Advertise on podcast: NTSB News Talk – Aviation Accidents, Safety Investigations & Pilot Lessons

Max Trescott and Rob Mark talk about the Bangor, Maine Bombardier Challenger 650 crash (N10KJ)—a major breaking story—and what the earliest discussion points usually look like before investigators have hard answers. They outline why takeoff accidents in winter conditions immediately raise questions about contamination, deicing decisions, holdover time, and whether ice or snow could have been present at the start of the takeoff roll. Then the episode shifts to set of other NTSB cases with sharply different aircraft and missions—but familiar human factors. These include the American Aviation AA-1A (N9439L) near Alamogordo, NM, Cirrus SR20 (N814) in Watertown, WI, Beech C23 (N76SB) in Virginia, Mooney M20C (N1204X) in Texas, Cessna 206 (N460DC) in California, Piper PA-30 Twin Comanche (N8693Y) in Illinois, and a Beechcraft 95 Travel Air (N369BB) training flight in Alabama. Across them: unstable approaches, late go-arounds, loss of control close to the ground, and pilots pushing past safe margins.

Max Trescott and Rob Mark connect a string of very different accidents with one shared theme: safety margin usually disappears one “reasonable” choice at a time—until the airplane (or the environment) collects the debt. They open with a major development: the NTSB’s urgent recommendation to Textron after two fatal post-maintenance stall test flights in Hawker business jets. Max and Rob explain why stall testing in swept-wing jets can be uniquely unforgiving, and why “unacceptable stall characteristics” should make every pilot sit up straight. The takeaway: if a flight requires test-pilot skills, then “maintenance requires it” doesn’t make it safe—it demands the right training, the right crew, and the right conditions. Max then shares NTSB news: a public board meeting on Tuesday, January 27, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. ET to determine probable cause for the January 29, 2025 midair collision over the Potomac River near Reagan National (PSA CRJ700 and an Army UH-60L Black Hawk). Max and Rob will be watching closely and will share clips in a future episode. From there they break down recent accidents and reports, including: the Dassault Falcon 50, 9H-DFS, crash near Haymana, Turkey; an MD530F helicopter, N3502P, near Superior, Arizona where a slackline/highline may have been a factor; a TBM 700, N700PT, near Monroe, Wisconsin involving an approach continued below minimums; the Hawker 900XP, N900VA, fatal post-maintenance stall test crash; a Cessna P210, N1400, fuel exhaustion accident in San Diego in IMC with low recent flying; and a Bonanza G36, N360FV, near Tracy, California that illustrates the engine-emergency dilemma: choose the ugly, certain option—or gamble for the “better” airport you might not reach.

Episode 20 of NTSB News Talk opens with an aviation milestone: the first confirmed in-service, real-world use of Garmin’s Autoland. A King Air B200, tail number N479BR, squawked 7700 and ultimately landed itself at Rocky Mountain Metropolitan Airport (KBJC) in Broomfield, Colorado on Saturday, December 20, 2025. Garmin later confirmed the activation, and ATC audio captured the synthetic callouts declaring “pilot incapacitation” and the system’s intention to land. Max adds the kind of detail that makes this story feel real: he was flying in Colorado that day, monitoring Guard, and heard the automated messages as they occurred. He also heard a voice transmit on Guard mentioning a depressurization and describing difficulty changing frequencies—consistent with the way Autoland takes control of communications once activated. In their discussion, the flight track shows the airplane climbing out of Aspen into the low-20s, then descending, leveling, and later maneuvering near the destination before landing—exactly the kind of structured “get down, get safe, get on the ground” profile Autoland is designed to execute. Aviation outlets reported the emergency was tied to a pressurization issue and the engagement of emergency descent logic. Aviation International News+1 After a quick note that Episode 19 was cited in a New York Post story by Emily Crane, the episode pivots into four NTSB reports that all share one theme: the accidents are “simple” only if you ignore the physics. First is N850JH, a fatal TBM 850 crash near Ludington, Michigan. The NTSB concluded the pilot departed after pulling the airplane from an unheated hangar during active snowfall and taxiing out with visible snow contamination on the wings and horizontal stabilizer. Deice boots don’t solve that on the ground; contamination kills performance margins by reducing lift and increasing drag right when the airplane is most vulnerable—after rotation. The report narrative (and local coverage quoting it) describes a normal-looking departure that quickly turned into a wing drop, stall, and impact. Next is N7756N, a Cherokee accident at Frazier Lake Airport in Hollister, California (Sept. 10, 2025)—no injuries, but packed with lessons. The pilot came in high and fast, tried to salvage it with a slip, floated significantly, then initiated a late go-around. During the go-around attempt, the wheels touched down about two-thirds down the grass runway; with 40° flaps still selected, the airplane became airborne again, but the pilot saw about 45 knots and a mostly-on stall warning and then pulled power to idle to “abort” the go-around, leading to a hard landing, bounce, and impact with a dirt mound. The report also highlights a major contributing setup: landing runway 05 with wind 250 at 11—i.e., meaningful tailwind. Third is a fatal VFR-into-IMC CFIT involving N320P, a Lancair 320 near Manitowoc, Wisconsin. The flight...

Max talks with Rob Mark about the fatal crash of a Citation 550 in Statesville, North Carolina, that killed six people, including a NASCAR driver Greg Biffle and members of his family. The accident occurred shortly after takeoff, making it one of the most closely watched aviation tragedies of the week and a focal point of this episode. Preliminary information indicates the Citation 550 departed Runway 10 at Statesville Airport and soon reported engine trouble. The crew attempted to return to land on Runway 28. ADS-B data shows the aircraft remained airborne for approximately seven minutes and came remarkably close to completing the return. The jet maneuvered back toward the airport, descended unusually low on downwind—likely to remain below cloud ceilings—and successfully aligned with the runway before crashing just short of the pavement following a rapid descent and post-impact fire. Weather conditions at the time were poor but not extreme, with drizzle, reduced visibility, and broken ceilings reported near the time of the accident. Max and Rob discuss how emergency returns immediately after takeoff create one of the highest workload scenarios pilots face, especially when compounded by weather, low altitude, and potential mechanical failures. While twin-engine aircraft are designed to continue flight after an engine problem, this accident highlights how quickly margins disappear when multiple stressors converge. The episode then places the Statesville crash within a broader context of recent fatal accidents involving business jets. Max and Rob examine a Citation III crash in Toluca, Mexico, that killed all ten people on board. Although weather at the time was VFR, the airport’s high elevation—approximately 8,500 feet—dramatically reduced aircraft performance. ADS-B data revealed excessive airspeed on short final, followed by an attempted go-around that showed no sustained climb. The hosts note that go-arounds at high density altitude are particularly unforgiving, and that many pilots underestimate how marginal climb performance can be when aircraft are heavy. Attention then turns to an unusually blunt public statement from NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, who criticized proposed military exemptions to ADS-B requirements in Washington, D.C. airspace. Homendy warned that maintaining separate rules for military aircraft risks repeating history, referencing a fatal midair collision nearly a year earlier involving a military helicopter operating without ADS-B. Max and Rob discuss how exceptions intended for rare circumstances can become normalized, undermining the very safety systems designed to prevent collisions. Several additional accidents are reviewed, including a fatal Twin Comanche crash in Illinois and a night training flight in Louisiana that ended when a Cessna 172 crashed into Lake Pontchartrain. In the Louisiana accident, ADS-B data showed a gradual descent toward the airport, followed by a tight 180-degree turn and a sudden acceleration. In the final seconds, the aircraft’s descent rate increased dramatically, consistent with somatogravic illusion—a powerful and often deadly sensory illusion caused by acceleration in dark or instrument conditions. Max explains how somatogravic illusion can trick pilots into believing the aircraft is pitching up when it is not, prompting them to push forward on the controls. In visual conditions, outside references correct the error. At night or in IMC, the...

Episode 18 begins with an extraordinary behind-the-scenes dispute surrounding the Air India Boeing 787 crash investigation. Max and Rob open with a Wall Street Journal report describing how U.S. technical experts arrived in Delhi last summer expecting to assist with the black-box analysis, only to be told they would need to board a late-night military flight to a remote facility. NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy expressed concerns about U.S. personnel and equipment being moved into an area under State Department terrorism advisories, especially given rising tensions in the region. The NTSB pushed instead for data extraction either in Delhi or in Washington, triggering a rapid series of high-level calls involving the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Boeing, and GE Aerospace. Indian officials insisted they had full capability to download the recorders, yet simultaneously requested more than 30 pieces of specialized equipment from the NTSB, further complicating the diplomatic dynamics. Homendy ultimately issued a 48-hour ultimatum: select Delhi or Washington for the data download, or the U.S. would withdraw from the investigation entirely. India chose Delhi, but the episode highlights how political sensitivities can shape technical investigations—especially when early evidence, as reported, suggested the possibility of intentional fuel-cutoff switch manipulation. The hosts note that pilot-suicide scenarios, though rare, account for more fatal commercial accidents than many pilots realize, citing EgyptAir, Germanwings, Malaysia 370, and other historical cases. From the geopolitical, the episode shifts to more traditional NTSB investigations. A midair collision in Canada between a Cessna 172 and a Piper Seminole resulted in the 172 losing a wing and crashing, while the Seminole landed safely. Max shares the surprising statistic that roughly half of U.S. midair collision victims survive and recounts how a midair experienced by Cirrus co-founder Alan Klapmeier helped inspire the CAPS parachute system. The next story involves a Piper Arrow III that crashed during a nighttime arrival in Pittsfield, Illinois. The pilot had flown nearly five hours from Alabama—an exceptionally long time in that type of aircraft—and arrived as conditions were deteriorating to low visibility and a 300-foot overcast. Max emphasizes the difficulty of recognizing inadvertent IMC at night and discusses how fatigue and lack of instrument proficiency may become factors once more details emerge. A TBM 700 accident in Monroe, Wisconsin offers another sobering look at missed-approach challenges. With visibilities down to a quarter-mile and ceilings around 300 feet, the aircraft attempted a GPS approach to Runway 12, then initiated a missed approach. Instead of climbing outbound on the published track, radar data shows the aircraft turning prematurely, losing airspeed, and entering a stall and loss of control. Max highlights how even experienced instrument pilots often under-practice missed approaches in actual IMC, making it one of the most common fatal accident points in general aviation. The episode then examines a dramatic near-miss involving an Air Arabia Maroc Airbus A320 departing Catania, Italy. A ferry crew failed to load weight-and-balance data into the MCDU, meaning no V-speeds were computed. The aircraft rotated late, climbed shallowly, then descended toward the sea at night, triggering multiple GPWS warnings before the crew recovered at just 41 feet above the water. With moonless, dark-night conditions and no visual horizon, this oversight nearly resulted in a hull loss. Both pilots were highly experienced—proof that skipping basic procedures can endanger even seasoned crews. Next, Max and Rob turn to the UPS MD-11 engine-separation crash in Louisville. New preliminary findings show fatigue cracking in engine-pylon attachment lugs, reminiscent of the American Airlines DC-10 crash in 1979 where a maintenance...

Episode 17 of NTSB News Talk brings together an unusually rich set of accidents and safety insights, all centered on pilot decision-making, trim system failures, swept-wing stall risks, and the ongoing challenge of hand-flying in IMC when automation misbehaves. In this week’s discussion, hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark use recent NTSB reports to highlight the mistakes, mechanical failures, and chain-of-events that continue to trap even experienced pilots. For listeners who fly IFR, rely on autopilots, or operate aircraft with electric pitch trim, this episode offers lessons that are immediately relevant. The episode opens on an encouraging note. Max reports that the United States saw three CAPS parachute deployments in three days—Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. These weren’t all Cirrus aircraft, either; one was N163BR, a Lancair Turbine LX7, one of the fastest experimental turbine singles in the fleet. All three incidents involved engine failures on approach, and every person involved walked away uninjured. For Max and Rob, it’s another sign that whole-airframe parachutes continue to save lives and will become increasingly common as the general aviation fleet modernizes. But the tone shifts as the hosts examine the crash of N30HG, a King Air B100 on a humanitarian mission to Jamaica following Hurricane Melissa. Shortly after takeoff from Florida, the aircraft descended rapidly and struck palm trees before crashing into a pond, killing both on board. A similar King Air pilot’s Facebook account of a pitch trim runaway and violent pitch-down event becomes an important point of comparison. While the NTSB has not yet identified the cause, the parallels highlight how aggressive and unexpected trim-related events can be—and how essential it is for pilots to know exactly where the trim and autopilot disconnects are located, especially when operating older turbine aircraft. In the next case, XA-JMR, a Mexican registered Hawker 800XP fatal accident near Battle Creek, Michigan, post-maintenance work required a swept-wing stall test. The Hawker had been down for seven months while technicians inspected the wing’s leading edges for corrosion. Manufacturer guidance requires that a qualified test pilot perform the post-maintenance stall series. But when the crew was unable to schedule one, they elected to fly the test themselves. Moments after entering the test area at 15,000 feet, the crew transmitted in Spanish that they had stalled the aircraft and were attempting to recover—an attempt that ultimately failed. For Rob, a veteran swept-wing pilot, the lesson is clear: pilots must say “no” when a task exceeds their experience or training, especially in high-AOA testing where swept-wing handling characteristics are unforgiving. The episode then examines several loss-of-control accidents during IFR operations. N9627X, a Cessna 210 bound for Jonesboro, Arkansas deviated around convective weather, then began a series of inexplicable turns and large speed changes before crashing in heavy IMC. A separate Cirrus SR22 accident in Louisiana involved a pilot who reported autopilot issues during a go-around, then lost control while hand-flying. Both accidents reinforce how quickly pilots can become disoriented when hand-flying after automation confusion—especially in turbulence or low visibility. The hosts next highlight a a href="https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/561073"...

Max Trescott and Rob Mark explore one of the most overlooked killers in aviation: common medications that quietly impair pilots and contribute to fatal crashes. While many aviators think over-the-counter or prescription drugs are safe if they “feel fine,” the NTSB’s recent accident reports tell a different story. In case after case, pilots who ignored FAA medication rules—or failed to understand them—lost control of their aircraft, sometimes within seconds of takeoff. Pilots should read the FAA's Over-the-counter (OTC) Medications Reference Guide before taking an OTC medication. The episode opens with a discussion of the NTSB’s recent safety recommendation involving Learjet landing-gear inspections, then pivots to a more personal revelation. While preparing a previous show, Max reviewed several fatal accident reports and realized that three of them, selected at random, shared a common factor: medication use. A fourth involved an untreated medical condition. That chance discovery became the foundation for this episode. The first accident involves N510KC, a Piper Malibu converted to turbine power that crashed shortly after takeoff in Nebraska. Toxicology revealed Ambien (Zolpidem), a powerful sleep aid. The pilot—experienced and well-trained—appeared to rotate normally before the airplane rolled left and hit trees. Rob recalls his own experience with Ambien and how it caused amnesia: “My wife said I was talking and walking before bed, and I had no memory of it.” The NTSB concluded that impairment and overloading likely caused the loss of control. The next accident centers on N915DV, a Cessna Turbo 206 that struck mountainous terrain in Utah. The pilot had taken cetirizine (Zyrtec), an antihistamine many pilots assume is “safe.” Yet studies show that even mild sedation can impair cognitive performance—especially at altitude. The U.S. Navy found that cetirizine increased errors during flight-simulation tests at 10,000 and 15,000 feet. Zyrtec appears on the FAA’s “no-go” list, and pilots must typically wait up to five days after the last dose before flying. In another case, N880A, a Cessna 414 stalled after takeoff when the elevator trim was left in a full-nose-up position. The pilot had taken sertraline (Zoloft), an antidepressant that requires special FAA issuance and strict medical monitoring. He hadn’t reported it on his medical. Investigators also found other red flags: diabetes, unresolved maintenance issues, and a non-functioning tachometer. Rob calls leaving the engines running while stepping out of the aircraft “reckless,” and Max explains how unreported antidepressant use can disqualify a pilot without proper documentation. The final crash involved N4184G, a Nanchang CJ-6A performing a flyover in Colorado. The pilot abruptly pulled into a vertical maneuver, stalled, and spun in. Post-accident analysis revealed uncontrolled diabetes with blood-sugar readings over eight times normal levels. He had previously disclosed diabetes on his FAA medical but failed to list it later—suggesting denial or complacency. Fatigue or blurred vision may have contributed to his erratic control inputs. Across these four crashes, one lesson stands out: pilots often underestimate how...

In Episode 15 of NTSB News Talk, co-hosts Rob Mark and Max Trescott examine a week filled with new legislation and a series of tragic accidents that highlight recurring lessons in aviation safety and human factors. The show opens with the Senate Commerce Committee’s new bipartisan aviation safety bill, which—if passed—would close the ADS-B loophole that allows certain military aircraft to operate without transmitting position data. Rob explains that the legislation was sparked by the midair collision near Reagan National Airport (DCA) involving a military jet and a civilian aircraft, after which the NTSB identified over 15,000 unreported near misses in the Washington, D.C. area. Max notes that while the bill’s text isn’t public yet, reports indicate it would require ADS-B In for aircraft already required to carry ADS-B Out. Rob then recounts the fatal stall-test crash of a Hawker 800 that had just undergone heavy maintenance in Battle Creek, Michigan. The aircraft entered an unrecoverable stall during post-maintenance checks at 15,000 feet, killing all three aboard. Having flown the Hawker himself, Rob explains how rare and risky such stall tests are—especially without an experienced test pilot. Max adds that with two similar Hawker losses in 18 months, new FAA or manufacturer guidance may soon follow. The discussion shifts to Erie, Colorado, where a JMB VL3 Evolution light-sport aircraft crashed during pattern work in extreme, sudden wind shear that tore down wind socks and caught multiple pilots off guard. Witnesses described gusts exceeding 50 knots. Investigators found the ballistic parachute’s activation pin still installed—a fatal oversight. Max explains how the startle effect and loss of fine motor control under stress can make removing such a pin nearly impossible in flight. His advice: Always pull the parachute pin before takeoff. From there, Rob examines the Gulfstream G150 runway overrun at Chicago Executive (PWK), where a new copilot landed long and fast on a wet runway while the speed brakes were never deployed. Despite thrust reversers and hard braking, the jet slid into the EMAS barrier. Fortunately, nobody was injured. Rob and Max use the incident to illustrate how auditory exclusion—the brain’s inability to process sound under stress—can cause pilots to ignore or not even hear a call to “go around.” Max next analyzes the Cirrus SR22 crash near Ruston, Louisiana, in which a private pilot flying an RNAV approach reported autopilot trouble and began hand-flying shortly before losing control. ADS-B data showed large heading deviations and a rapid descent from 1,200 feet AGL. Though weather looked benign, embedded thunderstorms and outflow boundaries were present. The Cirrus parachute was found undeployed. Max discusses how pilots under pressure often fail to pull CAPS when they should, particularly when they feel personally responsible for the problem. The episode closes with a sobering case from Lincoln, Montana, where a recently licensed private pilot attempted a night landing in mountainous terrain at an airport surrounded by peaks up to 8,600 feet. With...

In Episode 14 of NTSB News Talk, hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark analyze a series of recent NTSB preliminary and final reports that reveal how weather, fatigue, distraction, and airspeed management continue to play major roles in both near misses and fatal crashes. With their characteristic mix of insight and practicality, the two veteran aviation journalists connect the dots between accidents that could have been avoided — from runway confusion at LAX to a tragic Cessna 210 in-flight breakup in a thunderstorm. The episode begins with a dramatic runway incursion at Los Angeles International Airport. An American Airlines A320 was forced to abort its takeoff at 145 knots when a Boeing 777 cargo jet accidentally turned onto the same runway. The controller, distracted and calling the wrong call sign several times, urged the cargo flight to “cross quickly,” which only compounded the confusion. Thanks to a quick-reacting Airbus crew and reliable communications on LiveATC.net, disaster was narrowly avoided. Rob and Max explain that high-speed rejected takeoffs are among the most dangerous maneuvers in aviation because they push brakes, thrust reversers, and pilot reflexes to their limits. They emphasize that even in this case — where no one was injured — such events underline how fatigue, communication errors, and poor situational awareness can converge in seconds at busy airports like LAX. From there, the hosts shift to a string of recent fatal general aviation crashes, all with different aircraft and weather profiles but a common theme: loss of control in challenging conditions. The first involved a TBM 700, N111RF, that crashed shortly after takeoff from New Bedford, Massachusetts, during poor weather associated with a nor’easter. The aircraft struck a car on Interstate 95, killing both people onboard. ADS-B data showed the plane leveled off at just 800 feet and remained below the cloud layer before descending out of control — possibly an example of a pilot hesitating to enter IMC, losing situational awareness in marginal VFR. Next, they discuss a Beech Baron, N121GJ that went down near Williston, Florida. Three people were killed when the twin appeared to descend rapidly — over 3,500 feet per minute — just as thunderstorms moved through the area. With lightning reported nearby, the NTSB suspects weather penetration or turbulence led to the loss of control. A third case, a Beechcraft King Air C90, N291CC, that crashed near Hicks Airfield in Texas, drew particular attention because it appeared to be a training flight. The aircraft had spent 90 minutes practicing approaches before a sudden, steep, left-turn descent at low altitude. ADS-B data showed the aircraft slowed below 100 knots, consistent with an aerodynamic stall, possibly during simulated engine-out training. Both pilots were killed. Max and Rob discuss how multi-engine training carries inherent risk, especially when one engine is feathered or throttled back. “Airspeed is life,” they repeat — a theme echoed throughout the episode. In two preliminary reports, Max walks through additional lessons for pilots. A Sport Cruiser, N336SC, in Maine experienced an apparent engine failure, with witnesses reporting a loud pop before seeing the aircraft descending with its parachute only partially deployed. The host notes that parachute systems like

In this episode of NTSB News Talk, hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark welcome Michael Graham, a current member of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), for a deep discussion on the agency’s work and the broader state of aviation safety Graham begins by clarifying the role of NTSB board members, often misunderstood as investigators. While trained in accident investigation, board members function more like the “Supreme Court of Transportation Safety,” deliberating on reports and voting on recommendations that flow from investigative teams. They also serve as media spokespeople at accident sites, coordinate with local authorities, and meet with victims’ families. A major portion of the conversation focuses on advocacy—convincing regulators, manufacturers, operators, and associations to implement safety recommendations. Graham acknowledges that implementation can take years or even decades, citing the long struggle to mandate Positive Train Control in the rail sector. Despite delays, the board persists in pushing for life-saving changes. The discussion then shifts to Safety Management Systems (SMS). Graham describes his advocacy for SMS across Part 135 operators, manufacturers, and repair stations, and highlights FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-92D, which now provides scalable SMS guidance for small operators and even single-pilot GA. This, he says, is a breakthrough that makes SMS practical outside of large organizations. From his Navy background, Graham stresses the role of safety culture: open communication, willingness to accept critique, and rigorous debriefs after every mission. He encourages GA pilots to adapt these practices by critiquing their own flights, flying with peers who can offer feedback, and leveraging available flight data tools. Pilots, he argues, must move past ego and embrace constant improvement. Graham also highlights spatial disorientation as a persistent and deadly problem. While only a fraction of GA accidents involve it, more than 90% are fatal. He recalls accidents such as the 2019 Amazon Air crash near Houston, underscoring the importance of proficiency in instrument flying. Pilots, he warns, must remain both current and truly proficient to avoid disaster. The conversation touches on technology as an engineering control for safety. Graham sees promise in ADS-B In for situational awareness, particularly in congested or uncontrolled airspace, and advocates for broader adoption. He also points to angle of attack indicators as an underused but powerful tool for GA pilots to understand aircraft performance margins. Additional topics include lessons from the NTSB’s General Aviation Dashboard, frustrations with slow NextGen implementation and ATC staffing, and the destruction of the TWA 800 reconstruction once displayed at the NTSB Training Center. Graham also describes his path to the board, from Textron safety leadership to a lengthy nomination and confirmation process, and the challenges of balancing safety priorities with limited agency staffing. Throughout, Graham emphasizes that aviation safety is never static. A safe state is not permanent; it requires constant vigilance, adaptation, and recognition of new risks. For pilots and organizations alike, the lesson is clear: success comes from continuous critique, data-driven decision-making, and openness to feedback. This wide-ranging interview provides both a candid look inside the NTSB and actionable lessons for GA pilots, safety professionals, and anyone passionate about preventing accidents.

Episode 12 of NTSB News Talk with hosts Max Trescott and Rob Mark delivers a comprehensive discussion of recent accidents, preliminary findings, and final NTSB reports, highlighting recurring safety themes for GA pilots. The episode begins with the White House nomination of American Airlines captain John DeLouv to the NTSB board, and an invitation for listeners to suggest questions for an upcoming interview with a board member. The first accident examined is a Lancair Super ES crash near San Jose on September 12, 2025. ADS-B data showed unusual behavior, with a temporary TIS-B hex code indicating the aircraft may have suffered an electrical failure. The pilot completed odd turns, steep descents, and eventually lost control, reminiscent of a prior electrical-failure accident on the East Coast. The takeaway: system failures can snowball, and pilots should land at the first safe opportunity. Next, the hosts review a Bonanza BE-35 accident in Denver after multiple touch-and-goes. The ADS-B track suggested reduced altitude, slower speeds, and eventually a likely engine failure. The pilot attempted a turnback but fatally crashed. Max and Rob emphasize the priority of aviate–navigate–communicate, reminding pilots that talking to ATC should never outweigh flying the airplane. Two Cirrus SR22 accidents highlight starkly different outcomes. In Michigan, a Gen 6 SR22T ditched in Lake Michigan after an oil pressure failure. The pilot deployed CAPS, and thanks to a nearby Malibu and quick Coast Guard response, all aboard were rescued uninjured. In contrast, an SR22 in Franklin, North Carolina, crashed fatally during a go-around, illustrating how seldom-practiced procedures lead to errors with trim, flaps, and rudder control. The hosts urge pilots to rehearse go-arounds regularly. The preliminary reports shift focus to Shelter Cove, California, where a student pilot illegally carrying a passenger crashed into fog, killing himself and injuring the passenger. The case illustrates hazardous attitudes like anti-authority and the risks of taking unqualified passengers. Another case, a Cessna 340 in Missouri, involved a fatal stall-spin during pattern entry, with eyewitnesses describing a wing drop consistent with low-speed loss of control. Among final reports, the hosts cover a widely discussed PA-28 accident in Kentucky in which a young CFI posted on social media mid-flight before pressing into nighttime thunderstorms. Misunderstanding NEXRAD latency and underestimating storm hazards led to an in-flight breakup. In another Bonanza case in Georgia, a pilot attempted a steep turnback shortly after takeoff with the gear down, stalled, and crashed into a

Max talks with Rob Mark about the latest NTSB cases and safety lessons for pilots. They begin with new details on the B-52 near miss at Minot, North Dakota, where the bomber nearly collided with both a regional jet and a Piper Archer. The tower controller, working alone without radar support, became overwhelmed and failed to advise the B-52 crew of conflicting traffic. At one point, he even issued incorrect altitude and heading clearances. Though everyone avoided contact, the case illustrates that controllers can—and do—make mistakes, making pilot vigilance essential. Attention then turns to a fatal midair collision in Fort Morgan, Colorado, where a Cessna 172 on a straight-in approach collided with an Extra 300 turning base just after an aerobatic contest. Because of their high- and low-wing configurations, each aircraft was hidden in the other’s blind spot. The accident underscores the importance of CTAF communication, traffic scanning, and using a second radio to monitor the local frequency even while on IFR clearances. Rob next reports on a Cessna 172 from San Jose’s Reid-Hillview Airport whose pilot declared jammed flight controls. Another pilot attempted to assist in the air, but the aircraft ultimately crashed. The case recalls earlier accidents where loose objects, like portable GPS antennas, jammed control linkages. The episode also examines student pilot tragedies. In Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, a young student turned crosswind too soon at low altitude and struck trees. In New Jersey, a 61-year-old student in a Cirrus SR20 succumbed to somatogravic illusion, leveling off at night and descending into terrain after takeoff. Both highlight the risks of solo flight without CFI oversight and the dangers of night solos. Further cases include a Cessna 152 overrun at night in Kansas with a pilot who fled the scene, a T-6 Texan stall/spin at Oshkosh caused by low-speed maneuvering, and a Cessna 206 crash in Alaska where water-contaminated fuel led to an engine failure. Throughout the discussion, Max and Rob emphasize recurring themes: respect stall speeds and G-loading, always sump fuel, avoid complacency with ATC instructions, and never assume other pilots are on frequency. Their message is clear—aviation safety depends on every pilot maintaining situational awareness, discipline, and respect for physics.

In Episode 10 of NTSB News Talk, aviation safety experts Max Trescott and Rob Mark examine recent accident reports that reinforce why loss of control in flight continues to be the number one cause of fatalities in general aviation. Drawing from official NTSB accident reports and preliminary findings, they analyze crashes involving a TBM turboprop in Montana, a Beechcraft King Air in Arizona, and other cases where night flying illusions and equipment failures played a decisive role. TBM Crash in Kalispell, MontanaRob begins with an August accident in Kalispell, Montana, where a TBM turboprop attempted to land at the city airport. Witnesses said the aircraft touched down near the approach end of the runway before veering into parked planes, sparking a fire. Incredibly, all four occupants survived with only minor injuries. Though details are still sparse, the incident highlights how quickly loss of control can occur even in a high-performance single-engine turboprop. Max and Rob stress that while the TBM is an advanced and capable aircraft, any landing can go wrong if the pilot mismanages energy or fails to stabilize the approach. This accident serves as a reminder that precision, discipline, and preparation remain critical during the landing phase, when the margin for error is smallest. King Air 300 Crash in Chinle, ArizonaThe hosts then turn to a tragic August 5th accident involving a Beechcraft King Air 300 on the Navajo Nation in eastern Arizona. The aircraft was inbound on a medical transport flight, but before picking up its patient it crashed near the single runway at Chinle Municipal Airport. All four aboard—two pilots and two healthcare providers—were killed. Conditions that day created a perfect storm: a density altitude of over 8,400 feet combined with gusty crosswinds approaching 28 knots, nearly 90 degrees to the runway. The demonstrated crosswind limit for the King Air 300 is 20 knots, but as Rob explains, that number is not a hard limitation—it simply reflects the strongest crosswind tested during certification. What really matters is pilot proficiency. The Chinle crash underscores the dangers of trying to land in challenging conditions when performance margins are already compromised by high elevation and high temperature. For many pilots, especially those not flying crosswind landings regularly, the combination can quickly exceed skill level and lead to loss of control. Cessna Conquest II Crash in OhioRob next covers a preliminary report on a Cessna Conquest II that departed Youngstown, Ohio, en route to Bozeman, Montana. Security video showed the aircraft lifting off after a normal ground roll, but instead of climbing, it leveled off at just 100 feet and maintained that altitude until impacting trees. Both engines were reportedly running, making the lack of climb especially puzzling. Witnesses described unusual engine sounds, but Max and Rob note that eyewitness accounts are often unreliable. The bigger mystery is why the pilot failed to climb, despite having ample power available. Possible scenarios include distraction, incapacitation, or improper handling of the aircraft. As Max points out, 80 percent of accidents are linked to human error, and this crash may ultimately fall into that category. Night Illusions and the Needles, California AccidentMax then shares insights into a a...

On this episode of NTSB News Talk, Max Trescott covers the third and final day of the NTSB’s investigative hearing into the January 2024 midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport between a PSA Airlines CRJ-700 and a U.S. Army UH-60L Black Hawk. Day 3 featured Panel 4: Collision Avoidance Technology and Panel 5: Safety Data and Safety Management Systems. The hearing opened with spatial disorientation testimony and interviews with Army pilots about Route 4 altitude protections they incorrectly believed would keep them clear of Runway 33 arrivals. NASA’s Dr. Stephen Casner explained that cockpit traffic displays can help pilots spot targets up to eight times faster than by visual scan alone. Experts detailed ADS-B system complexities — including the two incompatible broadcast frequencies (UAT and 1090ES) — and reviewed the limits of pre-ADS-B collision avoidance technology. The UH-60L Black Hawk lacks integrated traffic displays, relying instead on iPads with Stratus receivers, which Army policy prohibits the flying pilot from using. Portable ADS-B In devices provide only partial traffic pictures unless paired with ADS-B Out, limiting situational awareness. Discussions turned to TCAS: its nuisance alert problem, differences for helicopter operations, and why the CRJ-700 lacks a certified ADS-B In solution. The NTSB Chairwoman confronted the FAA over its 17-year refusal to mandate ADS-B In, despite repeated post-collision recommendations. The Army is now procuring 1,685 Stratus/iPad sets for priority units, but operational use will still be limited at low level. FAA data revealed 366 TCAS resolution advisories within 10 nm of DCA from 2023–2025. Testimony noted that crews involved in RAs are typically not notified unless a deviation occurs. Panelists debated safety culture, just culture, and leadership removals at DCA Tower after the accident. A controller supervisor described the pre-accident culture as “robust,” but post-accident changes removed key institutional knowledge. The hearing also exposed gaps in PSA pilot special-qualification training for DCA — including no information on helicopter routes or operations — and examined simulator results showing that circling to Runway 33 can double or triple pilot workload compared to a straight-in to Runway 1. Closing testimony on future ACAS XR technology indicated it could have alerted the Black Hawk crew 73 seconds before impact, with potential nationwide deployment by 2027. Max weaves these details into a narrative showing how technological shortfalls, flawed assumptions, procedural gaps, and cultural challenges all converged in this tragic midair — and what reforms could prevent a repeat. NTSB Docket on Reagan National midair collision Check out our other Aviation News Talk Network podcasts: UAV News Talk Podcast  Rotary Wing Show Podcast Aviation News Talk

Max Trescott plays audio clips from Day 2 of the NTSB investigative hearing on the midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport between a PSA Airlines CRJ-700 and a U.S. Army UH-60L Black Hawk. This day focused exclusively on Panel 3: Training, Guidance, and Procedures Applicable to DCA Air Traffic Control, revealing systemic issues that shaped the events leading to the accident. A major theme was visual separation. Testimony explored the difference between pilot-applied and tower-applied visual separation in Class B airspace and the operational norm at DCA where helicopter pilots almost reflexively request pilot-applied visual separation. Experts explained how the unique combination of restricted airspace, helicopter routes, and runway configurations makes visual separation “paramount” for traffic flow, though it shifts collision avoidance responsibility to pilots. A U.S. Army pilot described the difficulty of spotting Runway 33 arrivals at low altitude, highlighting how these challenges contributed to the accident sequence. Staffing emerged as a critical factor. The DCA tower had 19 fully operational controllers to cover 16 shifts a day, forcing position combinations such as merging tower and helicopter frequencies. Witnesses described high workload and a culture summed up by the phrase “just make it work,” raising questions about whether safety margins were being eroded. A management-level request to reduce arrival rates from 32 to 28 per hour due to safety concerns was denied, reportedly over political timing related to FAA reauthorization. The hearing also examined miles-in-trail spacing, revealing inconsistent agreements between Potomac TRACON and DCA Tower and noting that arrivals were being fed at less than four miles apart before the accident. Conflict alert systems were scrutinized, with testimony that up to 50% of alerts are “nuisance alerts,” that could lead to controller desensitization. The Black Hawk’s lack of ADS-B Out was discussed, though radar coverage mitigated its effect on conflict alerting in this case. Additional revelations included confusion over helicopter route altitudes, the tower’s downgrade from Level 10 to Level 9 (which resulted in new controllers being paid at a lower level than existing controllers), and an external compliance audit that found 33 areas of non-compliance—so severe the audit was halted and converted into an internal corrective action. The episode also covers the failure to conduct alcohol testing at all of controllers after the accident, contrary to the DOT’s two-hour requirement. Max weaves over an hour of testimony into a narrative that exposes the intersection of human factors, training gaps, and systemic pressures inside one of the nation’s most complex airspace environments. The episode underscores how a combination of cultural norms, operational constraints, and safety oversight gaps set the stage for this tragic collision—and what must change to prevent future accidents. NTSB Docket on Reagan National midair collision Check out our other Aviation News Talk Network podcasts: UAV News Talk Podcast  Rotary Wing Show Podcast Aviation News Talk