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Oral argument for Salazar v. Paramount Global, argued on October 14, 2026. YouTube

Beaird v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Oct 13, 2026. Petitioner: Kendrick Jarrell Beaird.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Kevin Joel Page (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur) Anthony J. Dick (Court-appointed amicus curiae) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kendrick Jarrell Beaird pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. During sentencing, the district court applied a penalty enhancement under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because Beaird possessed a “large capacity magazine.” While the text of the Guidelines does not define that term, the accompanying official Commentary specifies that any magazine capable of holding more than 15 rounds triggers the increased penalty. Beaird possessed a magazine that held 17 rounds. He argued that the district court erred by relying on the Commentary to define a term missing from the actual Guidelines. This challenge focuses on the level of deference courts must grant to supplemental Commentary, especially when that Commentary expands the scope of sentencing enhancements beyond the written text of the Guidelines. The district court sentenced Beaird to 72 months in prison and three years of supervised release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that prior circuit precedent foreclosed Beaird’s challenge to the court’s reliance on the Guidelines commentary. Question Does Stinson v. United States still correctly state the rule for deference that courts must give the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2026. Petitioner: Department of the Air Force.Respondent: Prutehi Guahan. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The U.S. Air Force operates Andersen Air Force Base at the northern tip of Guam, adjacent to Tarague Beach—a coastal area that sits above Guam's sole-source drinking-water aquifer and serves as habitat for endangered sea turtles. Since 1982, the Air Force has disposed of hazardous waste munitions at Tarague Beach through open burning and open detonation (OB/OD) operations, a method that involves igniting or exploding ordnance in open air. Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Air Force must obtain a permit every three years from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency (Guam EPA), which has administered RCRA on the island since 1986. The Air Force has renewed that permit on a triennial cycle without interruption. When its most recent permit approached expiration in September 2021, the Air Force submitted a renewal application to Guam EPA in May 2021—without first preparing any environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The application described planned OB/OD operations for 2021 through 2024 and proposed restarting open burning, which had been inactive since at least the early 2000s. The Air Force conducted no environmental impact statement, no environmental assessment, and offered no public comment opportunity before committing to that plan. Guam EPA accepted the application, held a public comment period, and issued a preliminary notice neither approving nor denying the application while it reviewed public comments. Meanwhile, under RCRA's automatic-extension provision, the Air Force continued OB/OD operations under its 2018 permit while the renewal remained pending. Prutehi Litekyan filed suit in the District Court of Guam in January 2022, alleging that the Air Force violated NEPA by submitting its RCRA permit renewal application without conducting the required environmental review; the district court granted the Air Force's motion to dismiss on three grounds—lack of standing, absence of final agency action, and failure to state a claim—and Prutehi Litekyan timely appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed all three holdings. Question 1. When the federal government submits a permit application to continue disposing of hazardous waste, does that submission count as a final, reviewable government decision under federal law? 2. Before submitting that permit application, must the federal government first conduct the broad environmental review that federal law generally requires—even though the hazardous waste permitting process already includes its own, more limited environmental review?

Oral argument for Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, argued on October 06, 2026. YouTube

Johnson v. United States Congress Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Oct 5, 2026. Petitioner: Floyd D. Johnson.Respondent: United States Congress. Advocates: Jeffrey W. Chen (for the Petitioner) Kevin J. Barber (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Floyd D. Johnson, a United States Army veteran, began receiving disability benefits for service-related post-traumatic stress disorder while serving a 40-year prison sentence in Florida. Although the Veterans Benefits Administration initially approved a high level of compensation, it later reduced Johnson’s monthly payments to a 10 percent rate. The agency cited a federal law, 38 U.S.C. § 5313, which limits disability compensation for veterans incarcerated for more than 60 days following a felony conviction. Johnson filed a lawsuit against the United States Congress in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of the benefits reduction law. He argued that the statute acted as an unconstitutional “bill of attainder”—a law that unfairly targets specific individuals for punishment—and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Johnson requested a court order to stop the government from reducing benefits for incarcerated veterans and sought retroactive pay for the withheld funds. The district court dismissed Johnson’s complaint as frivolous after assuming it had jurisdiction to hear his constitutional claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated that judgment and ordered the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act strips district courts of the power to hear such challenges. Question Did the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act stripp district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this court in Johnson v. Robison, to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans’ benefits?

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 5, 2026. Petitioner: Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.Respondent: County Commissioners of Boulder County. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Boulder County and the City of Boulder (collectively, "Boulder") sued Exxon Mobil Corporation and three Suncor Energy entities, alleging that the companies' decades-long production, promotion, refining, marketing, and sale of fossil fuels knowingly drove climate change and caused concrete harm to Boulder's property and residents. Boulder further alleges that the defendants compounded this harm by intentionally misleading the public about fossil fuels' role in accelerating climate change. The alleged injuries include flood damage, increased wildfire risk, drought, and physical damage to public buildings and infrastructure—costs Boulder claims it has absorbed and will continue to absorb. To recover those costs, Boulder asserts state common law claims for public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. Critically, Boulder seeks only monetary damages—not an injunction against fossil fuel operations or any form of emissions regulation. The defendants argue that these state-law claims are precluded because federal law—specifically the Clean Air Act, the federal common law of interstate pollution, and the federal foreign affairs power—occupies the field and bars state courts from adjudicating harms rooted in interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions. Boulder filed suit in state court; the defendants removed the case to federal court, but after extensive litigation that included appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and two certiorari petitions in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the remand order and the case returned to the Boulder County District Court, which denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on preemption grounds. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado for extraordinary review under C.A.R. 21, which that court accepted and resolved in Boulder's favor on May 12, 2025. Question 1. Does the Court have statutory and Article III jurisdiction to hear this case? 2. Does federal law preclude state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate?

Mullin v. Doe Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2026. Petitioner: Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.Respondent: Dahlia Doe. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for the Respondents in Case No. 25-1083) Geoffrey M. Pipoly (for the Respondents in Case No. 25-1084) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program to allow foreign nationals from countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disasters, or other extraordinary conditions to live and work legally in the United States on a temporary basis. Federal law requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to periodically review conditions in each designated country and, after consulting with other government agencies, determine whether those conditions still justify protection. Syria has held TPS designation for years, shielding its nationals from deportation to a country ravaged by civil war and humanitarian crisis. Shortly after taking office in January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14159, directing the Secretary to aggressively limit TPS designations. Secretary Kristi Noem then terminated TPS for Syria on September 19, 2025, with an effective date of November 21, 2025 — giving roughly 6,100 Syrian TPS holders weeks to lose their legal status, work authorization, and protection from deportation. Seven Syrian nationals with family ties in the United States sued, arguing that the termination violated federal immigration law, was arbitrary and capricious, and reflected discriminatory animus rather than a genuine, good-faith review of conditions in Syria. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion and postponed the termination effective November 19, 2025; the government appealed and moved to stay that order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the stay on February 17, 2026, concluding that the government had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. Question Did the Trump administration lawfully end the Temporary Protected Status program for Syrian nationals?

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2026. Petitioner: Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.Respondent: Amarin Pharma, Inc. Advocates: Charles B. Klein (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Michael R. Huston (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Amarin Pharma markets icosapent ethyl under the brand name Vascepa. In 2012, the FDA approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication), which affects patients with blood triglyceride levels of at least 500 mg/dL. In 2019, following additional research and clinical trials, the FDA approved Vascepa for a second use: reducing cardiovascular risk in patients with triglyceride levels of at least 150 mg/dL (the CV indication). Amarin listed two patents covering the CV indication in the FDA’s Orange Book. In 2016, Hikma Pharmaceuticals submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application seeking approval for a generic version of icosapent ethyl. When the CV indication was approved in 2019, Hikma filed a “section viii statement” seeking FDA approval only for the SH indication by “carving out” the patented CV indication from its label—creating a “skinny label.” The FDA approved Hikma’s ANDA in May 2020. Throughout 2020, Hikma issued press releases referring to its product as the “generic version” or “generic equivalent” of Vascepa, describing Vascepa as indicated “in part” for the SH indication, and citing Vascepa sales figures (over $1 billion annually) that were attributable primarily to the CV indication. Hikma also marketed its product on its website under the therapeutic category “Hypertriglyceridemia” and as “AB” rated, though with a disclaimer that it was approved for fewer indications than Vascepa. In November 2020, Amarin sued Hikma for induced infringement of its CV indication patents. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Amarin’s allegations—based on Hikma’s skinny label combined with its press releases and marketing materials—plausibly stated a claim for induced infringement. Question 1. When a generic drug manufacturer excludes a patented use from its label, can it still be liable for inducing infringement if it calls its product a “generic version” of the brand-name drug and cites publicly available information about the brand-name drug’s sales? 2. Can a patent infringement complaint survive dismissal if it does not allege that the defendant made any statement specifically instructing or encouraging the patented use?

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2026. Petitioner: Cisco Systems, Inc.Respondent: Doe I. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul L. Hoffman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated a campaign of persecution—referred to as “douzheng”—against practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual discipline derived from Buddhism that grew rapidly in popularity across China. In 1999, the Party formally sought to eliminate Falun Gong through detention, forced conversion, and torture, designating it an illegal organization. To support these efforts, the Chinese authorities envisioned a nationwide surveillance system named the “Golden Shield,” designed to monitor online activity, identify practitioners, and facilitate their apprehension. Because China lacked the necessary technological infrastructure, Chinese officials sought help from Western firms. Cisco Systems, Inc., a U.S.-based tech company, allegedly responded with enthusiasm: from its headquarters in San Jose, California, Cisco pursued contracts, developed Golden Shield software and hardware, and provided training and support to Chinese security officers. Plaintiffs alleged that without Cisco’s technology—including advanced databases, real-time monitoring systems, and network optimization tools—Chinese authorities could not have effectively tracked, detained, or tortured Falun Gong adherents. Plaintiffs in this case include thirteen Chinese nationals and one U.S. citizen, Charles Lee, who claim they were targeted using Cisco’s technology and then detained, tortured, and subjected to psychological and physical abuse. Some plaintiffs reported multiple detentions and long-term surveillance; others described instances of torture facilitated by personalized information drawn from Golden Shield databases. Several allege that the abuses led to the deaths of family members. They contend that the design, development, and optimization of Cisco’s technology—and its tailored marketing to support Falun Gong persecution—enabled widespread human rights abuses undertaken by Chinese state and Party officials. The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2011, bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). The district court dismissed all claims, finding them insufficiently connected to the United States and lacking the necessary legal support for aiding and abetting liability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that aiding and abetting liability is actionable under both the ATS and the TVPA and that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged Cisco’s knowing participation in a domestic context. Question Does either the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act allow a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting?

Chatrie v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2026. Petitioner: Okello T. Chatrie.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Okello Chatrie was arrested in connection with the armed robbery of a bank in Richmond, Virginia, where an individual entered the Call Federal Credit Union, threatened employees and patrons with a handgun, and escaped with $195,000. The robbery was captured by surveillance footage, which showed the perpetrator appearing to talk on a cellphone. Lacking viable leads, Detective Joshua Hylton applied for a “geofence warrant” in June 2019. This novel form of warrant compelled Google to provide location data for all devices that had been near the robbery site within a one-hour window around the time of the crime. The geofence specified a 150-meter radius centered on the bank, encompassing not only the crime scene but also public streets, private residences, a hotel, a church, and a restaurant. Google responded with anonymized location data of devices within the geofence during the specified time. The government then requested two additional sets of data from Google: (1) expanded location data from nine of the original nineteen users, covering movements outside the geofence over a longer timeframe, and (2) identifying information for three of those users. One account belonged to Chatrie. Based on this data, law enforcement identified him as the suspect, arrested him, and charged him in federal court. Chatrie moved to suppress the location data obtained through the geofence warrant, arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the warrant likely violated the Fourth Amendment but declined to suppress the evidence under the good-faith exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. While the panel sharply disagreed both on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred and whether the warrant was constitutionally valid, all judges agreed that any defect was ultimately excused under the good-faith exception. Question Did the execution of the geofence warrant violate the Fourth Amendment?

Monsanto Company v. Durnell Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2026. Petitioner: Monsanto Company.Respondent: John L. Durnell. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Ashley C. Keller (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) John L. Durnell used Monsanto’s product Roundup, a herbicide containing the active ingredient glyphosate. Durnell subsequently developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which he alleged was caused by his exposure to Roundup and glyphosate. In January 2019, Durnell sued Monsanto, asserting claims for strict liability defective design, strict liability failure to warn, and negligence. Durnell claimed that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label to alert users to the risk of developing non-Hodgkin's lymphoma from glyphosate exposure. After a jury trial in September 2023 in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, the jury found in favor of Durnell on his strict liability failure to warn claim and awarded him $1.25 million in compensatory damages, but ruled for Monsanto on the defective design and negligence claims. Monsanto moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that federal law—specifically the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)—both expressly and impliedly preempted Durnell’s failure to warn claim. The trial court denied the motion, and Monsanto appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, which affirmed the judgment. Question Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempt a label-based failure-to-warn claim where EPA has not required the warning?

Blanche v. Lau Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2026. Petitioner: Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General.Respondent: Muk Choi Lau. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioner) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Muk Choi Lau, a native and citizen of China, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on September 7, 2007, after several years of traveling to the country as a nonimmigrant. On May 7, 2012, Lau was charged in New Jersey with third-degree trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, he left the United States for a brief period. Upon returning on June 15, 2012, he presented himself at John F. Kennedy International Airport as a returning lawful permanent resident. However, because of his pending charge, immigration authorities declined to admit him outright and instead paroled him into the country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Over a year later, in June 2013, Lau pleaded guilty to the counterfeiting charge and was sentenced to two years’ probation. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Lau in March 2014, charging him with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Lau argued that he should not have been treated as an arriving alien at the time of reentry and that he was eligible for a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The immigration judge rejected both claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Lau petitioned for review, arguing primarily that DHS lacked clear and convincing evidence to treat him as an applicant for admission on reentry merely due to a then-pending charge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, holding that DHS erred in treating Lau as inadmissible based solely on unproven allegations at the time of reentry and granted his petition. The immigration judge ordered removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision in 2021. The Second Circuit vacated the removal order in 2025 and remanded the case to terminate proceedings under the inadmissibility ground, reserving the possibility of future removal under a deportability provision. Question To remove a lawful permanent resident who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, must the government prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the lawful permanent resident’s last reentry into the United States?

Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2026. Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al.Respondent: AT&T, Inc. . Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.) Vivek Suri (for the FCC, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between 2014 and 2019, AT&T operated a location-based services program in which it collected and shared its customers’ mobile location data with third-party service providers such as Life Alert and AAA. To provide this data, AT&T contracted with “location aggregators,” who in turn resold the data to service providers. AT&T required those providers to obtain customer consent for each location request and reviewed their procedures, but it did not directly verify customer consent before transferring data. In 2018, news reports began revealing that some service providers misused or failed to adequately protect customers’ location data. In response, AT&T halted access for those providers, and by March 2019, shuttered the entire location-data program. Prompted by these reports, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated an investigation and in 2020 issued a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), proposing a $57 million fine for AT&T’s purported violations of Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934 and corresponding FCC regulations. AT&T challenged the classification of location data as “customer proprietary network information” (CPNI), asserted it had acted reasonably, and raised constitutional objections. After reviewing AT&T’s written response, the FCC rejected its defenses and issued a forfeiture order. Significantly, the FCC imposed the fine without a hearing or trial; AT&T’s only opportunity to respond occurred through written submissions to the agency. AT&T paid the fine and petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the FCC’s in-house enforcement process violated AT&T’s rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Question Are provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 that govern the Federal Communications Commission’s assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III?

Sripetch v. SEC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2026. Petitioner: Ongkaruck Sripetch.Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) From at least 2013 to 2019, Ongkaruck Sripetch participated in a series of fraudulent securities schemes involving at least 20 microcap, or “penny,” stock companies. Working alongside various associates and through multiple entities, Sripetch acquired discounted shares of small-cap companies and then secretly funded promotional campaigns to inflate their stock prices before selling his own holdings into the artificially heightened market—a practice known as stock scalping. He also engaged in unregistered sales of securities, most notably through control of a company called Abby Inc., and manipulated trading in another company, VMS Rehab Systems, through matched trades and wash trades designed to create the illusion of market activity. Later, he organized pump-and-dump schemes for Argus Worldwide stock, using matched trading to build trading volume before dumping shares after promotions without disclosing his intent to sell. In 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a civil enforcement action against Sripetch and others. In 2023, Sripetch consented to a bifurcated judgment, agreeing to the SEC’s allegations for the purposes of remedies. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California found him liable for $2.25 million in disgorgement and over $1 million in interest. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the SEC may obtain disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing that investors suffered pecuniary harm, joining a circuit split on this question.   Question May the SEC seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm?

T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2026. Petitioner: T. M.Respondent: University of Maryland Medical System Corporation. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In March 2023, T.M., a woman with a rare medical condition that triggers psychosis upon consuming gluten, was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center after an episode. Her treating psychiatrist sought and received state approval to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication; T.M. contested this but was unsuccessful in administrative proceedings. Independent psychiatrists later stated that T.M. no longer required inpatient care. To secure her release, T.M. and the hospital negotiated an oral agreement, which was formalized as a state court consent order. The order allowed her to leave the hospital on the condition that she comply with ongoing psychiatric treatment and medications, switch providers, and drop pending lawsuits. Her parents, J.M. and A.M., were also bound to notify authorities if she failed to comply. Ten days later, represented by new counsel, T.M. and her parents filed the present federal lawsuit claiming that the consent order was unconstitutional and entered under duress. They challenged the order as violating T.M.’s due process rights and sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating its enforcement. They did not request damages or challenge the initial commitment decisions. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the lawsuit. It held that T.M.’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, because they amounted to a request for federal review of a state court judgment. It also dismissed the parents’ claims for failure to state a constitutional violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that T.M. was a “state-court loser” seeking to undo a state judgment still reviewable in Maryland courts. Nonetheless, it remanded for the district court to modify T.M.’s dismissal to be without prejudice, due to lack of jurisdiction. Question Can the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties who lose in state courts from challenging injuries caused by state-court judgments, be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court?