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Jeremy Bearer-Friend and Sarah Polcz discuss their proposal to require leading AI firms to pay taxes in equity, reshaping how the gains from AI are distributed ---- Artificial intelligence is rapidly reshaping the economy, but two Stanford Law alumni argue that existing tax frameworks are failing to capture—or fairly distribute—the value it generates. Jeremy Bearer-Friend, JD '14, a professor at George Washington University Law School, and Sarah Polcz, JSM '12, JSD '20, a professor at UC Davis School of Law, join co-host Professor Richard Thompson Ford to discuss a proposal that would require leading AI companies to pay a portion of their taxes in equity rather than cash, with those shares placed into a public trust, and their work with U.S. Senate members to make this happen. The conversation explores a central question: If AI was built on vast amounts of human-generated text, images, and creative work, who is entitled to share in the wealth it produces? Bearer-Friend and Polcz connect their proposal to broader concerns about wealth concentration and whether the gains from AI will flow to a narrow class of tech executives and investors—or to the public at large. The episode also examines how an equity-based tax could work in practice, including questions of governance, political insulation, and the mechanics of a sovereign wealth fund, and what it would mean to give the public a direct stake in the companies shaping the future of artificial intelligence. Links: Jeremy Bearer-Friend  >>> GW Law School pageSarah Polcz  >>> UC Davis School of Law page“Sharing the Algorithm: The Tax Solution to Generative AI” >>> Columbia Journal of Tax Law pageAmerican AI Wealth Fund Bill >>> PDF“Everyone Wants to Tax A.I. The Big Disagreement: How?” >>> NY Times DealBook page“Don’t laugh off Bernie Sanders’ communist AI-heist attempt — young voters are falling for it” >>> New York Post pageConnect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast WebsiteStanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn PageRich Ford >>>  Twitter/XPam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School PageStanford Law School >>> Twitter/XStanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X  (00:00:00) A Tax Paid in Stock(00:02:14) IP, Inequality, and the AI Boom(00:05:56) Why the Public Deserves an Equity Stake(00:11:58) How the Tax Would Actually Work—Stock, Rates, and Governance(00:16:59) Sanders, Trump, and a Race to Co-opt the Idea(00:21:06) Objections, Safeguards, and the Road Ahead  Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Stanford’s David Sklansky discusses the search of Rep. Ilhan Omar’s home, the Justice Department’s election-timing rules, and what courts can do when prosecutions are challenged as retaliatory. ---- Federal agents arrived at U.S. Representative Ilhan Omar’s door on October 12 and spent hours searching her home under a warrant a judge had approved. The search came three weeks before Election Day, and the Justice Department has a formal regulation against timing investigative actions to influence an election. Was the timing a coincidence, and were the department’s usual safeguards followed? Stanford Law professor David Sklansky, a former federal prosecutor and faculty co-director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center, joins Pam Karlan to discuss the search and the White House’s role in criminal investigations. Sklansky and Karlan discuss the Justice Department’s rules about investigations close to an election, including one that has never been written down. Sklansky revisits a well-known warning from former attorney general Robert Jackson about the danger of starting with a person and then looking for a crime to charge. He also explains the added constitutional protections that apply when the home of a member of Congress is searched. They look at how a judge decides whether to approve a search warrant, and why a person can’t argue that a prosecution is retaliatory until charges have actually been filed. Links: David Sklansky >>> Stanford Law School pageCriminal Justice in Divided America >>> Stanford Law School pageConnect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast WebsiteStanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn PageRich Ford >>>  Twitter/XPam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School PageDiego Zambrano >>> Stanford Law School PageStanford Law School >>> Twitter/XStanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters: (00:00:00)  Introduction(00:01:26)  The Raid on Representative Ilhan Omar's Home (00:02:15)  How Did the Government Get a Warrant? (00:04:12)  Three DOJ Policies Implicated by the Timing (00:05:33)  Is There Still a Public Integrity Section? (00:06:43)  The Unwritten 60/90 Day Rule (00:07:57)  What Could They Be Looking For? (00:09:23)  The Speech or Debate Clause and Congressional Searches (00:10:50)  Prosecuting Without Political Interference (00:12:38)  No White House Contact on Criminal Cases (00:13:46)  From Nixon to a DOJ "Inside the White House" (00:15:13)  Politicized Pleadings in Civil and Election Litigation (00:17:23)  Edward Levi's Post-Watergate Legacy (00:17:49)  Robert Jackson's Famous Speech on Prosecutors (00:20:56)  Trump's Rhetoric About Omar and Somali Americans (00:24:53)  Is the Law Equipped for Vindictive Prosecutions? (00:27:47)  The Gap: No Remedy at the Investigation Stage (00:28:44)  Conclusion Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

The ACLU’s Sophia Lin Lakin discusses voting access and the redistricting battles shaping political power ---- Sophia Lin Lakin, JD ’11 (MS ’04, BA ’02), director of the ACLU’s Voting Rights Project, challenges the stated premises behind many current voting restrictions, including claims about widespread non-citizen voting. “If we’re worried about the integrity of our elections,” she tells Stanford Law professor and host Pam Karlan, “we should be worried about making sure that more people are participating in our elections and not chasing a fantasy.” That concern—how long-standing efforts to restrict voting access can make it harder for eligible voters to participate—runs through the episode, which was recorded shortly before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Louisiana v. Callais. In a 6–3 ruling, the Court struck down Louisiana’s congressional map, which had created a second majority-Black district, holding that the map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The decision could make it harder to use Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to challenge maps that dilute minority voting strength. Lakin and Karlan discuss what is at stake when access to the ballot becomes harder and the rules for translating votes into political power begin to shift. Their conversation focuses on proof-of-citizenship requirements, mail ballots, voter roll purges, and redistricting battles, offering a timely look at the legal fights shaping who can vote, whose ballots count, and whether communities can elect representatives of their choice.   Links: Sophia Lin Lakin >>> ACLU pageConnect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast WebsiteStanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn PageRich Ford >>>  Twitter/XPam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School PageStanford Law School >>> Twitter/XStanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X (00:00:00) The Three Buckets of Voting Rights  (00:02:35) Voter Roll Surveillance  (00:06:17) The Non-Citizen Voting Myth and the Dangers of Faulty Databases  (00:10:23) Citizenship Documentation Requirements  (00:16:19) Mail Voting Rules and the Materiality Provision  (00:21:00) Section Two of the Voting Rights Act and Redistricting Battles  (00:28:51) Race, Politics, and the Future of Fair Maps    Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

A sweeping Stanford Law study reveals how routinely federal courts seal records, sometimes concealing information with profound implications for public health and safety. ---- Evidence of dangerous drugs, defective products, and corporate misconduct is often hidden from public view through sealed court records. And federal judges are granting requests to seal records at an astonishing rate, often without applying the proper legal standard, according to the largest-ever study of the issue. Stanford Law professors Nora Freeman Engstrom, JD ’02, and David Freeman Engstrom, JD ’02, co-directors of the Deborah L. Rhode Center on the Legal Profession, join Pam Karlan to discuss their findings. Their research reveals that roughly 90 percent of sealing requests are granted, about three-quarters go unopposed, and judges frequently fail to cite any legal standard at all. Why is secrecy so pervasive in a justice system built on public access? The Engstroms explain how the incentives of litigants, lawyers, and judges can leave no one looking out for the public's right to know. They also discuss their push for a new federal sealing rule and why, with civil trials increasingly rare, access to court records is more important than ever. Links: Nora Freeman Engstrom >>> Stanford Law School pageDavid Freeman Engstrom >>> Stanford Law School page“[Sealed Document]: An Empirical Study of Sealing Orders in the Federal Courts” >>> Stanford Law School page“Millions Face Court Alone. California Can Change That.”  >>> Stanford Law School pageConnect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast WebsiteStanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn PageRich Ford >>>  Twitter/XPam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School PageDiego Zambrano >>> Stanford Law School PageStanford Law School >>> Twitter/XStanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X  (00:00:00) Introduction (00:02:08) What does it mean to seal a document? (00:04:06) What should be sealed, and sealing vs. redaction (00:05:55) Catch-22 and Judge Breyer’s redacted opinion (00:06:54) How the study was done: Two million dockets and a machine learning pipeline (00:08:20) The wrong standard (or no standard at all) (00:10:43) Real-world consequences: Sealing and hidden public health hazards (00:12:26) “Shadow consent”: Why sealing motions go unopposed (00:14:49) No constituency for transparency (00:16:06) Can the press be the fail-safe? (It’s a myth) (00:19:35) Proposed fixes: Intervention tools and a Rhode Center staff attorney (00:20:34) Law on the books vs. law in action: A rule of law problem (00:22:53) Why litigation transparency matters: Regulatory, procedural, and democratic work (00:25:55) The vanishing trial and why the papers matter (00:27:47) Cause for optimism? Prospects for rulemaking (00:29:12) Where to draw the line: Protective orders vs. sealing standards (00:30:26) Rules vs. standards: What should always be sealed? (00:32:05) Closing thoughts and where to find the article Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Deborah Sivas discusses the recent rollback of environmental laws, calls to streamline environmental review to speed up development, and the role communities should play in decisions about what gets built.  --- As the push to build more infrastructure gains attention, so does debate over the role of environmental protections and public participation. How can communities have a voice in development while still allowing needed projects to move forward? Stanford's Deborah Sivas, JD ’87, environmental law expert and co-director of the Environmental Law Clinic at Stanford Law School, joins Pam Karlan to discuss the “climate abundance” movement and its implications for environmental law. Sivas examines whether changes to environmental permitting would address the challenges of building new infrastructure and how communities can have a meaningful say in those decisions. “It’s not durable if you don’t have a population to support it,” she says. “If people can see it as a win-win coming into their communities in a way that benefits them as well as larger policy goals, to me, that’s the right way forward—not disenfranchising them.” Sivas and Karlan discuss how environmental law is evolving amid new policy and legal developments, including the current administration’s push for expanded fossil fuel development, changes to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and a proposal to open some of Alaska’s last old-growth forests to logging.   Links: Deborah A. Sivas >>> Stanford Law School pageEndangered Species Act’s “harm” rule, explained  >>> Stanford Law School pageConnect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast WebsiteStanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn PageRich Ford >>>  Twitter/XPam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School PageDiego Zambrano >>> Stanford Law School PageStanford Law School >>> Twitter/XStanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X(00:00:00) Introduction and welcoming Debbie Sivas  (00:02:16) What is "climate abundance"?  (00:04:22) Deregulation for fossil fuels, not clean energy  (00:06:26) Why the grid really isn't being built  (00:08:32) Killing wind projects (00:10:31) NEPA, the Supreme Court, and citizen suits  (00:13:03) Courts vs. agencies: a legal whiplash  (00:14:40) Opening Alaska's roadless forests to logging  (00:18:57) A "concrete proposal" for environmental democracy  (00:22:08) The national and global collective action problem  (00:24:02) Novel legal tools: IEEPA, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Defense Production Act  (00:25:42) Citizen suits' achilles' heel  (00:27:24) Training the next generation of environmental lawyers  (00:29:40) Clinic spotlight: Northern Chumash Tribal Council  (00:31:13) Closing thoughts  Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Nate Persily joins Pam Karlan to discuss efforts to change the rules governing the 2026 elections and the legal battles over how those changes would affect voting.  --- As the push to build more infrastructure gains attention, so does debate over the role of environmental protections and public participation. How can communities have a voice in development while still allowing needed projects to move forward? As the 2026 elections approach, questions about how Americans vote are increasingly becoming questions for the courts. Disputes over redistricting, mail-in voting, and how elections are run are raising broader questions about tensions between states and a federal government for control over who sets the rules and when they can be changed. Stanford's Nate Persily, JD ’98, a leading expert on election law, joins Pam Karlan to discuss the legal and constitutional questions surrounding elections.  Persily and Karlan discuss Missouri’s effort to redraw its congressional districts in the middle of an election cycle, the current administration’s efforts to change mail voting rules through the U.S. Postal Service, and the Supreme Court’s handling of election disputes. They also look ahead to the 2030 census, including questions about citizenship and who should be counted, and consider the broader consequences when election rules remain unsettled as voting gets underway. Links: Nate Persily >>> Stanford Law School pageConnect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast WebsiteStanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn PageRich Ford >>>  Twitter/XPam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School PageDiego Zambrano >>> Stanford Law School PageStanford Law School >>> Twitter/XStanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X(00:00) Introduction (00:01:53) Setting up today's two topics (00:02:21) Missouri's redistricting battle explained (00:03:49) The Supreme Court sides with the Missouri Supreme Court (00:04:42) Two separate Supreme Court interventions(00:06:37) Why this moment is unprecedented (00:08:54) The rise of one-party congressional delegations (00:11:54) Is there a way out? (00:12:47) A preview: the 2030 census fight (00:16:25) Shifting to how Americans actually vote (00:18:00) Trump's executive order on mail voting (00:19:51) The Postal Service's ballot-matching portal (00:21:37) Envelope errors and a scramble before Election Day (00:22:34) Round one at the Supreme Court: too soon to sue (00:24:57) Round two: now it's "too late" (00:26:21) The Postal Service's outsized role in elections (00:27:17) The Purcell principle and last-minute chaos (00:28:01) A fracturing Supreme Court on election law (00:28:54) "Suppression through chaos" (00:30:10) Closing   Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Stanford’s Anne Joseph O’Connell examines who can step in when a top federal position is vacant and what recent court decisions could mean for how those positions are filled.  ---- When a top federal position is vacant, someone still has to run the office. But who gets to step in, and what powers can they exercise while the position remains unfilled? Those questions are at the center of recent legal disputes over how the federal government operates when permanent officials are not yet in place. In this episode, Stanford Law School Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell, a leading scholar of administrative law and the federal bureaucracy, joins host Professor Pam Karlan to discuss the rules governing temporary officials and the way federal agencies are organized and staffed. O’Connell and Karlan examine recent disputes over U.S. attorneys and what happens when the usual process for putting a permanent leader in place does not happen quickly. They discuss how courts have interpreted the rules for temporary officials and what those decisions could mean for other federal agencies and future administrations. The conversation also considers how much authority the president has over the people who work for him and where the law draws the line. Links: Anne Joseph O'Connell >>> Stanford Law School page Pulte’s Appointment Shows Flaws in the Vacancies Act >>> Stanford Law School page Appeals Court Rejects Trump’s Strategy of Picking U.S. Attorneys  >>> Stanford Law School page Can the President Appoint Principal Officers Without the Senate? >>> Lawfare page Bureaucracy’s Boundaries >>> Lawfare page Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Rich Ford >>>  Twitter/X Pam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School Page Diego Zambrano >>> Stanford Law School Page Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X   (00:00:00) Welcome to Anne Joseph O'Connell (00:01:32) What "Actings" are, and why they matter (00:02:53) The U.S. Attorney job, explained (00:07:09) Three ways to fill a vacant U.S. Attorney seat (00:11:01) The courts say no to post-vacancy "first assistants" (00:12:37) Ripple effects across the federal government (00:14:07) Does this undercut the Unitary Executive? (00:15:24) A legislative fix, and the delegation workaround (00:16:31) Circuit courts shut down delegation (00:18:22) Trump v. Slaughter and the power to fire (00:19:12) The Librarian of Congress and the Register of Copyrights (00:22:26) Where's the line on presidential removal power? (00:27:02) Closing thoughts  Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

The ACLU’s Anthony Romero unpacks a sweeping docket—from a Supreme Court showdown over birthright citizenship to voting rights and free speech—as the rule of law is tested. --- In a timely conversation about the ACLU’s massive docket of cases, Pam Karlan speaks with Anthony Romero, JD ’90, executive director of the ACLU, about the surge of civil rights and civil liberties battles facing the country right now. Romero discusses major pieces of litigation spanning immigration, free speech, voting rights, and government accountability. A key focus is the Supreme Court showdown over birthright citizenship, where the Trump administration is attempting to deny citizenship to certain children born in the U.S., a move Romero calls an attack on one of the core promises of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also explore what happens when the government pushes the boundaries of compliance with court rulings and what that means for the rule of law. Tune in for a compelling conversation about the cases that could help define the next chapter of civil liberties law in the United States. Links: Anthony Romero >>> ACLU page Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Rich Ford >>>  Twitter/X Pam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School Page Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X (00:00) Introduction and ACLU’s Rapidly Expanding Docket (02:30) Small but Mighty—ACLU vs. Federal Power (07:00) Inside a Burgeoning Docket (11:30) Birthright Citizenship at the Supreme Court (16:00) Enforcement at Scale and the Rule of Law (21:00): An Inflection Point in Public Sentiment Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

The Declaration as a “promissory note”—and what it demands now In the final discussion of The Declaration at 250 series, Robert P. George, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University, argues that the Declaration of Independence should be read in the Lincoln–King tradition: not as proof that the American project was completed in 1776, but as a promissory note that sets enduring standards for justice. He confronts the central tension head-on—slavery alongside the Declaration’s equality claims—contending that the nation’s gravest wrongs were never the result of too much devotion to the Declaration’s ideals, but rather repeated failures to honor them. For George, the Declaration’s moral architecture depends on natural law and natural rights: rights are not gifts from the state, courts, or political majorities, but are grounded in a “more-than-merely human” authority and therefore cannot be legitimately revoked by human power. He then reframes the most familiar triad—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—arguing that “liberty” is freedom for worthy ends (not license) and “happiness” is flourishing and character (not mere pleasure or desire satisfaction), which means the founding principles carry substantive moral content rather than a thin, value-neutral individualism. Jonathan Gienapp, Professor of History at Stanford University, broadens and complicates this account by bringing the Declaration’s historical context into sharper focus. He emphasizes that the document’s immediate purpose was political: to justify revolution and to define legitimate liberty as non-domination—being governed by laws made with genuine representation and consent rather than by an alien will. Gienapp presses George to connect moral freedom-for-flourishing to political freedom-as-self-government: what changes if we place republicanism and democracy at the center of the Declaration’s promise, alongside natural rights? He also signals that the Declaration did not simply announce shared principles; it generated intense argument almost immediately over what “liberty” and “licentiousness” meant in practice, setting up a long-running contest over whose interpretation truly carried forward the Revolution’s aims. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters: [00:00:26 – 00:04:40] Chapter 1 — Series finale setup + introducing the speakers Host Michael McConnell closes out The Declaration at 250 and tees up the theme: the Declaration as a “promissory note,” then introduces Robert P. George and Jonathan Gienapp and frames the conversation as a capstone debate.[00:04:40 – 00:42:48] Chapter 2 — Robert P. George’s case: natural rights, civic virtue, and “freedom for” flourishing George argues America’s failures come from infidelity to the Declaration, not devotion to it, and grounds rights in a Creator and natural law. He reframes life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as moral claims aimed at virtue, ordered liberty, and human flourishing—not license or pleasure.[00:43:00 – 00:47:45] Chapter 3 — Jonathan Gienapp’s first question: liberty as non-domination and self-government Gienapp presses the political meaning of liberty at the founding—freedom as non-domination under representative institutions and consent. He asks how George’s moral account of liberty connects to republican self-rule and the Declaration’s grievance-driven justification for revolution.[00:47:45 – 01:00:19] Chapter 4 — Jonathan Gienapp’s second and third questions: wealth inequality + early fights over “liberty vs. licentiousness” Gienapp adds the material foundations of republicanism—property distribution, anti-aristocracy reforms like abolishing primogeniture/entail—and asks how inequality threatens civic virtue and ordered liberty. He then argues the Declaration sparked immediate, bitter disputes (Federalists vs. Jeffersonians/Jacksonians) over what counted as true liberty and who “captured the soul” of American democracy.[01:00:27 – 01:09:09] Chapter 5 — George’s replies: non-domination affirmed, inequality debated, polarization then vs. now George embraces the non-domination point and explains how founders linked freedom and republican self-government, while suggesting leading founders worried more about forced leveling than wealth gaps. He reflects on early partisan conflict but argues today’s divide is deeper because Americans no longer share a common moral vocabulary or civic framework. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Former state solicitors general Michael Mongan and Kevin Gallagher discuss the evolving role of state solicitors general and how states work together to shape legal battles before the Supreme Court. --- When states go to court, the battles are not always divided along party lines. State solicitors general often work across state lines to defend shared interests, coordinate legal strategy, and help shape cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. In this episode, former California Solicitor General Michael Mongan, JD '06 (BA '01), and former Virginia Solicitor General Kevin Gallagher, now partners at WilmerHale, join podcast host Professor Pam Karlan to discuss how the role of state solicitors general has evolved. They discuss multistate litigation, bipartisan coalitions, and how states can work together when their legal interests align. Mongan explains that bipartisan cooperation often happens when “they share sovereign interests as states and those interests are genuinely threatened.” Michael Mongan  >>> WilmerHale Page Kevin Gallagher  >>>  WilmerHale Page Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Rich Ford >>> Twitter/X Pam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School Page Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters 00:00 Introduction 03:03 What does a State Solicitor General actually do?  04:24 Independence from the Governor  06:10 Who speaks for the state?  09:22 How Virginia united every state  12:44 Where red and blue states actually agree  15:12 The mechanics of building a multistate coalition  17:06 Avoiding duplicate briefs: who writes first?  19:53 From public service to a state AG private practice  20:55 Why firms are racing to build state AG expertise  24:57 Favorite cases 28:44 Closing  Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

The real crisis isn’t the Declaration—it’s what we’ve stopped teaching. Peter Berkowitz, Tad and Dianne Taube Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, contends that universities have failed at liberal education—the cultivation of citizens prepared to exercise freedom and responsibility. He attributes the breakdown to politicized classrooms, overreliance on narrow “scientistic” approaches in the social sciences, and a professional culture that trains future scholars instead of educating future citizens—leaving graduates with little serious exposure to the Declaration, the Constitution, and the moral logic of self-government. Stephen Haber, Stanford Professor of Political Science, History, and Economics, presses the discussion toward causes and incentives, setting up a debate about who is responsible for the drift and what reforms could realistically restore civic learning. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters:[00:00:26 – 00:04:11] Chapter 1: Setting the stakes—The Declaration at 250 and today’s critiques Michael McConnell frames the episode around renewed skepticism of the Declaration’s natural-rights claims—from progressive critiques focused on slavery and domination to post-liberal arguments against “abstract” rights.[00:04:11 – 00:06:54] Chapter 2: Berkowitz’s opening—What the Declaration claims and why critics converge Peter Berkowitz restates the Declaration’s core logic (equality, unalienable rights, consent, and the right to alter/abolish destructive government) and argues that left/right critiques increasingly overlap in their indictment of universal rights.[00:06:54 – 00:17:47] Chapter 3: Universities and the erosion of liberal education Berkowitz contends civic understanding is collapsing because colleges no longer ensure a shared, rigorous education in founding principles, constitutional traditions, and the broader intellectual inheritance needed for citizenship.[00:17:47 – 00:31:00] Chapter 4: From “critical” to “generous” thinking—Mapping the modern critiques Berkowitz argues that criticism without charitable interpretation becomes a “rage to criticize,” then traces postmodern progressive and post-liberal arguments (including Deneen and Vermeule) that reject the Declaration’s rights framework and flirt with radical alternatives.[00:31:00 – 01:04:12] Chapter 5: Human rights, diplomacy, and reform—The Commission and a debate about university governance Berkowitz ties the Declaration to U.S. foreign policy via the UDHR and the Commission on Unalienable Rights, including its aims and controversies; Stephen Haber responds that boards, presidents, and provosts shape campus ideology and that governance-level changes could enable a revival of civic education. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

"The Declaration meets the machine age" In this episode of The Declaration at 250, Michael McConnell frames a question the Founders never confronted: if the Declaration grounds rights in human nature, what happens when machines can generate persuasive, human-like language at scale? Constitutional scholar Alexander Tsesis argues that the Declaration’s conception of rights is inherently human-centered—rooted in consciousness, moral agency, intentionality, and the capacity to participate in a constitutional republic—so AI systems are not and should not become First Amendment rights-holders. He warns that treating large language models as protected “speakers” would be a major break from the Declaration’s principles and could make ordinary democratic regulation—transparency requirements, labeling of synthetic content, safety rules, data practices, and restrictions on deceptive election deepfakes—far harder by forcing courts into strict scrutiny review. Stanford historian Anne Twitty broadens the lens by situating abolitionists’ use of the Declaration within wider 19th-century conflicts over speech and constitutional meaning, reminding listeners that rival traditions—including censorship and suppression—also shaped American practice. She also presses a key tension in Tsesis’s framework: abolitionists championed not only the right to speak, but the public’s right to hear, circulate, and access contested ideas (as seen in the abolitionist postal campaign and opposition to the congressional gag rule). That listener-centered strand, she suggests, could potentially be invoked by scholars arguing for some constitutional shelter for AI-generated communications—an argument Tsesis acknowledges but ultimately resists by emphasizing that the First Amendment’s core purpose is protecting human expression and self-government, not machine output. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters:[00:00:26] Chapter 1- Framing Question: Do constitutional rights grounded in “human nature” apply to AI? Host Michael McConnell introduces the episode’s core dilemma: the Declaration’s natural-rights logic underwrites later constitutional protections like free speech—so where does that leave generative AI? [00:01:18] Chapter 2 - Thesis: Why Tsesis says AI can’t be a First Amendment rights-holder Alexander Tsesis argues the Declaration and Constitution are human-centered: AI lacks consciousness, moral agency, and political personhood, so extending rights to LLMs would depart from founding principles and hinder regulation. [00:10:08] Chapter 3 - Regulatory Stakes: What happens if courts treat LLM outputs as protected “speech”? Tsesis warns that First Amendment coverage for AI could trigger strict scrutiny and undermine laws on transparency, labeling, safety, data practices, and election deepfakes—citing recent doctrine and cases like Reed v. Town of Gilbert. [00:52:35] Chapter 4 - Historical Challenge: Do abolitionists’ “right to hear” arguments support listener-centric AI rights? Historian Anne Twitty complicates the record: abolitionists elevated the Declaration, but censorship traditions were strong; she highlights abolitionist campaigns (postal campaign, gag rule) to argue listener rights might bolster pro-AI speech theories. [01:04:17] Chapter 5 - Tsesis Response: Listener rights matter—but is the First Amendment still speaker-centered? Tsesis agrees the right to receive information is important, yet maintains free speech is fundamentally about protecting human intention and self-expression, not conferring constitutional status on machine outputs. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Stanford’s Allen Weiner examines how the U.S. war with Iran raises questions about the president’s power to wage war and negotiate peace. --- The American war with Iran began with ambitious goals, including preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and potentially bringing about regime change. But the conflict may well be leading to a very different outcome, according to Stanford Law School's Allen Weiner, a scholar of international and human rights law and former State Department lawyer. Just prior to the recent collapse of the tenuous cease fire, Weiner joined podcast host Professor Pam Karlan to discuss how the conflict is arguably strengthening Iran’s most repressive factions while putting economic and diplomatic pressure on the United States. Weiner traces how the conflict grew out of the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal, asks whether the new agreement with Iran amounts to a weaker version of that accord, and considers how ceasefires and shifting legal rationales have allowed the administration to sidestep Congress and keep the War Powers clock from running out.  Allen Weiner  >>> Stanford Law School Page Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Rich Ford >>> Twitter/X Pam Karlan >>> Stanford Law School Page Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters 00:00:00 Introduction  00:02:09 Back to the JCPOA—The 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal  00:04:23 From "worst deal ever" to a weaker one  00:04:51 Two rounds of strikes  00:07:11 Regime change that wasn't  00:08:40 The Strait of Hormuz and the global economy  00:09:49 Emboldened by Venezuela  00:11:33 Israel in, NATO out  00:12:27 The new MOU  00:14:31 Israel left off the page  00:17:38 Free transit, for now  00:19:06 Treaty or political commitment?  00:21:36 The War Powers loophole  00:24:26 Can Congress actually enforce the War Powers Act?  00:28:12 Conclusion  Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

“Two competing originalist instincts” In this episode of The Declaration at 250, Michael McConnell introduces Randy Barnett, the Patrick Hotung Professor of Constitutional Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and Faculty Director of the Georgetown Center for the Constitution alongside Eugene Volokh, the Thomas M. Siebel Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford), and the Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus (and Distinguished Research Professor) at UCLA School of Law. Barnett and Volokh share respect for the Declaration’s importance but diverge on what that importance does in law. Barnett sees the Declaration as the “ground and foundation of future government,” supplying binding premises about “just powers” and limiting even broad state “police power” claims that risk subverting rights. Volokh counters that the Declaration resembles a political platform and persuasive rhetoric—valuable for context and values, but too general and historically contingent to function as enforceable law without tethering to more specific legal texts. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters [00:00:26] Chapter 1: Framing Question: Is the Declaration “law” if courts can’t directly enforce it? Host Michael McConnell opens by contrasting Justice Barrett and Justice Scalia’s view—Declaration as ideals, not law—with Randy Barnett’s claim that the Declaration functions as foundational law shaping constitutional meaning. [00:01:54] Chapter 2: Setting the Stage: Why Barnett and Volokh, and why this debate now? McConnell introduces Barnett and Volokh, highlighting their originalist and civil-libertarian influence and teeing up the central question: “Is the Declaration our law?” [00:06:11] Chapter 3: Barnett’s Case-in-Chief: How did Salmon P. Chase use the Declaration as law in anti-slavery litigation? Barnett argues the Declaration supplied a liberty baseline in 19th-century practice—especially in the Matilda and Van Zandt cases—supporting “clear statement” rules and strict construction against liberty-restricting interpretations. [00:37:38] Chapter 4: Volokh’s Challenge: What is the Declaration—and what isn’t it? Volokh contends the Declaration is best understood as a political platform/announcement with legal significance as an independence claim, but not as governing law; it can guide interpretation mainly when reinforced by constitutional provisions like the Ninth Amendment. [00:56:04] Chapter 5: Barnett’s Rebuttal: Can the Declaration shape doctrine without giving judges a blank check? Barnett responds that “law” is broader than judicially enforceable rules, arguing the Declaration legitimately informs burdens of justification and doctrines (due process meaning, presumptions of liberty vs. constitutionality) while remaining constrained by legal method and natural-rights theory. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

This episode highlights an often-missed story: the Declaration of Independence didn’t just shape the U.S. Constitution—it directly shaped state constitutions, many of which echo its natural-rights language more explicitly than the federal charter. Arizona Supreme Court Justice Clint Bolick argues that reading state constitutional provisions through the Declaration can strengthen enforceable limits on government power. The conversation reframes the Declaration from anniversary rhetoric into a practical interpretive tool in living state constitutional law. Bolick traces a two-way influence between the Declaration and early state charters, pointing to founding-era texts like Virginia’s 1776 Declaration of Rights as a roadmap for Jefferson’s phrasing—and noting that later state constitutions continued to incorporate Declaration principles such as equality, popular sovereignty, and inalienable rights. He then connects those ideas to modern doctrine, arguing that state courts can treat natural-rights provisions as meaningful constraints (or interpretive “prisms”) rather than mere preambles, with recent state supreme court decisions illustrating how the Declaration’s ideals can translate into concrete protections today. Connect: Episode Transcripts >>> Stanford Legal Podcast Website Stanford Legal Podcast >>> LinkedIn Page Stanford Constitutional Law Center >> Website Stanford Law School >>> Twitter/X Stanford Lawyer Magazine >>> Twitter/X Chapters: [00:00:26] Chapter 1 — McConnell’s framing: the “hidden” constitutional story in state charters The host introduces how state constitutions borrow explicitly from the Declaration and why that matters for modern rights protection. [00:05:59] Chapter 2 — Bolick’s thesis: an “enduring symbiosis” between the Declaration and state constitutions Bolick argues the Declaration’s influence on state constitutional text and interpretation is deeper and more direct than its influence on the U.S. Constitution. [00:10:46] Chapter 3 — Origins and transmission: Virginia’s 1776 rights language and state constitution “laboratories” Bolick explains the two-way borrowing between early state constitutions and the Declaration, including George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights. [00:27:57] Chapter 4 — From principles to doctrine: natural-rights clauses as enforceable limits (with cases) Bolick lays out how courts have used natural-rights provisions as substantive protections or interpretive tools, citing key state cases and modern disputes. [00:46:34] Chapter 5 — Ford’s recorded response + Bolick rebuttal: state power, natural rights, and the limits of the frame Ford praises state constitutionalism but complicates the natural-rights narrative; Bolick responds, emphasizing both self-government and enforceable individual rights. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.