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Rose Gottemoeller needs no introduction to regular listeners, however, it’s possible you didn’t see the release of her recent book on U.S.-Russia relations titled “Security Through Cooperation: Space, Nuclear Weapons, and US-Russia Relations After the Cold War.” During the podcast, we cover the post-Cold War U.S.-Russia relationship, from hopeful early days to the negative trajectory that marks the relationship for the past 15-20 years. Rose also points to what changes may need to happen for the relationship to return to a friendlier footing. You can find her bio here: https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/people/rose-gottemoeller And the page for her book here: https://www.sup.org/books/politics/security-through-cooperation We also mentioned Bill Browder’s book during the podcast, which you can find here. It is an important read for someone wishing to understand modern Russia. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of jobs. The written or podcast content is solely for education purposes, and in no way reflects the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We set out to discuss recent articles in the Orbis Journal of World Affairs by Lowell - a return guest on the Strategic Simplicity Podcast - and Austin Long. Each author raised different aspects of nuclear competition in their articles, with Lowell focusing on the possible “nuclear relationships” the United States may choose with Russia and China, and the impacts that may have nuclear forces and arms control policy. Austin’s article - shockingly - reviews Cold War superpower relations with a particular focus on the role technology played in the o.g. arms competition, and the new technologies that may play a role in the competition of today and tomorrow. We strayed into a wide ranging conversation about all things that are relevant to nuclear policy and arms control - grand strategy, bureaucratic prioritization, nuclear strategy - and Vipin barely got a word in edge-wise. Both authors end the podcast with the questions that preoccupy their minds after going through the writing process - hopefully a useful takeaway from students and young professionals subscribing to this pod. Lowell’s article Orbis. Austin’s as well. Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of jobs. The written or podcast content is solely for education purposes, and in no way reflects the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We take our conversation about ‘role’ and ‘reliance’ into a second podcast, where we share our opinions of Tyler Bowen’s May 15, 2026 article in War on the Rocks: “Restrain and Hedge: A New U.S. Nuclear Strategy for a Two-Peer World.” In his article, Tyler Argues for a U.S. strategy that deemphasizes damage limitation as an embrace of “nuclear restraint.” Instead, he proposes that the United States pursues an arms control framework with both Russia and China while improving the U.S. nuclear enterprise and defense industrial base to prepare the United States for an environment where arms control endeavors fail a trilateral arms race is unavoidable. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We rarely take liberties as co-hosts to talk about arcane and didactic international security subject matter. Or perhaps we do that every episode. At least we usually don’t spend a lot of time engaging in definitional combat. Austin, Matthew, Vipin, and I tried to do a little bit of that in Part I of this episode where we discussed the role of nuclear weapons vs. reliance on (or, because of Vipin, “salience of”) nuclear weapons. We asked ourselves whether these terms matter anymore, and if their relevance is fading, what does that say about the state of nuclear policy debates in DC and worldwide, the expert community’s interest in how nuclear weapons fit in national security strategy, and the level of understanding among international counterparts debating nuclear policy at fora such as the NPT Review Conference? Some authors who’ve touched on the subject in recent years - largely in advance of nuclear posture reviews or policy processes - and i’m sure there are many more, but not many recently: Brad Roberts: “On Adapting Nuclear Deterrence to Reduce Nuclear Risk.” 2020. Sophia Becker and Elisabeth Suh: “How Biden’s Plan to Limit the Role of Nuclear Weapons Challenges NATO.” 2021 Matt Costlow: “A Net Assessment of ‘No First Use’ and ‘Sole Purpose’ Nuclear Policies.” 2021. Adam Mount: “ The Biden Nuclear Posture Review: Obstacles to Reducing Reliance on Nuclear Weapons.“ 2022. Amy Woolf (formerly of CRS): “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Considering “No First Use.” Updated 2022. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

The gang got together this weekend to talk about a new Stimson Center report, “Why Strategic Superiority (Still) Doesn’t Matter: Nuclear Crises and the Failure of Theory.“ The new report by Chris Preble, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center, and Lucas Ruiz, a recent Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow in the same program, analyzes the role nuclear weapons played in four crises: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict of 1969, the 1973 Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) War, and the Kargil Crisis. Based on our read, the report functions as a rebuttal to a 2018 book by Georgetown professor Matthew Kroenig, titled "The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters." The report advocates for “sufficiency” as a north star for U.S. nuclear force planning - a secure second strike capability - rather than “superiority” is suggests has dominated U.S. nuclear thinking to date. The authors note that superiority “does not enhance security; it signals offensive intent, invites countermeasures, and erodes the stability that deterrence is supposed to protect.” We talk about the report's analysis of a few of these crises, the consequences of a "sufficiency" approach, especially for extended deterrence and nonproliferation, how non-nuclear weapons states may react to these obscure nuclear strategy debates in Washington, and discuss the connection between nuclear posture and arms control. Take a listen, and read the report below: https://www.stimson.org/2026/why-strategic-superiority-still-doesnt-matter/#elementor-toc__heading-anchor-0 and here's a link to Kroenig's book too: https://academic.oup.com/book/5898 This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

NTI’s Eric Brewer joins us to unpack how Iran’s nuclear program has transformed since the JCPOA era — and what that means for any future nuclear agreement, which we acknowledge may be quite far off. We talk about Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, the lack of IAEA access, new underground facilities, and years of experience with advanced centrifuges, and how these changes create a fundamentally different technical baseline than negotiators faced a decade ago. The three of us also talk about Iran’s intentions moving forward, summarizing recent public reporting and the disappearance of the IC’s long‑standing assessment that Iran was not pursuing key weaponization activities. We also discuss the ongoing conflict, starting with Operation Midnight Hammer, and how these events may have shifted Tehran’s strategic calculus with the old deterrence architecture weakened—its proxy network and missile forces have been degraded—whether Iran’s leadership might now view a nuclear weapon as the only reliable insurance policy. Finally, we talk about what a future deal (and additional policy measures) would actually entail. We cover building blocks on the topics of weaponization bottlenecks, regional missile transfers, and a more muscular counterproliferation posture, as well as what may be an exponentially more difficult verification mission, with new mechanisms for access, dispute resolution, and monitoring of military‑linked sites. Show notes and a few publicly available resources we referenced: We started out hoping to go into slightly more technical detail on JCPOA and future JCPOA provisions, but kept the conversation at a higher level for the sake of greater appeal to a wider array of listeners. However, if you would like to see more text… * JCPOA Full Text (U.S. State Department archive) * IAEA Additional Protocol (verification baseline): Reporting on Iran’s Program (2024–2025) * Wall Street Journal reporting on Iran “closing knowledge gaps” in weaponization * ODNI “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act,” assessment regarding Iran’s nuclear activities report (Nov 2024) Press on negotiations: * NYT, “United States Said to Have Sent Iran a Plan to End the Middle East War” * The Guardian, “UK security adviser ‘attended’ US-Iran talks and judged deal was within reach“ Foreign Affairs articles * Vaddi & Narang, “The North Korean Way of Proliferation” * Nicole Grajewski and Ankit Panda “The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence“ Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of USG jobs. The written or podcast content is solely for educational purposes, and reflects the personal views of contributors. Nothing on this Substack reflects the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

The Strategic Simplicity crew was at full strength for the first time in a month, and joined by Astrid Chevreuil to discuss French President Emmanuel Macron’s highly anticipated speech on nuclear doctrine on March 2nd. Astrid is a Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. She is a career diplomat with the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs with expertise on a range of nuclear policy and nonproliferation issues. Astrid’s analysis at CSIS: https://www.csis.org/analysis/macrons-ile-longue-speech-updating-frances-nuclear-doctrine-new-era Official translation of Macron’s speech: https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/president-delivers-speech-frances-nuclear-deterrence Select Media Coverage: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/05/-france-nuclear-deterrence-strategy-macron.html https://apnews.com/article/france-nuclear-weapons-macron-deterrence-ccbcfb03ef4a1e3efe287fb744adb148 https://www.france24.com/en/france/20260302-macron-unveils-france-nuclear-strategy-eu-counter-russian-aggression-wavering-us This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Austin, Matthew, Vipin, and I discuss New START expiration, new information revealed by the U.S. government regarding PRC nuclear test activities, and ideas for U.S. arms control policy efforts moving forward after the government’s rollout of post-New START priorities last Friday. Under Secretary of State Dinanno’s speech before the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (link) National Academies report on Technical Issues related to CTBT (including clandestine test activities) (link) Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of jobs. The written or podcast content is solely for education purposes, and in no way reflects the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

To close out (for now…) our three part series on New START and its pending expiration, Rebeccah Heinrichs and Frank Miller join Vipin, Austin, and I to explain why they think the United States should let the agreement expire without a continuation of the central numerical limits, as Russia has proposed. Our conversation touched upon Russia’s behavior in implementing the treaty, compliance record, the relevance of New START-like limits given the dilemmas facing the United States, the study of nuclear weapons policy and deterrence and the role arms control plays in this domain, and advice for new students and professionals looking to contribute to the field. As always, please feel free to leave us comments and questions and we’ll look to address them in an upcoming podcast. Background reading: Frank Miller and Eric Edelman, “No New START: Renewing the U.S.-Russian Deal Won’t Solve Today’s Nuclear Dilemmas.” Foreign Affairs. Frank Miller and Eric Edelman, “Time to End the Last U.S.-Russia Nuclear Treaty.” The Bulwark. Rebeccah Heinrichs, “New Start and Trump’s Nuclear Test.” WSJ. Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of jobs. In no way does written or podcast content reflect the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Arms control diplomacy is, like many other areas of government policy-making, hard to understand without experiencing directly. How defense strategy, political science, technology, and area studies combine with personalities, time pressure, and interagency tensions is difficult to describe - but these elements collide together in a highly concentrated fashion during an arms control negotiation. Greg Dwyer and Mike Albertson both served on the New START delegation at different points in their careers, and shared their experiences in part II of our New START series. Both spent time early in their careers “backbenching” the treaty negotiations in Geneva, and then carried leadership responsibilities on behalf of their agencies as part of the regular New START delegation that would travel to Geneva to engage in implementation discussions with Russian counterparts in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, a body created by the Treaty to ensure both parties had a venue to raise and address implementation and compliance questions. We all worked together on New START, so there is a fair amount of reminiscing in this episode, but Greg and Mike also provide a detailed glimpse into the work that goes on behind the scenes in arms control negotiation and implementation. I hope young professionals wondering what it’s like to work in this field take particular interest in this episode. As always, please feel free to send comments or question our way here or in the subscriber chat. Background reading (stuff I haven’t shared in previous posts, but seem pertinent to New START expiration). * I really hope DoW doesn’t get rid of this resource - a searchable treaty text with can help you go down a few of the rabbit holes we referenced during the podcast. * a 2024 RAND report on post-New START options. * Erin Dumbacher’s recent CFR post on managing Putin’s offer to maintain New START limits. * Frank Jones’ book “Obama on the Bomb,” covering New START and arms control efforts during the Obama administration. Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of jobs. In no way does written or podcast content reflect the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Rose and I covered the landscape related to New START and more: * Her experience as chief negotiator - managing Russian interlocutors, an interagency delegation in Geneva as well as the one back home, * the role of the President and other very senior officials in arms control negotiations, * New START and “reset” politics, * why “drive by” negotiations stink, * Putin’s offer to keep New START limits for one more year, * missile defense, * the recent Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report and bipartisanship in nuclear policy and arms control, * and much more. Recent and Upcoming work by Rose: * Dec. 10, 2025, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Arms Race 2.0.“ * Dec. 2025, Arms Control Association. “Getting the Most Out of New START Before It Expires“ * July 30, 2025, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “Nuclear arms control enters uncharted territory. It needs tools—both old and new.“ * May 2021, “Negotiating the New START Treaty.” * Coming April 2026, “Security through Cooperation: Space, Nuclear Weapons, and US-Russia Relations after the Cold War.” Also, this isn’t a new topic for Strategic Simplicity - we’ve devoted some time to New START on the podcast, in various posts and articles covering President Putin’s offer, U.S. nuclear force posture after New START, and U.S. arms control policy. Take a look: * Pods: * Posts: Pranay Vaddi, “Beware Russia Bearing Arms Control Gifts,’ RUSI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Before the holiday break, Vipin contributed a new post to the Strategic Stability Substack (I know, two in one year, how can he keep up this lightning pace) titled “Four Shibboleths of Nuclear Strategy.” In the post, Vipin asks whether we should take for granted four strong, consistent ideas that appear in nuclear policy debates: (1) strategic stability is “good,” (2) arms races are “bad,” (3) escalation is uncontrollable, and (4) deterrence is the threat that leaves something to chance (trying to surmise what Schelling really meant). This post highlighted some important questions about how we discuss nuclear policy: do the terms we use still hold the same relevance today as they did when they were first created, do we even operate from the same definitions as one another, and how have changes in the world changed how we think about policy underlying these principles? And to demonstrate how good of a sport he truly is, Vipin not only brought a new senior fellow on board at MIT’s Center for Nuclear Security Policy, but one who immediately wrote a substack post in response to Vipin’s “Four Shibboleths.” Matthew Sharp joins the group following a long career in government, with stops at the Department of State, NSC, and U.S. Mission to Vienna where he worked on IAEA issues. Matthew described the journey his brain took as he thought about Vipin’s post, elaborating on how he thinks about the risk of increased numbers via either horizontal or vertical proliferation, and shares his own view of the importance of strategic stability as a goal, and valuable if thought of as reaching a stable equilibrium. We saved a little time to talk about South Korea’s interest in nuclear submarines - what operational value nuclear-powered submarines can provide, and what kinds of activities South Korea may need to begin in cooperation with the IAEA, drawing upon Matthew’s past experience working on AUKUS implementation. We spent our last few minutes tackling a mailbag/chat question regarding the science behind nuclear winter and its place in nuclear policy discussions and international debate. Things to read: Sharon Squassoni in The Bulletin: “How nuclear submarines could pave the way for nuclear weapons in South Korea“ Brent Sadler for Heritage: “The Optimum Pathway for Building Nuclear Submarines With South Korea and Japan” James Scouras, Lauren Ice, Megan Proper at JHU/APL: “Whatever Happened to Nuclear Winter?” Strategic Simplicity is an independent publication. The views expressed in articles and podcasts belong to the participants only, and do not represent the United States government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or any other institution. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Charlie Glaser joins the podcast to discuss his new book, “Retrench, Defend, Compete: Securing America’s Future Against a Rising China.” We talked about his recommendations for U.S.-China policy, including his case for ending U.S. security commitments to Taiwan (though not ending peacetime security assistance) to reduce the potential for a destructive war with China, while strengthening it’s relationships with South Korean and Japan to deter Chinese aggression against the formal U.S. allies. Naturally, we discuss nuclear strategy, the balance of U.S. and PRC interests in the region, and Charlie’s motivations for writing this book (and advice for others thinking about how to contribute to ongoing debates over China security policy). See the Cornell Press summary for Charlie’s book here. Strategic Simplicity is an independent publication. The views expressed in articles and podcasts belong to the participants only, and do not represent the United States government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or any other institution. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Heather and I discussed the 2025 CSIS PONI Project Atom Report, entitled “Escalation Management in Acute and Protracted Conflicts in the Indo-Pacific.“ Project Atom brings several authors together to propose alternative strategies for managing escalation with China. Authors provided submissions examining diplomatic risk management, conventional deterrence, regional nuclear deterrence, allies perspectives, and political stakes in a U.S.-China conflict. We veered into a wider discussion of nuclear dynamics between the United States and China, where the report submissions touched on regional nuclear capabilities which may be important for U.S. escalation management approaches, and how this could all play in NPT diplomacy. The entire report is well worth your time. Take a look here: * 2025 Project Atom report. You can also watch the launch event from this past week on the CSIS website. We’ll be back next week with an episode introducing Charlie Glaser’s new book, “Retrench, Defend, Compete.“ Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

I was really lucky to have Tong Zhao, a Senior Fellow with the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, spend his late Friday afternoon with me to walk through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs new white paper on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. Our discussion spanned nuclear doctrine, posture shifts, multilateral arms control, and advice for early career professionals interested in U.S.-China nuclear dynamics. We discuss some of the key terms of art that appear in the document and what they may mean in the contexts of China’s transforming nuclear arsenal: ‘strike only after being struck first,’ ‘rapid response,’ ‘lean and effective,’ and ‘strategic early warning.’ Tong also helps explain the difference between ‘no first use’ and no ‘threat’ of first use - the latter being absent from China’s NFU policy and relevant to the future attempts to deter non-nuclear attacks (or, depending on your perspective in a conflict, coerce adversaries). We discuss the permanence, or lack thereof, of NFU in the midst of a crisis. Tong lists several questions experts and policy makers should make to gain greater clarification from Chinese interlocutors on China’s nuclear policies. Tong describes China’s confidence in a more “ideal” deterrence strategy, buoyed by confidence in its conventional military advantage in theater as well as broader, favorable shifts in the geopolitical balance of power including a reduced U.S. prioritization of ideological confrontation, and why that may mean China doesn’t feel much pressure to reach nuclear parity with the United States, which does and will maintain a stronger nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, a dynamic where PRC leadership feels they’re achieving military advantage aims also alleviates any pressure to engage in constructive arms control discussions with the United States. Finally, we touch on China’s behavior and priorities in multilateral arms control fora and Tong provides advice for new professionals interested in building expertise as a practitioner or researcher in U.S.-China strategic relations and arms control. There is a lot left to cover in this white paper, but hopefully this episode serves as a primer on the core nuclear policy elements. Show notes: Here are a few documents, projects, or topics we discussed during the podcast. * Brookings Analysis of the CCP Fourth Party Plenum, 15th Five Year Plan * Arms Control Association “The Potential of the P5 Process.” Former Acting Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Tom Countryman. * Carnegie Endowment “Miniaturization and Modernization: The Untold Story of China’s Nuclear Weapons.” Tong is hosting Dr. Hui Zhang to discuss his new book on China’s nuclear warhead development at an event on Tuesday, December 9 at 10:00 AM EST. Register here. * Foreign Policy. “Is China Changing its Nuclear Launch Strategy?” Tong Zhao. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com