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Today's daf is sponsored by Meryl and Harold Sasnowitz in loving memory of their mothers, Malka bat Chaya Etle & Mordechai, and Toby Raizel bat Rechel & Tzvi whose yahrzeits both fall on 16 Adar. "They left a legacy of Yiddishkite that has grown through multiple generations."  Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether one can keep impure truma wine in one's house to be used over time for creating a good smell in the house (ziluf) or does one need to be concerned that it may cause transgression as one may forget that the wine is impure and may drink it. Rabbi Yishamel son of Rabbi Yosi suggests a compromise approach, however, others did not like the suggestion. If honey is dripping from a vessel and the honey owner promises the wine owner that if he/she spills the wine, the honey owner will compensate him/her for the loss of wine, then the honey owner must pay. However, from a different braita it seems that one can claim, "I never really meant what I said, I was just fooling with you." How is this resolved? Why does the Mishna not only bring a case of honey/wine but also a case with two people who each have a donkey (one worth more than the other) that gets swept away by a river and one asks the other to save his/hers instead of saving their own donkey? Two questions are asked about variations on the donkey case. What if one saves the other donkey and is promised to be compensated for his/her donkey but then their donkey comes out of the river on its own - do they still receive compensation as promised? What if one tries to save the donkey but is unsuccessful? The Tosefta Bava Metzia 7:7 is quoted where there are several cases of distribution of expenditures for a group of people traveling together if for example robbers come or if they need to hire someone for the group. What are the criteria used for determining the method of dividing? The Tosefta continues with a case of people on a boat that is beginning to sink - how do they determine how much each person needs to throw off the boat to save themselves? If one steals a field and then gives it to thugs who come to seize property, does the thief need to return the land or can he/she say to the owner, "Go get it from the thugs?" On what does it depend?

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her mother, Carolyn Barnett-Goldstein, on her 5th yahrzeit. "She was passionately dedicated to the Jewish People and the arts. We miss her larger-than-life presence every day, and struggle to understand that she is gone." Today's daf is sponsored by Abby Flamholz’s daughter-in-law, Sigal Spitzer Flamholz and her two granddaughters Nitzan and Orlie Flamholz in honor of Abby's birthday. "Thanks for paving the way for Talmud Torah in our family!" If one recognizes items belonging to them in someone's house and the owner of the house claims they purchased them, the owner of the house takes an oath about the purchase price and returns the item to the original owner for the value of the item. But this is only if it is known that the person was robbed. If not, there is a concern that the claimant sold the item and now regrets the sale and wants the item back. The Gemara asks why knowing the person was robbed is enough to allay the fear that they are just trying to renege on a sale? Rav explains that there needs to be some sort of circumstantial evidence that the item in question was stolen. If a thief sells a stolen item, can the one who was robbed demand the item back from the buyer or only from the thief? Rav and Rabbi Yochanan disagree. Four explanations are brought to explain the basis of their debate. The rabbis instituted takanat hashuk to protect buyers. The takana is that if someone claims that the item is theirs, they can take it back but they need to reimburse the buyer the amount that they paid so that the buyer does not need to find the thief who sold him/her the item. In what cases does the takana apply/not apply? If two people are walking and one has honey in a jar that is breaking, and the other has wine (less expensive than honey) and the wine owner dumps the wine to help save the honey, what compensation does the wine owner receive? The Gemara questions why we do not assume that the honey was already hefker (ownerless) as the owner knew it would be gone in a minute and gave up ownership of it in which case it can be considered acquired by the wine owner, as can be inferred from braita? to resolve this, they limit the case in the Mishna. The Gemara then questions the halakha in the braita based on a different braita which seems to contradict. How are they reconciled?

Today's daf is sponsored by Amy Goldstein in loving memory of her grandmother, Ann Barnett, on her 13th yahrzeit. "She was dedicated to the Jewish People and was a lifelong Zionist, and we miss her every day."  Rava brings another law that relates to non-Jewish courts - a Jew cannot testify about a monetary case against a Jew if the court accepts the testimony of one witness as that is against Jewish law. One who does this is excommunicated. One is also excommunicated for selling a property to a gentile if it borders on the property of a Jew. For what reason is this prohibited? The Mishna says if someone steals and gives you a different item in return, or if a tax collector seized an item and replaced it with another, one can keep the item as one can assume that the original owner despaired of ever getting it back (had ye'ush), as ye'ush with a change of domain (shinui reshut) is effective to make one the owner of the item. But in other cases, the Mishna mentions that only if we know the owner despaired, then the item is acquired. How can we reconcile the difference between these two lines in the Mishna? The Mishna doesn't distinguish between genieva and gezeila and it can be derived from the first line in the Mishna that if we don't know that the owners despaired, we assume they have, in either case. This (and a braita) seem to contradict Raba's reading of a different argument in Masechet Keilim between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis who each think that there is reason to distinguish between genieva and gezeila in this issue (each in a different way). Various answers are brought, among them they introduce a new opinion of Rebbi who equates the genieva and gezeila. Does Rebbi hold that they are the same regarding ye'ush and follow Rabbi Shimon's view on gezeila or the rabbis' opinion? The two sources brought before (our Mishna and the braita) are brought to answer the question but are rejected. A third source is brought where it proves that Rebbi holds that genieva and gezeila have the same law - like gezeila according to Rabbi Shimon and we can assume the owner despaired. A woman and minor are believed to testify about who is the owner of a swarm of bees. However, this is limited to the case where they did not testify in court but mentioned it in the context of a conversation (mesiach lefi tumo). When else can people be believed when saying something in the context of a conversation? 

Today's daf is sponsored by Sylvia Klein in loving memory of Marion Pickens. "Marion is the beloved mother of my friend, Pamela Elisheva. She was committed to education, she instilled a love of learning in her daughter. May her memory be a blessing." Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the birth of a grandson to our friend and co-learner Malkie Klein. "May the entire family enjoy great נחת as he grows לתורה ולחופה ולמעשים טובים, emulating your love of learning, passion for equity and care and concern for all" When a subpoena is sent with a woman or neighbor, under what circumstances, can we assume they relayed the message? In what cases can we not assume that the subpoena was delivered as there is reason to believe they did not think they were being relied on? This would affect whether or not we can excommunicate the person subpoenaed if he/she does not show up to court. There are certain times of year and times of the week when people are busy and therefore shouldn't be subpoenaed to court. The next mishna deals with things one should avoid doing with non-Jewish tax collectors who were suspected of having stolen money from others. When questioned by Shmuel's statement dina d'malchuta dina, the law of the land is the law, the rabbis differentiate between tax collectors who collect by law and those who work independently of the government or are known to collect more than they are supposed to. Another case is brought which leads to the question of whether stealing from a non-Jew is considered stealing or not. One source says it is forbidden while another says it is forbidden on account of kiddush Hashem, indicating that it is permitted by the letter of the law. How are these two sources reconciled? Rabbi Shimon Chasida said that stealing from a gentile is forbidden but there is no obligation to return a lost item to a gentile. Rav Huna and Rav bring sources from the Torah to support these rulings. Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair says that Jews are obligated to return lost items of gentiles if by refraining from doing so, there will be a chilul Hashem. If one makes a mistake in paying a Gentile, one does not need to correct the mistake. Rava makes several statements regarding Gentiles and tax collectors. The first proves Shmuel's statement of dina d'malchuta dina from the fact that we are allowed to benefit from bridges built with tax money. Abaye argues with this proof. Some of the others relate to cases where gentiles collect from one person the portion of the other - in what circumstances is this not considered theft?

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the engagement to Shai Laniado, son of our friend and co-learner Sami Groff,  to Lily Snyder. "May the home that they build together be filled with the passion for truth, clarity and equity and love for the Jewish nation that you model for all of us!" Today's daf is sponsored by Avi Jencmen in loving memory of Menachem ben Tzvi haCohen. Rami bar Hama holds that orphans are considered like purchasers. Was his statement derived from our Mishna or from a braita on a different issue - interest that a father collected and then passed on through inheritance to his children? What is the relevance of whether it was derived from our Mishna or the braita? The Gemara quotes two other braitot regarding stolen items consumed by a third party or passed on through inheritance. According to these braitot, do we distinguish between younger/older children? Are the older children believed if they claim they are certain the father returned the item? If a man borrows an item and then dies and the children use the item, what is their level of responsibility? What if they did not realize it was a borrowed item and consumed it? How does it affect the situation if the father leaves them land as inheritance? Do Rava and Rav Papa disagree about this case? Rav Papa's approach is premised on the understanding that a borrower takes on responsibility for accidents from the moment the accident happens, not from the moment the borrower borrows the item. According to some, Rava holds that it begins the moment the borrower borrows the item. Sumchus and the rabbis debate whether or not minors can be brought to court. Rabbi Yirmia has an issue with property rights to land of his father-in-law that he claimed was given to him but the orphans claimed they inherited it from their father (Rabbi Yirmia's father-in-law. Rabbi Avin was unsure about whether the case could be judged as the children were minors. Rabbi Avahu brought proof from a different situation where they ruled against minors, but the Gemara rejected the comparison. Can testimony be accepted without the presence of the litigant? What about the ratification of documents? Different opinions about the matter are mentioned and the amoraim explain the circumstances under which one can have a court session without the other side present.

Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the marriage of the granddaughter of our friend and co-learner Rookie Billet. "As the new couple builds their בית נאמן בישראל, continuing the paradigm that you and Rabbi Heshie have established, we are certain that they will be a source of nachat to you, your family and the Jewish nation." When someone steals from a convert who then dies, if the thief wants to repent, he/she must pay the principal, one-fifth and bring a sacrifice. All are given to the family of kohanim working at the Temple on the week that the thief comes to bring the sacrifice. The principal must be paid before the sacrifice. What if the money and the sacrifice are brought to two different families of kohanim on two different weeks? If they were brought the same week but one to a family who was not serving, one is penalized and needs to give the item received to the other - who is penalized and why? This is a subject of debate among Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis. The guilt offering brought after stealing is compared to the guilt offering brought for meila - misuse of consecrated property. Three braitot each quote Rebbi (Rabbi Yehuda haNasi) explaining Rabbi Yehuda's position in particular cases. The Gemara helps to better understand each braita. The tenth chapter starts with a discussion of someone who eats the stolen item from the thief or passes it on by inheritance to the heirs - can the owner demand the money back from the one who consumed it or the heirs, or only from the thief? The Mishna rules that the owner cannot demand it from a third party. Rav Chisda holds that it depends on whether or not the owner has given up on getting his item back (ye'ush). In the case where there was ye'ush, the owner cannot demand it from the one who consumed it as the combination of the owner's ye'ush and passing it on to someone else allows it to change ownership and therefore the original owner has no claim with the third party - he/she can only claim it from the thief. But if the original owner has not given up, then the one who consumed is considered as if he/she stole it from the original owner as it was still in the owner's possession at the time of consumption. He understands that the Mishna must be referring to a case where there was ye'ush. Are heirs viewed as buyers (meaning that when the item passes to them, it is considered moving into another's domain) or not? Rami bar Hama and Rava disagree about this which leads them to a disagreement about how to understand the case in the Mishna regarding the heirs.

Study Guide Bava Kamma 110 Today's daf is sponsored by Mona Fishbane in loving memory of her beloved daughter-in-law, Leah Levitz Fishbane, Leah Gavriella bat Yaakov v'Etta Beya. "Leah was a beautiful neshama. May her memory be a blessing." A kohen can choose to bring a sacrifice (guilt or sin offering) when it is not his week to be on duty (mishmar) and the meat and hide will be for him, and not given to the kohanim working in the Temple that week. However, does a kohen have the right to choose that a particular kohen will do the sacrificing and receive the meat and hide or does it automatically get given to the kohanim on duty that week? On what does it depend? If one steals from a convert, and the convert dies, the thief returns the item to the kohanim working in the Temple that week when the thief brings the guilt offering. The money needs to be given before the guilt offering. What if the thief died before giving the money or after giving the money but before bringing the sacrifice, what happens to the money - does it go to the kohanim or is it given back to the heirs of the thief? Since the returning of the item (the principal) to the kohen is called by the Torah "an asham," a word that is also used in general to mean the guilt offering, there are various halachot that treat this payment with the same rules as the guilt offering. For example, it can't be paid at night just as sacrifices cannot be brought at night. Rava asks various questions about this comparison. Rava asks if the payment to the kohanim is viewed as an inheritance (as they are in place of the convert's inheritors) or as a gift? What are the ramifications of this question? They conclude that it is viewed as a gift.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Idana Goldberg and Michael Kellman in honor of the marriage of their daughter Noam to Avichai Klugerman last night in Israel. "May these two chayalim build a bayit neeman b'yisrael and may the zechut of our learning keep all the soldiers safe." If a shomer falsely claims an item was stolen or lost, what is the shomer responsible to pay if witnesses come and prove that the shomer lied? If the claim was theft, the thief pays a double payment, but if the claim was that the item was lost, just the principal is returned. If the shomer confesses, he/she pays the principal, adds one-fifth (chomesh) and brings a guilt offering. If a son steals from his father and then confesses after the father's death, he needs to return the item and the chomesh payment to the sons of his father or the father's brothers, but he cannot inherit it. However, if he has no money, he can borrow money to pay the heirs and the creditor can collect the loan from the estate, in which the thief is included. A similar solution is suggested when a father takes a vow not to allow his son to benefit from him in life and after death. Rav Yosef rules in the case of theft from a father, if there are no heirs, the son can give the money to charity. This statement assumes that there is no way to pardon the principal, as if there was, the son could pardon his own obligation to return the principal. However, a Mishna on Bava Kamma 103a explains that one can pardon the principal. Three possible answers are brought, connecting it with a debate between Rabbi Yosi haGalili and Rabbi Akiva regarding one who stole from a convert who then died without heirs. If one steals from a convert who has no heirs and denies the claim under oath, if the convert dies and then the thief confesses, the payment is given to the kohanim. From where do they derive that this law applies to female converts as well? Which kohanim receive it? It is given to the ones who are working in the Temple the week that the thief brings the guilt offering. If the thief is a kohen, they cannot take the lost item for themselves but must give it to the kohanim working in the Temple that week - from where is this derived?

Today's daf is sponsored by Yaffa Wenner in loving memory of her mom, Lea Steinlauf. "My mother enjoyed the pursuit of knowledge. She loved the challenge it presented. I think my learning Daf Yomi would make her smile and chuckle. How far we've come as women, in our journey."  Today’s daf is sponsored by Sylvia Klein in loving memory of her father, Sherman Israel Klein, Shnayor ben Yerachmiel v’Sara. “He loved learning, the Jewish people, Israel, and his family. Everything was “interesting” to him. We continue to learn from his example.”  Two questions are asked (one is answered, one is not) regarding the mechanism by which one may be obligated only in the double payment, canceling the one-fifth payment. Is it possible there could be situations where one could be obligated both? Can one person be obligated to pay the one-fifth payment twice on the same item? If a shomer chinam opts not to take an oath that the item was stolen and pays for it, the shomer gains the rights to the double payment if the robber is caught. However, there is a disagreement between Rava and Abaye regarding a case where the shomer first took an oath and then paid. What is the reason for each opinion and how does each prove his opinion from a Mishna in Bava Metzia 33b? If the shomer takes an oath, is the shomer still considered relevant to the case, and if the thief were to confess to the shomer, but deny the theft to the owner, and witnesses came, would the thief be exempt from the double payment on account of the confession to the shomer? On what does it depend? Other questions are raised about who is responsible for finding the thief if the shomer paid the owner for the value of the stolen item.

Study Guide Bava Kamma 107 Rabbi Chiya bar Abba's third statement in the name of Rabbi Yochanan is that one in not liable to payment for claiming an item one is watching is stolen unless there is a partial confession and partial denial (modeh b'miktzat). This is a subject of debate between him and Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef who holds that modeh b'miktzat is not relevant in this type of case - only in a loan. What is the logic behind his distinction? There is a three-way argument regarding the relationship between shlichut yad (where the shomer used the item he was watching) and the case where the shomer claims the item was stolen. If the shomer used the item and then claimed it was stolen, is he/she obligated in the double payment or do we say that first he/she was obligated for shlichut yad in which case he/she acquires the object and is now responsible even for accidental damage or do we say that the obligation for claiming it was stolen is only in a case where there is shlichut yad? Or possibly both are options. 

Study Guide Bava Kamma 106 Today's daf is sponsored by Judy Schwartz in loving memory of her parents, Yechezkel Shraga ben Yehuda Leib Halevi and Esther Tydor whose yahrzeit is 7 Adar, and Shirley K Tydor, Sara Reizel bat Mordechai Yitzchak and Freida Sima, whose yahrzeit was 23 Shevat. "They would have been thrilled to know their daughter and granddaughters learn daf yomi!"  Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of Gitta’s granddaughter, Esti Rosenberg engagement to Baruch Lapidus. "May the couple be blessed with a lifetime of good health, happiness and nachat." Today's daf is sponsored by the Tannenbaum family in loving memory of Miriam's father, -יעקב יצחק בן משה נחום הלוי ז"ל Jack Zemsky zl on his 20th yahrzeit tomorrow. "His life embodied a metaphoric reading of the pasuk, "ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים" He was one whose actions were infused with drawing closer to הקב"ה. His modeling of אהבת ה' & אהבת ישראל continue to inspire us יהי זכרו ברוך" Rav Sheshet holds that once one denies a claim regarding an item he/she was watching, he/she is considered a robber and is obligated to pay even for accidental damages, even if they didn't take an oath denying the claim. Rami bar Chama contradicts Rav Sheshet's opinion from a braita, but it is resolved. Another contradiction is brought from a halakha of Ilfa and is resolved in two possible ways. Rav learns from the verse "the owner takes and he doesn't need to pay" that once a shomer (or debtor) takes an oath, even if witnesses come and prove is was stolen, the shomer will no longer be exempt from payment. Three rabbis raise difficulties against this statement of Rav. The first two are resolved. As a result of the last difficulty, Rava qualifies Rav's statement and limits it to a case where the shomer claimed it was lost, and then swore and witnesses came to contradict the oath. Only in that case, is one exempt from payment. But in all other cases where the shomer came forward and admitted or in a case where the claim was that it was stolen and then witnesses came, he/she would be obligated to pay as the verses in the Torah clearly state that. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba states in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that if one claims an item they were watching was stolen and they also slaughtered it, they would also be liable to pay the four/five payment. They raise difficulties with this opinion but resolve it. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba states in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that if one claims an item that one found was stolen from them, all the same laws apply as to a shomer. A difficulty is raised, but resolved in two ways. 

Today's daf is dedicated in memory of all the soldiers who were killed this week and for a refuah shleima to all those injured.  Two answers are given to resolve the contradiction between the inference from our Mishna and a braita about whether or not heirs need to pay the chomesh. Since the Mishna establishes that the obligation to return the item directly to its owner only applies when the item owed is more than a pruta, Rava explains the law in a case where the price drops in value, but raises a question in a case where the value of the items stolen was a pruta and but half were already returned and what is left is no longer a pruta. Two other similar-type questions are brought that Rava asked about the shaving of a nazir and laws of impurity. Rava also asks about chametz that was stolen before Pesach and at the time the robber swore falsely, it was already after Pesach and the item no longer had value. Do the laws of swearing falsely for theft apply since the chametz has potential value as it can cause a monetary obligation or do they not apply since the chametz now has no inherent value, as it is forbidden to benefit from? Raba thought there was an obvious answer - one is obligated because of its potential value as he proves from a different case. Rav Amram questions his answer from a braita and Raba answers it by distinguishing between the chametz case and the case in the braita. Some clarifications are made regarding some of the cases mentioned in the braita quoted by Rav Amram. Ben Azai talks about three types of false claims one can swear about in denying one knows testimony about a lost item. Rabbi Chanina and Shmuel understand this source differently. The root of their debate is connected to the ideas discussed previously about a claim that could lead to a potential financial loss and whether or not laws of false oath denying monetary claims apply to those cases as well. Rav Sheshet holds that once one denies a claim regarding an item he/she was watching, he/she is considered a robber and is obligated to pay even for accidental damages, even if they didn't take an oath denying the claim. Rav Sheshet brings a source to prove his claim, but it is rejected. Rami bar Chama raises a contradiction to Rav Sheshet's opinion from a braita, but it is resolved.