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This year’s World Economic Forum took place amid turbulent transatlantic relations. Donald Trump has renewed his plans for “getting” Greenland, threatening to annex part of a NATO ally. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine rages on, while the peace talks have stalled. What is the state of the European discussion on relations with the U.S.? Can Europe support Ukraine while managing its own domestic challenges and a volatile U.S. foreign policy? What are Western leaders thinking in terms of their Russia strategy?

Under Putin, Russia has established a relationship with Venezuela, and was heavily involved in the country until recent years. The Chavez and then Maduro regimes bought Russian weapons with sizeable loans from the Kremlin, Moscow ordered its energy companies to invest in Venezuelan oil fields, and Russia boasted of having secured a foothold in the U.S.’s backyard. With Trump’s swift and successful operation to arrest Maduro, the situation has changed. What are the implications for Russia’s global posture? What can the Kremlin do, and will it do anything? Will deposing Maduro lead to a situation in which Venezuelan oil floods global markets with U.S. help?

India and Russia have a mutually beneficial relationship going back decades, and since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, India’s strategic importance for Russia has grown considerably. This hasn’t gone unnoticed by the Trump administration, which has slapped additional tariffs on India for buying Russian oil. To maintain its position as an emerging global powerhouse, India must navigate not only an unpredictable U.S. foreign policy, but also a more assertive China that is exploiting Russia’s asymmetrical dependence, and a Europe that is unhappy about New Delhi’s ties to Moscow.

Russia went from a tsarist empire and the totalitarian USSR to the freedom of the 1990s, complete with hopes of becoming a European democracy. Unfortunately, multiple missteps and reckless foreign policy endeavors have resulted in Russia becoming a security threat to Europe and its own neighbors. Two Chechen wars, the invasion of Georgia, and annexation of Crimea paved the way for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. How did it end up this way? Were there signs? What is the current state of Russian society?

Russia has had a year to convince Trump to give up on Ukraine and force Zelensky to surrender, but at the end of 2025, we are yet to see any significant results from the Kremlin’s efforts. After a triumphant beginning that had Europe and Ukraine worried, and an unprecedented Anchorage summit between Putin and Trump, the situation no longer looks as favorable for Russia. The planned Budapest summit has been called off, Trump has introduced the first sanctions against Russian oil giants since returning to the White House, and the U.S. president never misses an opportunity to criticize Putin for being intransigent. What contributed to Russia’s diplomatic failure? When did Putin stop relying on his diplomats, and how did the Russian Foreign Office come to be nothing more than another source of the Kremlin’s delusion and another mouthpiece for Putin’s propaganda?

After recent failures to bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table to end the war in Ukraine, Trump has adopted a new approach to Putin, taking the significant step of sanctioning Russia’s two biggest oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil, while also demanding that China and India stop buying Russian oil. Will this step finally persuade Putin to negotiate an end to his war? Why has it taken the United States so long to go after the two biggest cash cows in Putin’s war chest? Will these sanctions have any side effects for global markets?

Russian assets abroad were frozen almost as soon as the country launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The idea of seizing those assets and transferring them to Ukraine has been discussed in Western capitals for more than three years, but no significant action has been taken because the assets are protected by sovereign immunity and the West is officially not at war with Russia. Now, with a new administration in the United States and the war of attrition in Ukraine dragging on, European leaders find themselves between a rock—the need to show unwavering support for Ukraine—and a hard place: growing public discontent at having to fund this war from European pockets, when there are billions of euros in Russian money sitting in Western bank accounts. What would the procedure be for embarking on such a complex legal matter? What would setting such a precedent mean for the EU, the euro, and the dollar, and for the countries looking to deposit their reserves in the EU? And does Europe have a plan B if internal divisions can’t be overcome?

Over the last month, there have been multiple violations of NATO airspace by Russian fighter jets and drones most likely launched by Russia. The alliance must now come up with an adequate response to this “probing” by the Kremlin and develop a sensible strategy to prevent future violations—while managing the risk of escalation. What is the Kremlin trying to achieve? How prepared is NATO to face this challenge, and what would an effective mitigation strategy look like? How will this new dynamic impact the war in Ukraine and the level of European support for Kyiv?

The Russian oil and gas sector has been under significant pressure this year, but has continued to withstand sanctions. Recently, however, Ukraine has launched a series of massive drone attacks against Russian oil refineries, significantly lowering their capacity and making a noticeable dent in Russia’s horn of plenty. At the same time, global oil prices have slumped, which further complicates Moscow’s management of budget revenues. How is Russia coping with these challenges? Is the expanded energy partnership with China providing a helping hand? And are Western hopes that the Russian war economy’s energy engine will break down in the next twelve months rooted in reality?

At this week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping seemed determined to show the whole world that Russia-China relations are better than they have ever been. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China has become Putin’s most valuable ally, both in diplomacy and on the battlefield, providing dual-purpose technology for Moscow to continue its aggression. Are Sino-Russian relations really at their peak? What can the history of the USSR and China teach us about the nature of this union? How strong is the bond between the two?

Since the regime brutally crushed opposition protests in 2020, Belarus has rarely made the headlines. Some see the country as a loyal satellite of Russia, stripped of all agency, others overlook it entirely. Despite the lack of attention, though, much of significance is currently underway. In recent months, Belarus has hosted Western officials, released political prisoners, and apparently tried to distance itself from Moscow (despite allowing Russia to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory). What is happening inside Belarus? And what should Western officials understand about one of the most important pieces of the European security puzzle? For additional insight on a possible Russia-Europe conflict, and the role of Belarus, see Artyom Shraibman's paper. You can also read Balázs Jarábik's piece on Belarus.

Since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, life for Russia’s rich and powerful has passed the point of no return. The recent suicide of Roman Starovoit is the first case in post-Soviet Russia of a cabinet minister taking their own life when faced with an investigation and possible prison term. For many, it has brought back memories of Joseph Stalin’s purges in the 1930s. How are members of the Russian elite processing Starovoit’s death? If the old rules of the game no longer apply, are there any new rules? How will the death affect Putin’s control over his power vertical? Check out the newsletter Fairdaily on Substack. Alexandra Prokopenko's piece on Roman Starovoit's death. Tatiana Stanovaya's piece on Russian elites.

This year’s NATO summit was very unusual on multiple levels. Amid the disruption brought by Donald Trump’s presidency, and with Ukraine’s European allies adamant that continuing U.S. leadership is needed to help the embattled country at the most critical point in its defensive war against Russia, NATO members made an unprecedented commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defense by 2035. Where is NATO headed under Trump 2.0? Will its European members be able to implement the defense spending targets set in The Hague? What lessons is the Kremlin taking from the summit, and how could NATO affect Putin’s war optimism?

The war between Israel and Iran, Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, is entering its second week, with potential for escalation and worrisome spillover effects. Yet Moscow is not rushing to support Tehran in any meaningful way. President Vladimir Putin has even downplayed the significance of the strategic partnership agreement signed with Iran just six months ago. Instead, Putin is courting Donald Trump, offering mediation: an offer the U.S. president was quick to reject. Will there be a more heavy-handed intervention by the Kremlin to help Iran? What cards can Russia still play to remain relevant? How could the escalating conflict in the Middle East affect Russia’s strategic position, including in Ukraine?

At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Western leaders put a lot of faith in applying economic pressure to Russia, and it is now probably the most sanctioned country in the world.But despite the unprecedented sanctions tsunami, the Russian economy is yet to collapse. How long can the Kremlin maintain its ever-growing military spending and the overall economic imbalances? Will Putin be able to simultaneously finance his costly war, keep the population happy, and maintain macroeconomic stability?   For additional insight into this issue, read Alexandra Prokopenko's piece for Foreign Affairs on Putin’s trilemma: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putin-not-yet-desperate