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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

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Rating
★★★★★
4.8
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14 reviews
This podcast has
191 episodes
Language
English
Explicit
No
Date created
2012/02/19
Latest episode
2026/11/10
Average duration
51 min.
Release period
38 days

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The Aristotelian Society, founded in 1880, meets fortnightly in London to hear and discuss talks given by leading philosophers from a broad range of philosophical traditions. The papers read at the Society’s meetings are published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. The mission of the Society is to make philosophy widely available to the general public, and the Aristotelian Society Podcast Series represents our latest initiative in furthering this goal. The audio podcasts of our talks are produced by Backdoor Broadcasting Company in conjunction with the Institute of Philosophy, University of London. Please visit our website to learn more about us and our publications: http://www.aristoteliansociety.org.uk

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09/11/2026: Alex Long on The Method of Hypotheses in Plato's Phaedo
2026/11/10
About Alex Long is Professor of Classics at the University of St Andrews. He is the author of Conversation and Self-Sufficiency in Plato (2013) and Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019), and, with David Sedley, translated Plato’s Meno and Phaedo for the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. His most recent book is a collection co-edited with Barbara Sattler, Parmenides: New Perspectives (2025). He is currently finishing a monograph on naturalism in Plato’s political thought. Abstract In Plato’s Phaedo Socrates has a method of hypotheses, not, as is usually supposed, a method of hypothesis. The passage illustrates a principled way of taking a position on many questions and so satisfying the wide-ranging curiosity shown by Socrates’ predecessors, the Presocratics. In calling his positions his ‘hypotheses’ Socrates is not indicating a lack of certainty about them. The paper defends this interpretation with reference to other uses of the relevant expressions in the dialogues, and argues that it helps us resolve long-standing problems about the passage.
26/10/2026: David Liggins on The Richness and Strangeness of Higher-Order Metaphysics
2026/11/06
About David Liggins is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Manchester. Ontology is at the centre of his research interests. In 2024 he published a monograph, Truth Without Truths (Oxford University Press), and a Cambridge ‘Element’, Abstract Objects. David is a former editor of Analysis. Abstract Unlike first-order logic, higher-order logic permits quantification into syntactic positions other than name position, such as predicate position and sentence position. The contemporary movement called ‘higher-order metaphysics’ is based on higher-order logic. But there is significant confusion about how higher-order metaphysics relates to existing questions in metaphysics, which in turn clouds our understanding of the merits and demerits of higher-order metaphysical theories. Building on work done by Lukas Skiba, I use the notion of conceptual engineering to offer clarification, with the aim of helping us appreciate the full richness and strangeness of theories in higher-order metaphysics.
12/10/2026: Fatema Amijee on When Can Inquiry Come to an End?
2026/11/06
About Fatema Amijee is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. Much of her research concerns, in one form or another, the principle of sufficient reason, which holds that everything has an explanation. She publishes widely in metaphysics, early modern philosophy, feminist philosophy, the philosophy of religion (especially Islam), and the history of analytic philosophy. She is currently completing Metaphysical Inquiry and the Reach of Reason, a monograph to be published by Oxford University Press. Her previous work has appeared in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, the British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, and many other journals and volumes. She has also edited the Bloomsbury Handbook on Émilie du Châtelet, and is co-editing with Michael Della Rocca the volume Principle of Sufficient Reason for Oxford University Press. Abstract Explanatory inquiry seeks explanations for facts. I argue no amount of evidence can support an entitlement to the possibility of successful explanatory inquiry. Yet, absent this entitlement, no inquirer can rationally close their inquiry, a result that is devastating for our practices, epistemic and otherwise. I show that avoiding this sceptical conclusion requires a non-evidential epistemic entitlement to the possibility of successful explanatory inquiry. In particular, it requires that for any inquirer and any target of inquiry, the inquirer is epistemically entitled to the claim that their target has a knowable explanation, namely, one that is within her cognitive reach.
28/09/2026: Alexander Bird on Inaugural Address: Against Empiricism
2026/11/06
About Alexander Bird is the Bertrand Russell Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge, and a Fellow of St John’s College, Cambridge. He teaches and researches in philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics, and history and philosophy of medicine. He is currently engaged on a project “Creativity Across the Arts and Sciences” with Alison Hills. Alexander was previously Peter Sowerby Professor of Philosophy and Medicine at King’s College London and before that the Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. He also taught at the University of Edinburgh, Dartmouth College, St Louis University, and the University of Bergamo. His published works include Knowing Science (2022), Nature’s Metaphysics (2007), Thomas Kuhn (2000), and Philosophy of Science (1998). He is a Correspondant de l’Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Institut de France. Abstract I examine the motivations for being an empiricist in the philosophy of science and find them wanting. Either the motivations are inherently weak. Or they fail to provide a rationale for the practices of science.
19/01/2026: Lewis Ross, Are Philosophers Absurd? Progress, Testimony & Dividing Labour
2026/02/16
About Lewis Ross is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics. He is also the Director of LSE’s Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS). Lewis works on different topics at the intersection between epistemology, philosophy of law, and political philosophy. Right now, he is particularly interested in the theory and practice of criminal justice. His PhD was from the University of St Andrews and before that he completed a law degree. Abstract Philosophy is much changed from the time that many of the analytic classics were produced. It now resembles, in many ways, a mature scientific discipline—with large division of cognitive labour. Big philosophical questions are routinely broken down into ever-smaller research questions and addressed in growing thousands of narrow publication units. Yet what purpose does this division of labour serve? Philosophers are notoriously sceptical about simply relying on each other’s published findings. Indeed, most publications seem to add to, rather than reduce, philosophical disagreement. There is a looming worry about absurdity here. Large amounts of intellectual effort are spent on activities that seemingly do not contribute to settling the core questions of the field. In response to this worry, some are tempted by radical claims about the point of philosophy. For instance, some say that it is an ‘exceptional’ field that does not aim to settle on knowledge or truth in the same way as other fields of inquiry. But this response, it seems to me, still leaves the structure of contemporary philosophy without justification. In this talk, I grapple with this problem and explore a more optimistic perspective. I consider a middle ground between two typical ways to think about philosophical progress: locating progress not in the mind of the individual, nor in the discipline as a whole, but rather in the small research communities that populate it.
16/02/2026: Colin Chamberlain: After the Fall: Malebranche on the Law of the Body
2026/02/16
About Colin Chamberlain is Associate Professor of philosophy at University College London. He was previously an Associate Professor at Temple University. He is currently working on a book about Nicolas Malebranche’s account of the embodied mind, as well as working on Margaret Cavendish’s views about colour and perception. Abstract Malebranche holds that the Fall changes the mind’s relationship to the body from union to dependence. This change transforms the significance the senses have for the mind. Before the Fall, the senses respectfully advised the mind of the body’s needs. After, the senses command and tyrannize it. That is, the senses come to speak with the force of law when they urge the mind to care for the body’s needs. In general, Malebranche holds that a perception—a mental representation that things are thus and so—becomes a command for the mind, obliging it to consent, when the perception is enforced by inner sanctions. A perception has the force of law when the mind feels pain in withholding consent, pleasure when giving it. I argue that, after the Fall, the senses command in just this way. Sensory perceptions are accompanied by inner sanctions—pleasure and pain, reward and punishment—that imbue them with obligatory force.
13/10/2025: Sophie Horowitz on Plans, Learning, and Deferring
2026/02/16
ABSTRACT It is currently fashionable to talk about “synchronic conditionalization” – and more generally, synchronic or time-slice versions of norms that are normally understood as diachronic. But what is a synchronic version of conditionalization? Few authors address this question directly,1 but one often sees this synchronic entity labeled as a “plan”, “policy”, or “disposition”. I want to look at these labels a little more carefully. I will argue that conditionalization is a bad plan. More precisely: the way we naturally assess plans makes conditionalization look bad. But being disposed to conditionalize is good. That is, the way we naturally assess dispositions makes conditionalization look good like a good one to have. So if we want to defend a synchronic analog to conditionalization, we should go with dispositions, not plans. At the end of the paper I’ll argue that our way of assessing plans has more in affinity with another important epistemic concept: deference. ABOUT Sophie Horowitz is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, focusing on epistemology. Her interests include higher-order evidence, permissivism, and accuracy. Her monograph in progress, Guesswork, develops a view of accuracy according to which partial beliefs are more accurate insofar as they license true forced-choice guesses.
27/10/2025: Joe Saunders on What's Wrong with the Master: A Critical Analysis of Hegel's Master-Slave Dialectic
2026/02/16
ABSTRACT In his influential master-slave dialectic, Hegel looks to demonstrate that being a master is self-defeating. The master seeks absolute independence and genuine recognition from another. However, they depend upon their slave for their mastery, and the recognition their slave provides is “one-sided and unequal” (PS, §191, p. 114). Thus, Hegel claims that mastery undermines itself. In this paper, I put some pressure on this dialectic. Amongst other things, I argue that what is primarily wrong with the master is the fact they dominate a slave, not that they somehow fail on their own terms. ABOUT Joe primarily works on ethics and agency in Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. He also has interests in the philosophy of love and media ethics.
29/09/2025: Lucy O'Brien: Duddington and Our Awareness of Others’ Minds
2025/09/29
ABSTRACT What enables me to know that others exist? Natalie Duddington (PAS 1918-1919) offers two distinctive, and underexplored, insights into the question. She focusses on our capacity to perceive minds in perceiving animate beings, and on the ways in which we stand to be affected by others in knowing them. I will suggest a way of understanding what it is to see minds in action. I will also argue that ways we stand to be affected by others offers a resource for knowing others that takes us beyond perception, and is one that constitutes an antidote to the solipsist. ABOUT Lucy O’Brien is Richard Wollheim Professor of Philosophy at UCL. She has been at UCL since 1992. Her studies in Philosophy began with a BA Joint Hons in Pure Mathematics and Philosophy, and an MPhil in Philosophy, at the University of Sheffield. She went on to a DPhil in Oxford, followed by a post-doctoral position at King’s London. Her research interests lie in the philosophy of mind and action, with a particular focus on various forms of self-consciousness, and self-knowledge. She is writing a book on interpersonal self-consciousness following receipt of a British Academy/Leverhulme Senior Research Fellowship. She has published papers in a range of journals and collections, she is the author of Self-Knowing Agents  (OUP, 2007) and co-editor, with Matthew Soteriou, of Mental Actions  (OUP, 2009). She served as Director and Treasurer of the Aristotelian Society 2007-2014, and Vice-Chair of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 2015-2020. She was awarded a Humboldt Forschungspreis in 2021, and was made a Fellow of the British Academy in 2024. She was co-editor, with A. W. Moore, of the journal MIND from 2015-2025. She has been Chair of the Royal Institute of Philosophy since 2020.
10/03/2025: Pauline Kleingeld on Kant and the Methods of Moral Philosophy
2025/06/02
ABOUT Pauline Kleingeld is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. Earlier she taught at Leiden University and at Washington University in St. Louis. She is the author of Kant and Cosmopolitanism (CUP 2012), Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (Königshausen und Neumann 1995) and numerous articles. Her academic interests are in ethics and political philosophy, with a special focus on Kant and Kantian theory. ABSTRACT In the first section of his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (G1), Immanuel Kant claims to identify the supreme principle of morality. After famous discussions of the idea of a ‘good will’, ‘acting from duty’ and ‘respect’, he concludes that the highest moral principle is the following: ‘I ought never to proceed except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law’ (G 4:402). He claims that this principle implicitly governs ordinary moral practices and convictions. It is the ‘supreme’ moral principle in that it is a meta-principle by means of which substantive Kantian moral principles — such as ‘help others in need’ or ‘never lie’ — can be derived. Because Kant’s argument draws on moral convictions that are still widely shared, and because his conclusion articulates a paradigmatic position in moral theory, G1 has become one of the most renowned texts in the history of philosophy. The structure of Kant’s argument towards the identification of the supreme principle, however, has long been the subject of debate. Three serious difficulties stand out in the literature, and they all concern the most important steps of his argument: (1) Kant presents his argument as consisting of three propositions and a conclusion, but he labels only the second and third propositions as such. He does not make explicit what he takes the first proposition to be. In recent decades at least a dozen candidates have been put forward in the literature (see Steigleder 2022). (2) Kant claims that the third proposition follows from the first and the second, but it is widely regarded unclear how it is supposed to follow. (3) Kant’s final step to the formulation of the supreme principle is often said to be a jump over a gap, rather than a careful step that follows from the preceding argument. As a result, Kant’s reasoning towards the supreme moral principle seems more like a series of assertions and fragmentary arguments rather than a single argumentative chain. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s views on philosophical method shed new light on the structure and direction of his argument in G1. It has gone unnoticed that this argument consists of a chain of regressive inferences. I first explain the current positions in the literature regarding Kant’s method in G1 (§2). I then turn to Kant’s views on method (§3). Using his description of the so-called ‘analytic method’, I reconstruct the argument of G1 as a regressive chain. I argue that this reconstruction suggests solutions to the three main difficulties diagnosed in the literature, although several unclarities remain (§4).
28/04/2025: Léa Salje on "Artspeak"
2025/06/02
ABOUT Léa Salje is an associate professor at the University of Leeds. She joined Leeds in 2015 on a postdoc, and has been there ever since. Before that she did a PhD at UCL. She works in Philosophy of Mind, mostly on issues around self-knowledge and first person thought. Her first monograph Saying What One Thinks (forthcoming with OUP), is about the special form of self-knowledge we get by putting our thoughts into words.
13/05/2024: Eric Schliesser on Synthetic Philosophy: a restatement
2025/05/30
ABOUT Eric Schliesser is professor of Political Science, with a focus on Political Theory, at the University of Amsterdam. He was previously affiliated with Syracuse University, Leiden University, and Ghent University among others. Schliesser has published on early modern philosophy, philosophy of economics, the history of analytic philosophy, the history of feminism, and metaphilosophy. His publications include his monograph, Adam Smith: Systematic philosopher and Public Thinker (OUP, 2017). He has edited numerous volumes including (inter alia) Newton and empiricism. (OUP, with Zvi Biener, 2014); Sympathy, a History of a Concept (OUP, 2015); Ten Neglected Classics of philosophy (Oxford, 2017), Neglected Classics of Philosophy, Vol 2 (Oxford 2022), and a translation of Sophie de Grouchy’s Letters on Sympathy (together with Sandrine Berges, Oxford 2019). He keeps a daily blog Digressionsnimpressions.
11/11/2024: Christopher Cowie on Optimism In the Search for Extraterrestrial Life: A Philosophical Perspective
2025/05/30
ABOUT Christopher Cowie is Associate Professor at the University of Durham. He was previously Junior Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge and has held visiting fellowships at Harvard and Stanford. He is originally from Belfast, Northern Ireland. He is currently working on the implications of axiological paradox, and, unrelatedly, the philosophy of the search for alien life.
30/09/2024: Fabienne Peters on Inaugural Address: Relational Moral Demands
2025/05/30
ABSTRACT To act rightly is to act in accordance with moral demands. But what grounds moral demands? Much contemporary moral philosophy tends to take a non-relational approach to answering this question. According to non-relational moral theories, to act rightly is to act in a way that honours or promotes the (non-relational) moral properties of individuals, for example their well-being or their rights. According to relational moral theories, by contrast, at least some moral demands are grounded in a relation between individuals. To act rightly, is to act in accordance with what our moral relations to other individuals demand from us. Within relational theories, there is a further distinction to be drawn. Most contemporary relational theories presuppose that moral relations are determined by relational moral properties of the individuals involved. Call this account of relational moral demands individuals-first relationalism. Radical relationalism, by contrast, rejects the normative priority of moral properties of individuals – whether they are relational or non-relational properties. Instead, it has a relations-first structure. My aim in this paper is to argue that some moral demands are radically relational. ABOUT Fabienne Peter is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick, specialising in moral and political philosophy and in social epistemology, including political epistemology. She has published extensively on political legitimacy and democratic theory. Her current research is in meta-ethics. She served as Head of Department at Warwick from 2017 to 2020. Before joining Warwick, she was a postdoc at Harvard University and then an assistant professor at the University of Basel. She has also held visiting positions at the Research School of Social Sciences at ANU and the Murphy Institute at Tulane University. She has previously been an editor of Economics and Philosophy and is currently an Associate Editor of the Journal of Moral Philosophy.
10/02/2025: Nadine Elzein on Abilities, Goals, & Justifications
2025/05/30
ABSTRACT Many of our practices presuppose moral responsibility. Arguably, agents can only be morally responsible if they are able to act otherwise than they do. Compatibilists and incompatibilists traditionally disagree about whether determinism precludes the ability to do otherwise, often reaching an impasse because they endorse different readings of “able to do otherwise”. I argue that the correct reading of “able to do otherwise” depends on the purposes of our responsibility-entailing practices. Practices serving different purposes may warrant different readings. Consequently, there may be no single independently ascertainable definition of freedom to do otherwise that justifies our responsibility-entailing practices wholesale ABOUT Nadine Elzein is an Associate Professor at the University of Warwick. She completed her PhD at University College London, and has held posts at the University of Oxford, King’s College London, the University of Southampton, and University College London. Her research focuses predominantly on free will, moral responsibility, blame, and determinism. She has a present writing project with OUP on this theme.

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Yehaawww! 2026/01/03
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