a prison gang fight, causing chronic pain, but was not sent to a hospital. The Ninth Circuit held the suit did not present a "new" context from Carlson -not-withstanding an alternative remedial scheme this Court did not consider in Carlson , and despite significant factual differences such as the immediacy and severity of the harm alleged. The question presented is: Whether the Ninth Circuit here erred in recognizing a Bivens cause of action. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-15605

Guerrero v. Johnson | 11/04/26 | Docket #: 25-1003 25-1003 GUERRERO V. JOHNSON DECISION BELOW: 23-70002 CERT. GRANTED 6/15/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) prohibits successive habeas applications by state prisoners with only narrow exceptions, including for claims that "rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Near-identical language allows federal prisoners to file a successive habeas motion that contains "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." Id. § 2255(h)(2). The courts of appeals are divided over whether claims rely on "a new rule ... that was previously unavailable" when a claim based on the rule could have been raised in an earlier federal habeas petition but would not have succeeded. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits hold that whether a claim would have been meritorious does not affect whether the rule was previously available. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit adhered to its view (and that of the Ninth Circuit) that a claim was previously available only if it had "some possibility of merit" based on the evidence available to the petitioner at the time of an earlier petition. The question presented is: Whether a claim relies on a "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable" when the habeas petitioner could have asserted a claim based on the rule in a prior federal habeas petition. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-70002

St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy | 11/03/26 | Docket #: 25-581 25-581 ST. MARY CATHOLIC PARISH V. ROY DECISION BELOW: 154 F.4th 752   THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.   CERT. GRANTED 4/20/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Colorado's so-called universal preschool program pays for families to send their children to the preschool of their choice, public or private. To participate, preschools must ensure all families have an "equal opportunity" to enroll regardless of, inter alia , race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income level, or disability. Colorado nonetheless permits numerous exemptions from this requirement, both categorical and discretionary, allowing preschools to admit only "children of color," "gender-nonconforming children," "the LGBTQ community," low-income families, and children with disabilities. But Colorado excludes Catholic preschools because they admit only families who support Catholic beliefs, including on sex and gender. The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado's decision to exclude Catholic preschools. Applying Employment Division v. Smith , it held that Colorado's secular exemptions and discretion did not undermine general applicability. In so doing, the court sided with the minority position in an entrenched and acknowledged 7 -4 split over what kinds of exemptions and discretion undermine general applicability. The court also eschewed Carson v. Makin , concluding that its rule was inapplicable because Colorado's exclusion was not "on the explicit basis" of religion. The questions presented are: 1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct. 2. Whether Carson v. Makin displaces the rule of Employment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institutions. 3. Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be overruled LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1267

Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit Dist. Attorney’s Office | 11/02/26 | Docket #: 25-352 25-352 YOUNGE V. FULTON JUDICIAL CIRC. DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 974309 CERT. GRANTED 3/30/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party "must" plead "any" affirmative defense. The question presented is: Where a defendant has filed an answer without pleading an affirmative defense, may the defendant nonetheless assert that affirmative defense as the basis for a summary judgment motion, without amending or seeking to amend its answer to plead that affirmative defense, and may a defendant do so even if an amendment adding that affirmative defense would be barred by Rule 16(b)(4)? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-11418

Maxwell v. Dinis | 11/02/26 | Docket #: 25-5930 25-5930 MAXWELL V. THOMAS DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 453 QUESTION PRESENTED: In 2020 Maxwell sought transfer to halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. §3624(g), 18 U.S.C. §3621(b) and §3621(h), the CARES Act of 2020, 18 U.S.C. §3624(c), the Second Chance Act of 2018 reauthorized by the First Step Act of 2018, 34 U.S.C. §60541, and Compassionate Release. The Warden only addressed Maxwell's CARES Act request and denied relief. The warden otherwise ignored all Maxwell's other explicitly pled issues. Maxwell, after exhausting his administrative remedies proceeded in Court, filing a §2241 habeas. The U.S.D.C. dismissed alleging Maxwell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for First Step Act relief. Maxwell appealed the decision of the U.S.D.C. to the Fifth Circuit. Sua sponte , the Fifth Circuit held, contrary to this Court ’ s decision in Jones v. Hendrix , 216 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (2022), and contrary to nine other Courts of Appeal -- see Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2025); Jiminian v. Nash , 245 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2001); Hernandez v, Campbell , 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hutchins , 835 F.2d 185, 186 (8th Cir, 1987); Montez v. McKinna , 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Little , 392 F.3d 671, 678- 79 (4th Cir. 2024); McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus. - Suncoast , 851 F.3d 1076, 1092-93 (11th Cir. 2007) ( en banc ); United States v. Barrett , 178 F.3d 34, 50 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999); and Valona v. United States , 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998) --that its bright-line rule adopted in Melot v. Bergomi , 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) controlled. There the Fifth Circuit held that unless a favorable determination of the prisoner's claim would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release from his sentence, then the proper vehicle is a civil rights suit. The Fifth Circuit dismissed. I. The question for this Court is whether disputes regarding the calculation of an inmate's earned First Step Act time credits, enabling the inmate to transfer into halfway house or home confinement earlier, similar to parole, are actionable under 28 U.S.C. §2241, II. The question for this Court is whether, given all the obstruction of the administrative remedy process that took place in this case, under Perttu v. Richards , exhaustion of administrative remedies is interwoven into the underlying claims themselves, creating a fact issue for a jury, and whether the trial court must make that determination in the first instance LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40699 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A CLAIM REGARDING APPLICATION OF TIME CREDITS UNDER THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 , 132 STAT. 5195 – 5208 (CODIFIED IN RELEVANT PART AT 18 U. S. C. §§ 3631 – 3635 ), SEEKING ACCELERATED TRANSFER TO A HALFWAY HOUSE OR HOME CONFINEMENT, CAN BE BROUGHT IN A HABEAS PETITION UNDER 28 U. S. C. § 2241 . ORDER OF June 16 , 2026 : BRIAN W. BARNES, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW.               CERT. GRANTED 6/1/2026

Salazar v. Paramount Global | 10/14/26 | Docket #: 25-459 25-459 SALAZAR V. PARAMOUNT GLOBAL DECISION BELOW: 133 F.4th 642 CERT. GRANTED 1/26/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED:       The Video Privacy Protection Act (“ VPPA ”)  contains a one-sentence liability clause. It prohibits a “ video tape service provider ”  from “ knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider. ”  18  U.S.C. §  2710 (b)( 1 ). The statute defines “ consumer ”  broadly to include a “ subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider. ”  Id.  §  2710 (a)( 1 ). It defines “ personally identifiable information ”  to include information that “ identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider. ”  Id. §  2710 (a)( 3 ). And it defines “ video tape service provider ”  to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual materials. Id . §  2710 (a)( 4 ).        Paramount is a “ video tape service provider. ”  Both courts below assumed as much. Michael Salazar subscribed to Paramount ’ s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount then disclosed Mr. Salazar ’ s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That information counts as “ personally identifiable information. ”  Again, both courts below assumed as much.       The question here is whether the phrase “ goods or services from a video tape service provider, ”  as used in the VPPA ’ s definition of “ consumer, ”  refers to all of a video tape service provider ’ s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5748

Beaird v. United States | 10/13/26 | Docket #: 25-5343 25-5343 BEAIRD V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1410410 THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS GRANTED. THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER STINSON V. UNITED STATES , 508 U. S. 36 ( 1993 ), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES. Order of May 6 , 2026 ANTHONY J. DICK, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE , IN SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT STINSON V. UNITED STATES , 508 U. S. 36 ( 1993 ), STILL CORRECTLY STATES THE RULE FOR THE DEFERENCE THAT COURTS MUST GIVE THE COMMENTARY TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.         CERT. GRANTED 4/20/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment? II. Whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? III. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that  has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-10764

Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan | 10/07/26 | Docket #: 25-579 25-579 DEPT. OF AIR FORCE V. GUAHAN DECISION BELOW: 128 F.4th 1089 CERT. GRANTED 3/9/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq ., is a comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions, including facilities operated by the federal government. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Whether the federal government's submission to a state or territorial regulator of an application to renew a RCRA permit is "final agency action" that is immediately reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. 2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmental- review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq ., before submitting a permit-renewal application under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific procedures to review environmental impacts in the context of hazardous-waste treatment. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16613

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee | 10/06/26 | Docket #: 25-498 25-498 ANDERSON V. INTEL CORP. INV. DECISION BELOW: 137 F.4th 1015 CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific" because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the fiduciary acts." Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer , 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires." Hughes v. Nw. Univ ., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022). The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance, pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence" under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark." LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16268

Johnson v. United States Congress | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-735 25-735 JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES CONGRESS DECISION BELOW: 151 F.4th 1287 CERT. GRANTED 4/6/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Did the Veterans' Judicial Review Act strip district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this Court in Johnson v. Robison , 415 U.S. 361 (1974), to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans' benefits? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10682

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-170 25-170 SUNCOR ENERGY, INC. V. COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1363355 IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE. SEPTEMBER 28 , 2026 : JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.   CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24SA206

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 24-889 24-889 HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS V. AMARIN PHARMA, INC. DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1370 CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow." Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S , 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses, Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones." Id . at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use "actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use." Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005). The questions presented are: 1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use? 2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or even mentions, the patented use? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2023-1169

Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 25-1083 25-1083 MULLIN, SEC. DHS V. DOE DECISION BELOW: CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A952) PRESENTED TO JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR AND BY HER REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A999) PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE COURT IS ALSO DEFERRED. THE APPLICATIONS ARE ALSO TREATED AS PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT (25-1083, 25-1084), AND THE PETITIONS ARE GRANTED. THE CASES ARE CONSOLIDATED, AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT. CERT. GRANTED 3/16/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-2995