Advertise on podcast: This Means War

As the US mid-term elections approach, and Donald Trump's domestic approval ratings sit in the doldrums, Dr John Hemmings makes a timely intervention about what various futures might emerge and what they could mean for Allies. Because, as various world leaders from French President Emmanuel Macron to Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney have said, "There is no going back to the old alliance system that we once knew and understood." Is this simply pessimism for a world that is all about change? Is it just fatalism ro presume that a new balance of alliance membership is preordained to be a bad thing? Haven't we been through worse periods of alliance relationships across Cold War history – and emerged stronger for it? Worth getting your mind around potential future scenarios--short and long-term--before they are here. John certainly provides context and food for thought.

The charter for the Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank (DSRB) has been signed and founding members – notably including both Canada and Luxenberg – are piling on the pressure to start making funding available to member states, industrial primes, and commercial SMEs. According for Brigadier General (retired) Robbie Boyd, this is the best and most significant piece of innovation to have happened to deterrence in the least 45 years. The DSRB has become as political as it is economic and offers solution for like-minded democracies to make significant investments in hard power capabilities (like weapons and ammunition) that other financial institutions (like the European Investment Bank) will not allow. There aren't many places you hear a conversation about global financing of deterrence and defence in an accessible way. Robbie Boyd makes this deeply technical and fiduciary discussion digestible even to sailors.

The reticence of Western governments to use Land Forces on operations has been notable of late. Dr Jack Watling, from RUSI in London, talks through the reasons for this, the lessons from Ukraine (and whether these are different from lessons from other theatres), whether both the battlefield is transparent and if dispersion is helping, the strategies being employed by various belligerents, counter C2 warfare (with specific emphasis on the IDF experiences), logistics, the human requirement when technology becomes the driving force, and the reality of Ukrainian drone operations. What emerges from the discussion is that if you want assurance in reaching political goals when undertaking war, you must employ land forces – and you must have the scale to make them effective: doing it on the cheap or on a small scale (ie anything below Army Group) just won't cut it.

Despite all the diatribes written about the UK's 2026 Defence Investment Plan, the root of the issue wasn't identified; that the plan was about military hardware and not about the UK's National Security. Ewan Lawson talks about three aspects of the DIP that underline this. First, the UK's missile and air defence plans as an example of the military's attitude towards societal resilience and critical national infrastructure: Hybrid war is a Transition to War (in old money) and not a synonym for 'peace'. Second, the reality of cyber operations today; what has been learned from recent operations in terms of value-for-money (or not) that cyber provides as an exploitation or effect. Third, the worrying nature of the UK-US relationship (both militarily and politically) as it has degraded since 2001. The latter is vital for the UK's national security but it feels like there is a delusion in some areas that all is well, when patently it isn't.

The parliamentary committees responsible for scrutiny of the Ministry of Defence on behalf of society and tax-payers can't perform their roles effectively. Government departments, political and military leaders just don't seem to care: perhaps it is worse than that. According to Mike Martin, former military veteran and now Member of Parliament for Tunbridge Wells, they actively obfuscate and hinder scrutiny and proper governance. To provide the adequate governance and public assurance of the military and the department of state, select committees need teeth as well as a mouth with which to embarrass governments. Mike provides three suggestions for improvements, and a dose of reality on the scrutiny process.

How prepared are states for national emergencies and contingencies? Russian actions in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and the Baltic States have triggered a number of nations to re-energise their national resilience and preparedness planning moving from a 'Just-in-Time' to a 'Just-in-Case' mentality. In the UK, as pointed out by Lord Toby Harris (chair of the UK's National Preparedness Commission), the understanding of the risk by successive governments is high; their willingness to do anything about it is low. Investing in resilient infrastructure, meaningful engagement with businesses and third sector groups, and having honest conversations with the public just don't appear as coherent government actions. As Toby explains, this level of neglect is symptomatic of a much longer-term malaise: it is even embedded in the Treasury department's process for prioritising public investments. For over 20 years, Lord Harris has been chivvying and annoying successive British governments by raising preparedness and resilience as a topic that needs addressing. This episode gives a flavour of where the UK sits in being ready for the next national emergency.

If you think MDO is a prescription for how the US will fight, think again. Colonel (retired) Richard Creed, Director, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, explains how the concept has evolved since 2018 culminating in the publication of FM3-0 in 2025. Rich also explains how and why the NATO concept differs so much from the US one, and why the US can't simply make their doctrine into one for the Alliance. Covering the five approaches, the levels of applicability, and the command and control conundrum of MDO for the US Army, the conversation focuses on authorities and responsibilities as much as the philosophy of warfighting. Fascinating stuff.

A new book edited by Amos Fox and Franz Stefan Gady picks apart the concept of Multi Domain Operations in forensic detail. A collection of world class scholars and practitioners demystify the idea of MDO and airs just some of the key problems that lie within the 'Big Hand, Small Map' approach to military operations. From a lack of a theory of success, a failure to address tactical concerns, an agnostic view of adversaries, and some deep philosophical flaws, one wonders why Western leaders continue to be so besotted with MDO as a way of fighting. According to Amos and Franz: it just wont work.

Have Europeans become desensitized to Moscow's actions? 2025 saw Moscow fly armed drones into Poland; aerial incursions in Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Germany, and The Netherlands; seaborne and subsurface reconnaissance and attacks on the seabeds of the Atlantic Ocean, North, Baltic, and Norwegian seas; numerous incidents of water poisoning in Germany; parcel bombs being sent through the courier system; propaganda, cyber, information attacks and disinformation campaigns across European outlets; armed military personnel crossing Europe's borders; power outages across European countries; and political interference in most elections. President Putin has been orchestrating campaigns of sabotage, subversion, and attacks on most European states for 12 months (and hence attacks against the global economy), as well as continuing his long conventional military campaign that seeks the end of Ukraine as a country. According to Keir Giles we can expect more of the same in 2026.

How do defence companies fund growth when the orders from politicians have been promised but the cash isn't forthcoming? Want to build a new factory to double Europe's 155mm ammo production, or tank fleet, or - heavens forbid - drones? Great - but where does the money come from for the infrastructure? Why don't existing MFIs across Europe fill that space? And what might a dedicated defence, security, and resilience offer governments as well as industry? Former Brigadier General Robbie Boyd, now on the Senior Leadership team for the development of the new DSR Bank, explains all. This episode allows those in the national security community who don't have a deep understanding of the financial sector to understand the potential offered by a dedicated banking organisation for defence. Building off the ideas of a NATO bank, and linked directly to the rebuilding of NATO's failed deterrence posture, the DSR bank feels a bit like a game-changer.

A long held military truism is about commanding the high ground in any fight: often regarded as a precursor to victory. In the days of digital evangelism, much is made of this tenet in a metaphorical sense: there are claims that controlling the digital high ground will guarantee success. But warfare continues to require operating and fighting in physical terrain. In recent conflicts, few forces have been able to avoid fighting in mountains: the prevailing forces usually exploit mountains as the literal high ground. In the Kargil War, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and in Ukraine, as well as in resistance operations by the Kurds, mountain warfare has been a significant feature in fighting. Mountain warfare involves mobility (skiing, snowshoeing, dogs, mules, sledges, et al), mountaineering (ascending, roped or free climbing, traverses, rappelling, etc), cold weather survival (including avalanche preparation), and operating at height. It is also warfare: the requirements are not simply surviving and operating in cold weather or high environments but to contest, challenge, and fight in these conditions. Warfare in such environments cannot simply be bases and patrols, they do (and will continue to) entail combat operations. The history of human conflict does indeed demonstrate the advantages in controlling the high ground. The literal high ground. The realities of mountain and cold weather warfare – and the C2 element of that – cannot be escaped. Which is why so many states retain trained, equipped, and specialist formations to perform this task. They are not simply specialist light infantry: they offer skills that enable success in the extreme terrains. Lance Blythe talks about his new(ish) book, Ski, Climb, Fight: The 10th Mountain Division and the Rise of Mountain Warfare.

The disorderly arrival of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to the battlefield foretells of what is to come. The similarities to the hype around cyber warfare in the 2010s is all too clear. Yet the promise of profound change to warfare because of AI (and autonomy) is to be found everywhere. What is the reality? What will battlefields feel like? When will AI (in all its forms) arrive)? How do we know it will work as promised? What guarantees are there? Who checks the delivery? How can we derisk some of the (existential) threats that AI poses? Who is leading, and who is in charge? Rob Wilson, defence tech guru, addresses just some of these issues. We end up cracking open a can of worms, or perhaps Pandora's box.

That the military is subordinate to political (civil) authority seems like a no brainer. Headlines are made when challenges to this norm occur (see Trump 47 as an example), but those challenges have been more frequent and more dangerous in American history. Indeed, General Washington's principles of military subordination have had a myriad of challengers over the last 250 years: but the institutions have come through and self-corrected where necessary. In talking about her new book "The State and The Soldier", Kori Schake provides a quite excellent riposte to Samual Huntington's essay "The Soldier and The State". Her analysis of US civil-military relations since the Founding Fathers is a compelling read, and one that should be required reading (especially for those prone to over-excitement and clickbait headlines).

In military circles, training can mean all things to different groups. Some think it is for making friends and building partnerships. Other parts of the national security community think it is for validation of value-for-money; other parts consider it an assurance exercise. Even within the military, training gets a bum rap: being seen as either a waste of time, or a rare moment to escape barracks or dockyard hassle (or HQ long screwdrivers) and get away from it all. There is also a significant proportion of HQ staff – especially those in strategic level HQs – who think it is a waste of cash: something European militaries have been short of for decades. Perhaps this is the reason that training budgets often get hit to pay for shiny new kit that promises much but has less utility than might be expected. Yet for adversaries, the amount a military train sums up its credibility. Smart intelligence officials can make correlations between the amount of time that units regularly spend training with the credibility, lethality and readiness of their forces. If an adversary trains more, you need to at least match that in order to prevail in a conflict: any conflict. When building training events for contemporary militaries, leaders now need to tackle both the problem of smaller forces – doing by the same commitments as their predecessors – and a wider array of skills across the combat echelon. All this makes time for training the most precious resource a military force has. In recovering from campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the British Army recognised that something was not right with it's training: it simply wasn't getting what it needed from Cold war scripts and training design. So it started from scratch. Major General Chris Barry is the man who changed it: and who is leading delivery of the new Land Training System. I went down to his HQ at Warminster for a chat.

The was much to like about the 2025 UK SDR: an uncomfortable but honest diagnosis of the state of Britain's military; a characterisation of the world order and future threats; and a vigour to addressing the challenges. Professor Paul Cornish from the University Of Exeter's Centre for the Public Understanding of Defence and Security picks apart the issues in the document, as well as what was not in it. If 'Who was it for?' is perhaps the most revealing question and answer, then 'So what will Allies and adversaries make of it?' is the most worrying aspect. For those who think Paul and the team at CPUDS couldn't do better, the link below takes you to a series of essays that articulates a different take on the challenges and responses written over a couple of weeks during the Winter of 2024/2025. Writing a defence review is tough but not impossible. https://paulcornish.substack.com/p/uk-strategic-defence?utm_campaign=reaction&utm_medium=email&utm_source=substack&utm_content=post